Occasional Papers I

"Fingerprints on History"

The NATO Memoirs of Theodore C. Achilles

Edited by
Lawrence S. Kaplan and
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Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and
European Community Studies
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

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LYMAN L. LEMNITZER CENTER FOR NATO AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

The Kent State University Center for NATO Studies was established in 1979 to provide an institutional setting for the scholarly examination of the historical, political, cultural, and military experience of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In April 1982 the center was formally named after General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1963-1969. A decision was made in 1991 to expand the mission of the center to include an emphasis on the European Community.

The activities of the Lemnitzer center are devoted to the expansion and dissemination of scholarly knowledge about NATO, the European Community, and associated European-American issues. The center organizes lectures and conferences that are open to the general public. Scholarly meetings sponsored or cosponsored by the Lemnitzer Center have resulted in nine books. Additionally, the center is a repository for literature related to NATO and European Community subjects, and it encourages the development of specialized undergraduate and graduate courses to supplement already-established curricula within the university.

Published by the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Community Studies, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, 1992.

First published 1992
Printed and bound in the United States of America

ISBN: 1-882160-00-2

INTRODUCTION

It is not unusual for senior diplomats to record the highlights of their service. Their careers often touch upon great events in a nation's history, particularly if their service is long, varied, and distinguished. Theodore C. Achilles' service fits each of these categories.

When Theodore Achilles gathered his thoughts and observations more than twenty years ago in a personal history for the benefit of his family, he was not consciously writing for a wider public. But he knew that the highlight of his career, the framing of the North Atlantic Treaty, was also a turning point in American history. Consequently, we suspect that he would not have been surprised to learn that his memoirs have value for historians. In fact, important parts of his recollections have appeared in an oral history interview conducted by Richard McKinzie for the Harry S. Truman Library. Readers of that interview will recall his humor and modesty, reflected in the title that he gave his memoirs, "How Little Wisdom: Memoirs of an Irresponsible Memory." The title was drawn from Solon's commentary: "My son, you would be amazed if you knew with how little wisdom this world is governed."

As editors we have culled the years of his service to the Atlantic Alliance from over 900 pages of manuscript. It seemed fitting that the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Community Studies inaugurate its new Occasional Papers Series with the Achilles memoir. We enjoyed the cooperation of the Achilles family in helping to make this project possible. We also have been the beneficiary of the Atlantic Council's initiative in depositing a copy of the manuscript with the Lemnitzer Center. Our thanks, too, to S. Victor Papacosma, editor of the series and director-designate of the Lemnitzer Center and to Mark R. Rubin, director of the Center for International and Comparative Programs. Ruth Young once again served as wise adviser to the editors. Special thanks also to Robert P. Batchelor for his assistance in editing.

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While the career of Theodore Achilles had taken him to the Far East and to Latin America, his most exciting years were not as a journalist in Japan or ambassador to Peru but as a middle echelon official in Washington, London, Brussels, and Paris during the creation and formative years of the Atlantic Alliance. It was no coincidence that upon his retirement from government service in 1962 he spent the last years of his life promoting the organization as founding editor of the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, as vice chairman of the Atlantic Council in Washington, and as member of the board of directors of the Atlantic Institute. While he initially intended his thoughts to be a personal bequest to his children and descendants, he was aware that his life was

intertwined with a critical moment in American history. He was hopeful too that he "left at least a few fingerprints on history." As this memoir shows, he was correct in his judgment.

The creation of an entangling alliance with eleven other nations, ten of them European, represented an overturn of a 149-year-old American tradition of nonentanglement with Europe. The trauma of that remarkable change in the direction of American foreign relations was recognized in John D. Hickerson's exclamation to Achilles that "entangling alliances have been considered worse than original sin since George Washington's time." Nonetheless, Hickerson, director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs, charged him with the assignment of fashioning just such an entangling alliance.

As director of Western European Affairs in the Department of State in 1947, as vice deputy of the North Atlantic Council in London in 1950, and as minister in Paris in 1952, Achilles was to spend the critical early years of NATO behind-the-scenes in a policy-influencing position. He knew more of the inner workings of alliance making than the more senior diplomatists who signed treaties and agreements. As he pointed out in his memoirs, he was "to learn in due course that practically everything accomplished through an international organization is accomplished not in meetings but in the delegates' lounge, over coffee, tea, martinis, whiskey, or vodka." What he witnessed and what he contributed behind closed doors is worthy of the attention of historians in the future.

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Achilles' background provided an appropriate foundation for life in the Foreign Service. Prior to his entry in 1931, he had lived as a child in France and Germany before World War I, and had traveled widely with his mother throughout Europe. He traveled widely too in the United States as a youth, living his adolescent years in such places as Boston, New Haven, New York, Hawaii, and finally in California. It was not surprising that, while traveling in Europe between his sophomore and junior years in college, he discovered the calling he was to take up some years later. On that occasion he inadvertently found an envelope in his room at the Hôtel de la Paix in Geneva addressed to the Hungarian delegate to the League of Nations. In it was the day's printed agenda for the League of Nations Assembly. The information inspired young Achilles to put on a dark suit, hire a limousine, and pass himself off as a delegate at the assembly meeting. The year was 1923, and on that day he mingled for a few moments in the delegates' lounge with the likes of Aristide Briand, Gustav Stresemann, Joseph Pilsudski, and other luminaries of the time. He remembered it as a thrilling quarter of an hour, claiming that it made the Foreign Service his destiny--albeit not an immediate destiny. When he met his uncle, George Carter, a former governor of Hawaii, in Paris a week later, his passion was temporarily cooled by the comment: "Don't be a damn fool. If you want to be a minister or ambassador, don't go into the diplomatic service--stay home and go into politics. You'll get there a lot quicker." Achilles granted that his uncle was right, but with some detours he stuck by his impulse, and never regretted it.

His peripatetic youth, which found him in schools from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts as well as the Hawaiian Islands, did not equip him with all the tools of college preparation. Family tradition would have placed him at Yale where his older brothers had attended, but going to Yale would have meant leaving behind in California an aging mother to whom he was devoted. Stanford offered an appropriate compromise,

and a satisfactory one. He claimed that whatever he learned there was "coincidental," and perhaps incidental to the good times of college life of the 1920s. His variety of courses in the liberal arts, particularly his major in philosophy, provided a useful preparation for the life of the diplomat as generalist. Probably the most significant event of his college years was his aforementioned trip abroad in 1923 where, as he wrote, "for the first time I realized the richness of what Europe had to offer."

One consequence of an unfocused undergraduate education was graduation into the world in 1925 "without the slightest idea what I wanted to do." He filled the void, initially by revisiting Europe, and then spent two years at the Yale Drama School with thoughts of becoming a playwright. He projected that "plays were shorter than novels; ergo, they ought to be easier and quicker to write." They were not. He then had to conclude that he was too much like the person who began his play with "Scene: Carthage. Enter Hannibal riding on an elephant" and never could think of anything else to follow.

But if writing plays was not in Achilles' future, he still believed that some form of writing could be. Journalism attracted him. In 1928 he accepted an appointment as a correspondent for an English-language Japanese newspaper, thus combining his pleasure in travel with a chance to comment on the international scene. He was able to observe the Foreign Service in Tokyo firsthand without formally making a commitment to government service.

Life in Tokyo as a junior member of an English-language newspaper afforded many of the advantages that a life in the Foreign Service offered. He had access to information about the wider world and made acquaintance with key individuals in policy-making positions. In Japan he recalled the vice minister of foreign affairs telling him that the controversy in Japan over the Kellogg Pact of 1928 was a tempest in a teapot, and in the course of quoting him by name in his paper, he inadvertently caused the vice minister's resignation. In 1930, his comments on the London Naval Conference were printed with a byline in the *New York Sun*. Achilles cites both these incidents not as examples of brilliant reporting but as interesting incidents happening along the way. If his action resulted in the loss of a minister's job, it was because of inexperience, not design. Similarly, if his words were accepted by a New York newspaper it was, as he made clear, because he had taken them verbatim from the U.S. chargé at the embassy.

What these accounts, among many others, reveal is a lively personality with a self-deprecating recognition of his own frailties and a keen eye as well for the weaknesses of others. Modesty combined with wit fitted a personality that made friends easily. He had the social virtues of a sophisticated world traveler who was comfortable in any circle. Such qualities were appreciated. Over the years he acquired friendships that may have begun with family connections, but were maintained by the attractiveness of Achilles' personality. His contacts with government leaders were extensive. Before leaving Japan in 1931, he had developed a friendship with Ambassador William Castle, a descendant of one of the first American settlers in Hawaii and well known to Achilles' Hawaiian relatives. When he visited China on his way home, he received an audience with China's foreign minister who had been a Yale classmate of one of his brothers.

Given his enjoyment in traveling abroad, his ease in meeting people, and his interest in international affairs, it was hardly surprising that he ignored his uncle's advice

and did indeed seek a career in the Foreign Service--whether or not he ever became an ambassador. As a result of his frequent social and professional interchanges with Foreign Service officers, he was impressed with their caliber. Moreover, he sensed that he could influence foreign affairs more effectively from the "inside" rather than by merely writing about them as an outsider. Subsequently, as he noted ruefully, he had occasion to question this judgment when writing dull official telegrams, remembering also the effect that top-flight newspapermen had upon the shaping of foreign affairs. Still, he had decided "that my interest in foreign affairs was incurable, that the U.S. Foreign Service consisted of as fine a group of men as one could find, and that the service was administered as fairly on a strictly merit basis as was humanly possible. I hold those opinions strongly today."

Achilles returned to Washington and entered the Foreign Service in 1931. While the life of an officer meant frequent shifts of scene--and Achilles' career was no exception--his emphasis might have been on the Far East. He had two such opportunities over the years. Before taking the examinations he called on William Castle, then undersecretary of state, who suggested that the Far Eastern Division needed someone with his experience and that there was even a vacancy at the time. Castle sent him over to Stanley Hornbeck who "looked me over and did not like what he saw." The feeling was mutual. Achilles referred to Hornbeck as "the comma-pinching chief of the division." Achilles noted that, if Hornbeck had approved, he would have had his career as a Far Eastern specialist cut short during the McCarthy era when "our Far Eastern experts were fired practically to a man." Years later after World War II, he was offered a choice of an assignment to Nanking as counselor or Shanghai as consul general. This time John Hickerson, his colleague and benefactor, intervened to place him as chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

Although Europe was destined to be the center of his concern as diplomatist, the route to it was still circuitous. His first post in the service was to Cuba as vice consul in Havana in 1932. It was not a particularly happy assignment. The consul general was an "old-time martinet" who felt that the most important task a consul general had was personally "to count the petty cash and fee stamps at the end of each day." At this juncture Achilles claimed that he had two long-range ambitions--one to be undersecretary of state, the other to be a member of the Alibi Club, a Washington men's club. He also had "two intermediate range ambitions--one to be counselor of the embassy, the other to be a second secretary on the way." He never became an undersecretary, but he did become a member of the Alibi Club. Nor did he ever hold the rank of counselor of the embassy, or second secretary. But twenty-four years later he would leap over those two positions to become ambassador to Peru from 1956 to 1960.

While the post of ambassador may be the summit of most diplomats' ambitions, it was not the personal high point of Ted Achilles' long career. Rather it was his association with European affairs in the intervening years that claimed his interest and his devotion. He did not stay long in Cuba, and was not to return to Latin America until his appointment to Peru. In the interval he served from 1933 until his assignment as director of Western European Affairs in positions that created an impressive infrastructure for his service as one of the major American architects of the Atlantic Alliance.

Rome in 1933 became his first European post after Havana, but en route to Italy he was dispatched as an aide to Raymond Moley, head of the U.S. delegation to the London Economic Conference. This proved to be a sobering experience in which his unhappiness over the course of American monetary policy would be matched by disillusion over his encounters with Moley. He claimed that he learned a lesson in London: "'great' or at least much publicized political figures are no more able than anyone else." This initiation into high policy did not diminish the excitement he found on being on the scene in Italy as Mussolini prepared his invasion of Ethiopia, or his satisfaction in being reassigned back to Washington to the Western European desk in 1935, with special responsibility for League of Nations affairs. In retrospect, it was the visit to Geneva and the delegates' lounge in 1923 that first set him on the road to a life in the Foreign Service and his return to Washington in 1935 that placed him in a close relationship with Jack Hickerson, his future partner in NATO affairs.

At the end of the 1930s and when World War II began he was in London, attached to the U.S. Embassy as secretary of an intergovernmental committee on refugees. The coming of war posed no surprise for him. He traced its origins to the failure of the West to stand up to the Fascists. The League of Nation's effective demise was due, he was convinced, to its failure to meet the challenge of the Ethiopian war in 1935. As early as 1937 Achilles had written a long memorandum to this effect for general distribution in the department. It was undoubtedly Achilles' concern over the survival of Britain and the dangers from Nazi Germany that led him to celebrate, along with other members of the embassy staff, when Ambassador Joseph Kennedy resigned in November 1940. Kennedy, he observed, "did not care for the war, let alone the blitz. He was sure that it was only a matter of time before Hitler won."

During the war years in London Achilles forged bonds with European statesmen in his capacity as liaison with governments-in-exile. Lasting friendships developed with such figures as Trygve Lie of Norway, subsequently the first secretary-general of the United Nations, Eelco van Kleffens of the Netherlands, and Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium that later smoothed the way in negotiations over the North Atlantic Treaty when Spaak and van Kleffens were then leading spokesmen for their respective governments. His associations with European leaders continued when he returned in 1944 to Washington as assistant chief of the British Commonwealth Division of the Office of European Affairs (OEA) under Hickerson. When Hickerson became deputy director of the OEA, Achilles replaced him as chief of the division in 1945. Achilles was obviously not at the highest level of operations during World War II, but his close personal relations with Ambassador John Winant, Kennedy's successor at the Court of St. James, and his even older ties with Roger Makins, later Lord Sherfield, the senior minister at the British Embassy and a friend from his years in Japan, nonetheless offered him a perspective on American foreign policy that his rank might not otherwise have afforded him. Intimate knowledge of the fast-breaking events of the day also was the byproduct of his continuing role in the British Commonwealth office.

In the midst of these activities Achilles had occasion to listen to a speech by Clarence Streit, author of an influential book, *Union Now* (1939), advocating a federal union of Western democracies. He recalled:

> That evening had a profound effect on my life and, insofar as I have been able to be of any help, some effect on the course of history. I didn't realize it at the time; in fact I slept through most of Streit's talk and Mrs. Morehead had to poke me awake. However, I absorbed enough for it to germinate in my mind and inspire me, when the time came a few years later, to labor mightily to negotiate and secure conclusion and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and still later for the development of the Atlantic community, hopefully to become full federal union some day.

There is little exaggeration in this recollection. Achilles was already inclined toward service in the development of a new world order that would arise from the ashes of Europe. His recognition of America's contribution, potential and actual, to the building of a new system, made his transition to a devotee of an Atlantic community a natural progression. While he would not always follow Streit's path, Achilles' pursuit of an Atlantic model, rather than a European union, reflected Streit's influence throughout his life.

The need for something more than a world community of sovereign nations was made all the clearer by the fate of the new United Nations. An active member of the State Department's team at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, he was an on-site observer of Secretary of State Edward Stettinius' disabilities. ("Before the conference was over we . . . decided that Stettinius couldn't read. We would have his important statements typed in large type on cards and emphasize that he must not change a word but he would often disregard them and go off on his own.") He was also witness to and participant in the deal-making, arm-twisting, and ultimate compromises that would hobble the effectiveness of the United Nations from the start.

His four-year stint in Washington having expired in 1945, Achilles next had the opportunity of going to Moscow as first secretary, at the request of the old Russia hand, Charles Bohlen. But when Hickerson wanted him to return to London to negotiate a lend-lease settlement, Achilles had few hesitations about accepting the assignment at the rank of first secretary, bypassing the rank of second secretary. Between participating in the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London a month after V-J Day and his stay in Brussels and Paris as political adviser to the U.S. representative on the Military Committee of the Peace Conference, he came to a full recognition of the differences between the Soviet Union and the West. The need for Western resistance to communist pressures seemed never greater than in 1946 and 1947. The answer lay in a new organization of Western powers, a transformation of the Streit vision into reality.

At this juncture in his career he was catapulted into a position where he could be an actor on the international stage, if not in the leading role, at least in a vital character part. While the department was offering him a choice between a post in Nanking and one in Shanghai, Hickerson intervened once again as a deus ex machina. Achilles returned to Washington as chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to serve under Hickerson, now director of the Office of European Affairs. Together Hickerson and Achilles comprised a team that helped mold the Atlantic Alliance. Achilles wondered "what the rest of my career might have been like had I gone to either

post, but the next three years as chief of the WE changed not only my career but the rest of my life."

Reflecting later on his many assignments, Achilles spoke of the personal pleasure he derived from his work. He enjoyed being "in the center of things" and of helping to determine policy, "even if only in a very minor way." Much as he savored the privileges of ambassadorial life in later years, he concluded that the real satisfaction came in the contribution made by lower-level diplomats, something too often unrecognized outside the department. "It is the lowly desk officer who drafts the telegram expressing the policy." Although it may be altered by more senior officers subsequently, it is the desk officer "who basically set the course and in most cases what he initiated goes, in some form, even if considerably modified. That's why being in the department is fun."

There is no doubt that this is how he perceived his work in the making of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was fun. But it was also a mission. The Atlantic "ideal" became a lifelong goal, something that he worked for both in government and later out of government. By comparison, his service as ambassador to Peru proved to be of far less importance and in some respects far less exciting. That the middle-level officer made a difference in the outcome of the treaty has never been made clearer than in his unbuttoned account of what went on behind closed doors. Within a short time, most of the members of the Working Group became a "band of brothers." This international band of middle and lower level diplomats filled in details for the Ambassadors' Committee. From July to September 1948 in rooms without air conditioning, these men in shirtsleeves were not only on first-name terms, they also shared the same beliefs in the future of their respective countries. If higher authority presented one of them with foolish or obstructive instructions, they would work together to get them changed: "If our instructions were sound and agreement could be reached, fine. If not, we'd work out something we all, or most of us, considered sound, and whoever had the instructions undertook to get them changed. It always worked, though sometimes it took time."

Achilles was generous in his estimates of contributions by associates. He gave credit that he might have reserved for himself to journalists who were the beneficiaries of his carefully arranged press leaks. As for his partner, he called the completed text a "one-man Hickerson treaty." In the case of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Republican chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Eightieth Congress, he praised the senator's bipartisan support of the treaty while recognizing Vandenberg's political concerns in 1948 as a potential Republican presidential nominee. Even in rebuking George Kennan for claiming too large a role in the Working Group, Achilles made a special note of Kennan's positive contribution to the wording of the treaty's critical Article 5.

Achilles was not devoid of prejudices, and he expressed his dislikes vigorously in this informal accounting. What is surprising in a memoir listing hundreds of people who touched his life and work is the relatively small number of enemies that he acquired or individuals whom he genuinely disliked. Many of the latter happened to be French. For a variety of reasons, France emerged the odd man out in the alliance and its representatives posed difficulties. At the end of his memoir he claimed that he had "never thoroughly disliked but a very few people," and he had a half dozen on his list. France's Hervé Alphand was one of them, but so were Joseph and Robert Kennedy.

There are also colleagues who were not on his short list of adversaries but with whom he had difficulties. A few blocked his path of advancement. Achilles' dislike of Ambassador Kennedy stemmed from memories of Kennedy's behavior in London, but also of his attitudes toward England and the war. When President John F. Kennedy rejected Achilles' nomination for the ambassadorships to Poland and Australia, it was without explanation--and without commentary by Achilles. But at other places in his memoirs he wondered if his dislike of the Kennedys, expressed in his declining without excuse invitations from the Kennedy family when he was chargé d'affaires in Paris, might have damaged his career. Disarmingly, he observed: "It would be nice to think that, had I known or even guessed that in five years Senator Kennedy would be president and hold my future career in his hands, I would still have declined. But I know I wouldn't have." Despite all his difficulties with the Kennedys, he had only words of admiration when the future president visited France and asked penetrating questions about French politics and economics.

Evidence from this memoir weighs against Achilles' implication that he was a trimmer, accommodating those in power or those with prospects for power. He emerged from the Working Group a true believer in the Atlantic community, and spent the rest of his life advancing its cause. In this sense his ambassadorship to Peru was a temporary diversion. In the year following the signing of the treaty, he was in a position to influence its course as U.S. vice deputy to the North Atlantic Council in London and as senior minister at the U.S. Embassy in Paris when the Deputies Council was dissolved, to be replaced by the office of secretary-general.

In these positions from 1950 to 1955 Achilles was a staunch defender of the Atlantic ideal. If it was in danger, according to Achilles, it was not from Soviet threats but from a counterideal shared by many Europeans and by influential Americans. This was the belief in European unification, which won the allegiance of such powerful statesmen as George Ball, Robert Schaetzel, Douglas MacArthur II, and even General Eisenhower himself. There was nothing unworthy about the objective of European unification; it was simply unrealistic, in the estimation of Achilles and the small group of associates who agreed with him. A United States of Europe on the American model was an American notion impossible of realization. To achieve success, European unification should be tied to an Atlantic community in which the United States would play a critical role. Achilles blamed American congressmen who supported European unity as a means of relieving the United States of excessive commitment abroad; and he blamed the ideologues in the State Department who were so preoccupied with the changes in Europe that they resented any movement toward Atlantic unity as interfering with the European goal.

Achilles never concealed his feelings or walked away from controversy over his priorities. There was an edge to his comments about MacArthur that verged on the personal, but it was primarily based on their differing conceptions. MacArthur, like Ball, called himself an Atlanticist, but Achilles sensed that he was really no friend of NATO and deplored his influence as Eisenhower's political adviser. "I wished many times in later years that Doug had been named our No. 2 representative in NATO instead of me the previous summer (1950). Had he been, I would probably have gone as political adviser to Ike and I think there would have been a big difference in the course of events."

This assertion is obviously open to question, as Achilles recognized. But it was a measure of his devotion to a cause. Without denigrating European integration, he regarded it as insufficient, even if it could be realized without an American presence.

His long and fruitful retirement years began in 1962, and it was fitting that they were devoted to the advancement of the Atlantic ideal as a leader of the Atlantic Council and as a founder of the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*. He had allies in his movement, and in quality if not quantity they were equal to the European unity enthusiasts. Its champion, and Achilles' patron, was former Secretary of State Christian Herter, with the strong support of former Supreme Allied Commander, General Lauris Norstad. He was tempted also to work with Clarence Streit, the journalist who had first inspired him with a vision of Atlantic union. But it was Herter's invitation to start a magazine and set up a speaker's and writer's bureau promoting the NATO cause that Achilles accepted, "unhesitatingly" as he put it. While he recognized Streit's distinction as "the true father of the idea of Atlantic union," the journalist was too much the utopian by demanding action now. Herter shared Streit's objectives but by contrast was more realistic about their prospects and about the time it might take to achieve results. The Herter approach was better suited to Achilles' temperament. He accepted Herter's invitation to join the Atlantic Council.

It was a wise choice. Many of the frustrations with the Europeanists that he had encountered while in the State Department were repeated in his position of publicist. Probably as vexing as anything else was the lip service such figures as Dean Rusk would extend to plans for the transformation of NATO into a closer political union, only to see promises disappear into bureaucratic pigeonholes. Patience, as well as hope, was required to maintain faith over the years. And Achilles had both.

During his years at the Atlantic Council he invested much time and energy to the promotion of economic ties between America and Europe. He was convinced that the creation of such groups as the Committee on Economic Cooperation and an Atlantic Institute of Technology would help strengthen Atlantic ties by breaking down economic barriers among the allies. The gap between the industrial might of the United States and those of its European partners required action on the part of Americans, and this action could be on the private rather than on the governmental level. The gap, he noted, was not based on deficiencies in science or even in technology, but in management. Achilles' was a practical approach, and it encountered powerful opposition from the great companies of Europe which "had no great desire to see their smaller competitors given the benefits of American technological and managerial know-how. So it goes."

A case may be made that for all his pragmatism he was carried away on more than one occasion by some of the fervor that he identified with Streit. He even had a faith in the usefulness of the many Atlantic Union declarations, hailing the convention of Atlantic nations in Paris as a victory for Atlanticists and the consequent declaration of Paris in 1962 as a major triumph. He applauded President Richard Nixon for pressing for the NATO "Committee on Challenges of Modern Society" in 1969 and claimed that it achieved some positive results. But what were the results? Indeed, what were the specific goals of the Atlantic community leaders? Unlike the European union supporters, they had no clear vision of the road to unification, such as Jean Monnet and the European Economic Community possessed. At no point was the federal union of the Atlantic

nations spelled out. How much sovereignty would be sacrificed to achieve an Atlantic federation? Achilles and his colleagues can be faulted--or appreciated--for the same idealism that is associated with Clarence Streit.

But if Achilles had no blueprint for realizing the new order, there were the satisfactions of knowing that he and his transatlantic counterparts in the Atlantic Treaty Association were fighting the good fight--helping to break down economic barriers, building new ties across the Atlantic. If the results were not a reorganized NATO, they were a strengthened alliance, one that was able during his lifetime to surmount internal as well as external challenges.

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Theodore Achilles served in the State Department for thirty years, from 1932 to 1962. He suffered some disappointments in his career, but they were more than compensated for by the satisfaction he derived from his work, by the friendships he made, and by the mission he found. He died in 1986, having spent almost as many years in private life encouraging citizens' committees in all the member nations in the form of the Atlantic Treaty Association to maintain the momentum of the Atlantic movement. In the words of the obituary in the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, he was "a respected and beloved leader, tireless in his devotion to work, endlessly fertile in ideas, without vanity, and without pretense." His memoir reflects these qualities as much as it does the "fingerprints on history" that he hoped he may have left.

"Fingerprints on History"

The NATO Memoirs of Theodore C. Achilles

ORIGINS

Somehow NATO will always be associated in my mind with fishhouse punch. On Christmas eve and New Year's eve Washington's Metropolitan Club holds open house for lunch. On Christmas eve, the lunch is free and you pay for your drinks. On New Year's eve you pay for your lunch and get free drinks, notably eggnog or fishhouse punch. Between the two the club makes a handsome profit.

Having just come back to Washington in December 1947, I forgot to go to either. About 3 o'clock on the afternoon of New Year's eve I was dozing at my desk in the extreme northeast corner of the sixth floor of the "New" State Department when I woke in mild surprise to see Jack Hickerson,[1] whose office was at the extreme southwest corner, standing at my desk. Jack was full of fishhouse punch and the idea of a North Atlantic Treaty. In later years he swears it was martinis, that nothing so insipid as fishhouse punch has ever passed his lips, but I stick to my story. After all, we've all been drinking martinis for years with no such far-reaching consequences.

"I don't care," said Jack, "if entangling alliances have been considered worse than original sin since George Washington's time. We've got to have a peacetime military alliance with Western Europe. And we've got to get it ratified. It's your baby. Get going."

"Okay," I replied. "When do we start?"

"I've started it," said Jack, "but you've got the ball now."

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[1] John D. Hickerson entered the Division of European Affairs in 1927 on the Canadian desk, served as director for European Affairs from 1947-49, assistant secretary of state from 1949-53, alternate representative to the United Nation's General Assembly in 1949, and later was ambassador to Finland (1955-60), and to the Philippines (1960-61).

He sat down and elaborated. He had been in London with Secretary Marshall[2] and Foster Dulles,[3] who had been there as Senator Vandenberg's representative, at the last session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It had broken up in complete disagreement just before Christmas. That evening Ernie Bevin, then British foreign secretary, had invited Marshall for dinner alone. After dinner Bevin used almost the same words he used in the House of Commons a few weeks later:

> There is no chance that the Soviet Union will deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future. The salvation of the West depends upon the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe backed by the United States and the Dominions--such a mobilization of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within, and respect elsewhere.

Those words were engraved on Jack's memory as they are on mine. Western Europe, devastated, prostrate, and demoralized, sorely needed "confidence and energy within." With Soviet armies halfway across Europe and with strong Communist parties, the largest single ones in France and Italy, something to inspire Soviet "respect" was equally essential. Only the "moral and material force" of the United States and Western Europe together could bring either. Some form of union was clearly essential. What? And between whom?

The morning after that dinner with Bevin, Marshall told Dulles and Hickerson of Bevin's words. He was impressed but believed that the "union" must be solely European, with the U.S. supplying material assistance. His "Marshall Plan" speech was only six months old, the Europeans were still arguing over who was to get how much U.S. aid, and Congress still had to authorize, let alone appropriate, any U.S. aid at all. The Congressional problem was a considerable one, and Marshall understandably did not want to complicate it any more than absolutely necessary.

The secretary flew home. Dulles and Hickerson came by sea. Jack was convinced that this was not good enough, that only a moral commitment by the U.S. to do whatever was necessary, including fight, to restore and maintain a free and solvent Europe could create "confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere." By the time they reached Washington, Jack had made significant progress toward convincing Foster

[2] George C. Marshall served as secretary of state from January 1947-January 1949. Following this position, he briefly served as the president of the American Red Cross from 1949-1950, only to return to government service as secretary of defense from September 1950 to September 1951.

[3] John Foster Dulles served as adviser to the secretary of state at the London Conferences of 1945 and 1947, the Moscow Conference of 1947, and the Paris Conference of 1949. Dulles was appointed as interim U.S. Senator in 1949. He became secretary of state in 1953.

of the same line of reasoning. Dulles undertook to convince Vandenberg, then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,[4] and Hickerson to convince Marshall.

Jack and I had both read and been duly impressed by Clarence Streit's *Union Now*.[5] Perhaps it had made a deeper impression on me, the effete Easterner, than on Jack, the tough-minded West Texan, but Jack had the vision and the realism to believe that Streit had the right answer, if it could be achieved. Jack and I shared enthusiasm for negotiating a military alliance and getting it ratified, as a basis for further progress toward unity.

Early in January 1948 Bevin[6] made his historic speech in the Commons, embodied its substance in a message to Marshall, and asked what the U.S. would be prepared to do about it. Jack drafted and fought for a forthcoming reply, but Marshall balked. The reply he finally signed insisted that the nations of Western Europe should first show what they were prepared to do for themselves and each other, after which we would consider sympathetically what we might do to help. That was our theme song for the next few months: "Show what you're prepared to do for yourselves and each other and then we'll think about what we might do."

Bevin's message also stated that he hoped to realize a network of bilateral alliances between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, each ostensibly aimed at any new threat from Germany but actually and equally valid against any Soviet aggression.

Jack's draft reply to Bevin contained, and Marshall accepted, the suggestion that a similar collective defense arrangement between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries would be far preferable to a network of bilateral alliances. Bevin bought it. Senators Vandenberg and Connally,[7] who had been on the delegation that negotiated the

[4] Arthur Vandenberg was U.S. senator from Michigan, 1928-1951, and chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-1949.

[5] Clarence K. Streit, an American journalist, proposed the unification of the North Atlantic democracies along the lines of citizenship, defense, customs union, currency, and postal/communication systems. Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic* (New York, 1939).

[6] For the text of Bevin's speech to the House of Commons, 22 January 1948, consult *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 446, col. 383 ff.

[7] Tom Connally, U.S. senator from Texas, 1929-1953, was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1941-46 and from 1949-53. Connally was a U.S. delegate to the International Conference for Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio de Janeiro, 1947.

Rio Treaty[8] and, to safeguard its provisions, had fought at San Francisco for authorization of collective defense arrangements in the UN Charter, heartily approved.

It would be a long time before anyone would admit publicly that we were even considering a treaty, but Jack and I knew clearly from the beginning what we were working for. From the beginning Jack laid down two important ground rules. One was that the Senate, through the Foreign Relations Committee, was to be involved from the start: its advice was to be sought all the way through, rather than merely its consent to a signed and sealed treaty. The other was that the process be kept thoroughly bipartisan, quite essential in an election year with a Democratic administration and a Republican Congress and with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee a potential candidate for the presidency.

During January and February of 1948 Bevin, having accepted our suggestion for a collective defense arrangement, pushed on with negotiations with the French and Benelux governments that resulted in the Brussels Treaty[9], signed on March 17. Our official position was still and continued to be: "First show us what you're prepared to do for yourselves and each other and then we'll see what we can do."

Yet we had been pushing quietly ahead on two fronts. One was ultra-secret political and military talks with the British and Canadians about a treaty. The talks were held in the Joint Chiefs of Staff War Room in the bowels of the Pentagon, and the very existence of the talks was so secret that the Joint Chiefs sent staff cars to pick up the various participants and delivered them directly to a secret entrance in the basement.[10] It was so secret that one Pentagon chauffeur got lost trying to find it.

The U.S. was represented by Bob Lovett, then acting secretary of state, General Al Gruenther, then director of the Joint Staff, Jack, and myself. The Canadians were represented by their ambassador, Hume Wrong, General Charles Foulkes, chairman of

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[8] The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) was drafted on 2 September 1947, ratified by the U.S. Senate on 8 December 1947, and went into effect on 3 December 1948. Article 3 of the pact agrees that an attack against any member of the treaty shall result in ". . . meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."

[9] The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, signed at Brussels, March 17, 1948. Article IV stipulates that "if any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

[10] Achilles is referring to the six meetings of the United States-United Kingdom-Canada Security Conversations held in the Pentagon between 22 March 1948 and 1 April 1948. It is generally accepted that the North Atlantic Treaty was "effectively conceived" at these six meetings, not at the negotiations that began on 6 July 1948.

their Joint Chiefs, Tommy Stone, minister in the embassy, and Louis Rogers, second secretary. The British team had Lord Inverchapel, the ambassador, Gladwyn Jebb, Robert Cecil, General Hollis, Brigadier Price, and Donald Maclean, second secretary.[11]

The talks, even their existence, were ultra-ultra secret, and to this day I don't believe anything has been said or written publicly about them. Yet it was only two or three years later that Donald Maclean defected to Moscow.[12] The Russians must have been getting a daily play-by-play account.

The talks lasted about two weeks, and by the time they finished it had been secretly agreed that there would be a treaty, and I had a draft of one in the bottom drawer of my safe. It was never shown to anyone except Jack. I wish I had kept it. When I left the department in 1950, I dutifully left it in the safe, and I have never been able to trace it in the archives. It drew heavily on the Rio Treaty, and a bit on the Brussels Treaty, which had not yet been signed but of which we were kept supplied with drafts.[13] The eventual North Atlantic Treaty had the general form and a good bit of the language of my first draft but with a number of important differences. I'll come to those later.

The other front was the senatorial one. The Europeans were, with reason, becoming increasingly frightened, and their pleas for U.S. action becoming increasingly insistent. Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland had been taken over by Communist governments in the fall of 1947. The Czech coup came in February 1948 and the murder of Masaryk[14] in March. After the signature of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, Bevin

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[11] The United States was actually represented by Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas, John D. Hickerson, Theodore C. Achilles, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, Colonel Griffin, and George Butler. Records provide no indication that Robert Lovett, undersecretary of state from 1 July 1947, was directly involved in the meetings. The official record also indicates that the British team consisted of Lord Inverchapel, Gladwyn Jebb, Robert Cecil, Donald Maclean, General Sir Leslie Hollis, and Brigadier C. R. Price; the Canadian team included Ambassador Lester B. Pearson, Thomas Stone, Michael Wright, and General Charles Foulkes.

[12] Donald Maclean was a member of a Soviet spy network which included Guy Burgess and Kim Philby. Maclean was charged with supplying the Soviet Union with critical U.S. atomic power information, as well as with aspects of the planning and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty.

[13] The Brussels Treaty had in fact been signed five days prior to the opening of the talks.

[14] Jan Masaryk was a noncommunist foreign minister in the Klement Gottwald Communist administration of Czechoslovakia. On 25 February 1948, Gottwald assumed power, and on 10 March 1948 Masaryk "mysteriously" fell to his death.

and Bidault,[15] then French foreign minister, said in effect: "Now we've shown what we're prepared to do for ourselves and each other. What are you going to do? For God's sake, do something, quick."

We were also deeply disturbed by the Soviet westward pressure, but to the Europeans we still kept saying: "You've made a start, but it's only a small start. Put some military bones on that treaty, preferably collective ones."

We were sufficiently disturbed, however, to contemplate a declaration by President Truman that he was prepared to negotiate a military alliance with the parties to the Brussels Treaty and that, should there be Soviet aggression against any party to the treaty during negotiations and prior to the coming into effect of the Atlantic Treaty, the U.S. would consider it an unfriendly act.

Lovett tried that out on Vandenberg and got a resounding "No!" Why, asked Vandenberg, should Truman get all the credit? It was not an unnatural reaction on his part, for it was an election year and Vandenberg was interested in becoming the Republican candidate.

But he was a statesman as well as a politician, and his counterproposal was excellent. Why not, he asked, get the Senate to request the president to negotiate such an alliance? Wouldn't that give you a long start toward eventual bipartisan Senate approval? How right he was!

We accepted his approach with enthusiasm, and he and Lovett set out to draft a "Sense of the Senate" Resolution, with Jack's and my assistance.

Vandenberg had played a substantial role at San Francisco during the negotiation of the UN Charter and in the Senate for its ratification. In 1948 there was much public and congressional discussion of the need to strengthen the UN and several congressional resolutions on the subject were pending. Vandenberg wished to capitalize on these initiatives.

Accordingly, the preamble of the "Vandenberg Resolution"[16] called upon the president particularly to pursue the following objectives within the UN Charter. Its paragraphs 1, 5, and 6 referred to strengthening the UN itself. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 were, with the exception of one phrase, my language. They read:

> 2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter.
>
> 3. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.
>
> 4. Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

The words "by constitutional process" were Vandenberg's and they proved very useful in the resolution and in the treaty itself. "One-page Vandenberg" insisted that the draft be all on one page, and he typed it himself, although he had to use very narrow margins and almost ran off the bottom of the page. He also did his best to keep things bipartisan by insisting that the resolution be referred to as a "Resolution of the Foreign Relations Committee" rather than as the "Vandenberg Resolution." However, he could not have been displeased when the press and everyone else preferred the latter.

As soon as the resolution was introduced, President Truman hailed it. Paragraph 4 with its recommendation that the U.S. react to any armed aggression regardless of any treaty (other than the charter) went far to convey the warning we had contemplated that the president should give.

We were on the way, and the British and French were heartened but still gravely worried and impatient. We did not dare move until the resolution passed the Senate, and we pressed them to get going on some collective military strength. At the end of April the Benelux military authorities began discussions but only in September was the Western Union Defense Organization created, with Field Marshal Montgomery[17] as chairman of the "Commanders-in-Chief Committee" at Fontainebleau.

Montgomery did not mince words, and the British showed us one of his early secret telegrams from Fontainebleau. It stated: "My present instructions are to hold the line of the Rhine. Presently available allied forces might enable me to hold the tip of the Brittany Peninsula for three days. Please instruct further."

On April 28 Prime Minister St. Laurent of Canada[18] made the first overt proposal for a treaty when, speaking in the House of Commons, he proposed a single mutual defense system including Canada, the U.S. and the Brussels Treaty parties. Bevin promptly welcomed it.

Fran Wilcox was then chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He, Bill Galloway, whom I had gotten out of uniform and into WE and was now working with me, and I spent all day for two or three weeks drafting the committee's report on

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[15] Georges Bidault was the French minister of foreign affairs in 1948. Bidault went on to serve as deputy prime minister of France and minister of national defense until March 1952, and returned as minister of foreign affairs from 8 January 1953 until 19 June 1954.

[16] For the text of the Vandenberg Resolution on 11 June 1948, consult Senate Resolution 239, as printed in *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 94:7791.

[17] The defense ministers of the Brussels Pact met on 27-28 September 1948 and developed a joint defense strategy. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery was not confirmed as military chairman of the "Commanders in Chief Committee" until 5 October 1948.

[18] Louis Stephen St. Laurent was the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, 1946-48, and the prime minister of Canada, 1948-57. The address by St. Laurent before the Canadian House of Commons actually took place on 29 April 1948.

the resolution.[19] There were "ulcer lunches" of stale sandwiches or gummy beans from the scruffy newsstand snack bar across the hall from the committee room. Fran was an exacting taskmaster and a stickler for detail but able as hell and knew his committee thoroughly. They adopted the report unanimously and the Senate approved it by the highly satisfactory vote of 64 to 4 on July 21. Now we could move.

A similar resolution had been introduced in the House and also approved unanimously by the Foreign Affairs Committee. We waited a bit hoping that the House would pass it, but the House adjourned for the summer without action. We didn't much care. It was the Senate that counted.

THE WASHINGTON EXPLORATORY TALKS AND BEYOND

On July 6 talks began between Acting Secretary Lovett and the ambassadors of Canada, the U.K., France, Belgium, Holland, and the Luxembourg minister, ostensibly on problems of the defense of the Atlantic area, including the possibility of a treaty of alliance.[20] It would still be several months before we would admit out loud that we were negotiating a treaty.

The acting secretary and the ambassadors met once in a while, but the treaty was actually negotiated--"despite them," in Jack's words--by a Working Group, whose members became lifelong friends in the process. Its members were:[21]

United States:	Jack Hickerson
	Ted Achilles
	Bill Galloway
Canada:	Tommy Stone (later ambassador to Sweden and the Netherlands)
Belgium:	Roger Taymans (later ambassador to Thailand)
	Robert Vaes (later secretary general of the Foreign Office)
France:	Arnaud Berard (later ambassador to the United Nations, Germany, and Italy and adviser to the prime minister)
	Arnaud Wapler (later ambassador to Turkey)
Luxembourg:	Hugue LeGallais (the minister, who sat in both the ambassadorial and Working Groups since he was the head, and only member of, the legation)
Netherlands:	Otto van Rechteren (later ambassador to Japan)
	Claes Vreede (who later died of a stroke while minister in Paris)
United Kingdom:	Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar (later permanent undersecretary of the Foreign Office)

We met every day from the beginning of July to the beginning of September. That was before the days of air conditioning, and we all worked with our coats off. Most of us were already on a first-name basis, and we all would be by the third day. No records were kept.

The "NATO spirit" was born in that Working Group. Derick Hoyer-Millar started it. One day he made a proposal which was obviously nonsense. Several of us told him so in no uncertain terms, and a much better formulation emerged from the discussion. Derick said: "Those were my instructions. All right. I'll tell the Foreign Office I made my pitch and was shot down, and try to get them changed."

He did. From then on we all followed the same system. If our instructions were sound and agreement could be reached, fine. If not, we'd work out something that we all, or most of us, considered sound, and whoever had the instructions undertook to get them changed. It always worked, though sometimes it took time. That spirit has continued, to this day I believe, although the size to which NATO has grown makes it less easy.

Two years later we began in London to put the O on the NAT by creating the organization. Some of the members of the delegations had been members of the Working Group, some had not. I was our representative on one committee; the French representative had not been. He made some unacceptable proposal, and I told him it was.

"Those are my instructions," said he flatly.

From force of habit I said bluntly: "I know, but they're no good. Get them changed to something like this."

He was speechlessly offended. A little later in the meeting I made a proposal, under instructions I knew to be wrong. He and several others objected. I said: "I know. Those are my instructions. I'll try to get them changed."

I've never seen a more puzzled looking Frenchman. What, I could see him thinking, is this crazy American up to? Is he stupid or Machiavellian or what? But he got the idea in due course. He was Etienne Burin des Roziers, for several years my

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[19] Francis O. Wilcox was the chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1947-55, and assistant secretary of state from 1955-61. William J. Galloway was an affairs analyst for the State Department from April 1948-May 1950, an affairs officer in 1950, assigned as a special assistant in London from 1950-1952, Paris 1952-1954, and went on to serve in Vienna and as a special assistant to the director general of Foreign Service. According to John D. Hickerson, the ideas enclosed were those of Vandenberg, but the actual drafting was done by Theodore Achilles.

[20] The first meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security began on 6 July 1948, but no mention was made of Luxembourg participating in the process. Following the fifth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, 9 July 1948, the details of development were turned over to the Working Group participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security.

[21] Achilles' recollection of the Working Group is accurate with a few minor exceptions. The official role of participation indicates that George Kennan and Samuel Reber were members of the U.S. team. Additionally, John N. Henderson was part of the British team, and Jonkheer Reuchlin represented the Netherlands rather than Otto van Rechteren.

colleague as minister in NATO and later, after some years in the wilderness, General de Gaulle's chef de cabinet for many years. I was always confident that he kept the NATO spirit, but there wasn't much he could do about it in the Elysée. But that is far ahead of the story.

The French were of course difficult (they always are) in the Working Group. They boggled at everything. For weeks they insisted on the treaty having a duration of fifty years. (I thought of that often in the years when de Gaulle had the world wondering whether France would pull out as soon as she legally could, after twenty years). We did not think the Senate would take a duration of more than ten years and told Berard so repeatedly. He said that France would not sign unless it ran for fifty years. We told him bluntly that we didn't give a damn whether or not France signed, that we couldn't go beyond ten, that everybody else would sign, and that he knew damn well the French government was wetting its collective pants at least once a day for fear the U.S. wouldn't sign, or ratify.

That was the informal nature of our negotiations. Eventually we reached agreement on an indefinite duration with provision for review of the treaty at the request of any party after ten years and the right of withdrawal after twenty years. Now ten years have passed and so have twenty and no one has yet suggested any review of the treaty, let alone withdrawn.

The French were not the only ones to be difficult. We had some on our own side. Chip Bohlen and George Kennan were strongly averse to the idea of any treaty.[22] Chip was then counselor, which at that time meant in charge of congressional relations, and George, head of the Policy Planning Staff. In the departmental hierarchy they both ranked above Jack, and naturally above me, so that telegrams for the secretary's signature or memoranda to him, which we originated, were supposed to have their initials before they went to the secretary. They usually didn't. Sometimes we got by with it, sometimes we didn't. One time Pat Carter, General Marshall's executive assistant,[23] bawled me out for it: "There's too much half-assed staff work around here." I couldn't tell him why, but eventually we always got the secretary's or acting secretary's approval.

Chip's opposition was due to his belief, pretty much a conviction, that the Senate would never consent to ratification of a military alliance. His recommendation was that we get Congress to approve a massive military assistance program and let it go at that. His fallback position was the "dumbbell" one--that there be a bilateral agreement of some

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[22] Charles E. Bohlen was appointed counselor for the Department of State in 1947. He was transferred to Paris in 1949 as minister. Bohlen later served as ambassador to Russia from 1953-57, the Philippines 1957-59, and France from 1962-68. Bohlen closed his career by serving as deputy undersecretary of state from 1968-69. George F. Kennan was the director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1947-1949. He resigned that position to take the position of counselor of the Department of State from 1949-1951. Kennan briefly served as ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952 and was later appointed as ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1961-1973.

[23] General Marshall S. Carter served as the special assistant to the secretary of state during the term of George C. Marshall.

sort between the U.S. and Canada on one side and the parties to the Brussels Treaty on the other. He more or less fought a rearguard action against the treaty all the way through.

It was obvious that someone who did not believe in the treaty or that the Senate would ever approve it was not the man to get it through the Senate for us. Jack convinced Bob Lovett of the situation, and Chip was transferred to Paris. We cooked up a new job for him, that of regional supervisor for the military assistance program, which didn't yet exist but which we were confident Congress would approve.

Somewhere along the line George Kennan dropped his opposition and did make one positive contribution. The Rio Treaty provided that, in the event of armed aggression against any party, the other parties would "assist in meeting the attack." He pointed out that it might be far more effective to hit the enemy somewhere else rather than where the attack occurred. The language was therefore changed to "take such action as may be necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area," in other words, to beat the hell out of the aggressor wherever and however seemed best.

Aside from that positive contribution and occasionally seeing memoranda and drafts, George had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations. In his memoirs he makes the amazing statement that he was the department's representative on the Working Group. Jack Hickerson was assisted by Bill Galloway and myself. George was never on it, and I do not think he ever attended a meeting.[24] Success has plenty of fathers; even Chip became one after the treaty was ratified.

More than any other human being, Jack was responsible for the nature, content, and form of the treaty and for its acceptance by the Senate. He had insisted from the beginning that we constantly seek the advice, on a bipartisan basis, of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was the one who insisted that it be a collective defense arrangement as authorized by the United Nations Charter, and he was determined, though in deference to the Senate he was very careful about saying so, that it be a binding military alliance with real teeth. He was convinced and succeeded in convincing many others that World War III could best be avoided by persuading the Russians, in advance, that any armed attack on any country in Western Europe would bring in the might of the U.S. ("Pittsburgh and Detroit," as he said) immediately.

Jack also insisted that we not waste time arguing about a preamble until the rest of the treaty was finished. "No applesauce until we've finished with the meat and potatoes." And he insisted that it be short, simple, and flexible, permitting maximum freedom for evolution, development and response to unforeseeable circumstances. Early on he read a newspaper correspondent's comment that press reporting should be in language that the Omaha milkman could understand. Whenever anyone proposed any

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[24] George F. Kennan, in a letter dated 17 April 1990, took exception to Achilles' account. He states: "Not only was I a member of that working group but, by my own firm recollection, I chaired it on some, if not all, of its sessions." He also admitted to his early reservations regarding certain elements of the treaty, but pointed out that it was his "duty" to support the outcome. He stated, "But this was a far cry from publicly claiming credit for the authorship of it."

complicated language, Jack would remind him of that Omaha milkman, who became the spiritual stylist of the treaty.

It was a one-man Hickerson treaty. Article 5 was the guts of the treaty--the "go to war" article--and naturally it was the most intensively scrutinized and argued over, both in the Working Group and with the Foreign Relations Committee. We began with Article 3 of the Rio Treaty as a model. It read in part:

> The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Omaha milkman promptly threw out the "High Contracting" since "Parties" alone was just as good. I have recounted George Kennan's contribution to provide for winning the war rather than "meeting the attack." Early on Article 5 read:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as may be necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

There we ran into trouble with the Foreign Relations Committee. "Does this mean war? Is it constitutional? Don't forget that only Congress can declare war." We were working primarily with Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman, and Fran Wilcox, chief of staff of the committee, although we met informally a number of times with other members. Certainly Vandenberg and Wilcox did not object to a strong treaty but they had constantly in mind the need to get the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.

It was Vandenberg who suggested replacing the words "such action as may be necessary" by "such action as it deems necessary." This would not only give the U.S. full freedom of action but also enable Congress to decide whether or not war was necessary.

The committee was happy; the Europeans were not. To them this took the heart out of the binding commitment to go to war which they so badly wanted from us. We argued for days that it still provided that we must regard an attack on any of them as an attack on us and act accordingly and that we could be counted upon to be reasonable as to what action we deemed necessary. They were not convinced. What if there were a prolonged debate in Congress? Could we do anything quickly? Might not our eventual action be too late? Did not this greatly weaken the deterrent of making clear to the Russians that we would go to war immediately?

We had to admit that their fears had considerable justification. On the other hand, as we reiterated constantly, there would be no U.S. commitment of any kind unless the Senate accepted the treaty.

Eventually we agreed to insert "forthwith" ("by taking forthwith . . . such action") and "including the use of armed force" (". . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain . . .")

This was acceptable to the committee and to the Europeans, although they were not overly enthusiastic. With agreement on this the critical point had been passed. The final language therefore read:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist that Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Thus the treaty would be activated by any armed attack "in Europe or North America" but that required somewhat more precision. How about ships, aircraft, island possessions, occupation forces in West Germany or Berlin? Article 6 spelled this out:

> For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

The French made an effort to have the treaty cover all their colonial possessions, including Indo-China. The Foreign Relations Committee was insistent that we not get into the position of going to war to uphold "colonialism." The British, Belgians, and Dutch understood, and this left the French alone. The latter insisted that the three northern departments of Algeria were constitutionally part of metropolitan France and dropped the fight when we agreed to include them.

The article covers islands, ships, and aircraft in the North Atlantic "area" rather than the North Atlantic "ocean," thus covering the Western Mediterranean and Malta. I picked the Tropic of Cancer, running between Florida and Cuba, as a convenient southern boundary to avoid any complications with the Good Neighborhood. That limitation has often been criticized by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic,[25] as preventing the use of NATO naval forces south of that line. This did create a serious problem during the Cuban missile crisis when Britain objected to the use of NATO naval forces near Cuba. I have always maintained that there was nothing in the treaty to prevent their being used south of the Tropic; they were merely not under its protection

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[25] The position of supreme allied commander Atlantic (SACLANT) was created on 30 January 1952, with Vice Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (U.S.) as the first SACLANT.

south of it and whether or not they were sent there, or anywhere else outside the treaty area, was a political matter for decision by governments having naval forces assigned to NATO, in the light of circumstances at any given time. As far as I know, our government has never taken a definitive position on this point, but I gather that SACLANT and the Joint Chiefs concur.

The question of a northern boundary never arose during the negotiations. After signature and during the Senate hearings someone asked Dean Acheson what the northern boundary was. He thought fast and responded: "The North Pole." That has never been questioned.

Since Hawaii became a state, it has been pointed out that the treaty area does not include Hawaii. It doesn't. We'll have to take our chances on another Pearl Harbor.

Part of the bargaining with the French over colonial possessions had involved "consultation" over serious problems outside the treaty area. The British, Belgians, and Dutch also favored this and neither we nor the committee had any objections. There was no problem on agreeing to the language of Article 4:

> The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

It was understood that "territorial integrity" and "security" covered everyone's possessions anywhere and that "in the opinion of any of them" guaranteed consultation whenever anyone invoked the article. No one ever has, yet continuing political consultation on all manner of problems has become one of the most important developments under the treaty.

The U.S. government's insistence, pronounced constantly by Vandenberg and Lovett, that the Europeans show what they could do for themselves and each other was reflected in Article 3:

> In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

This also, in everybody's mind, provided a basis for the contemplated U.S. military assistance program. It also added to the deterrent to back up the will to fight with the ability to do so effectively. Everybody liked this article.

The Canadians realized more clearly than anyone else that a purely military alliance, as important as it undoubtedly was and is, was not enough, that what was really needed was the progressive development of a true Atlantic Community (with a capital "C")--that is, progressively closer unity in all fields. Prime Minister St. Laurent had implied this publicly and the Canadians pushed hard for some provision that would provide a basis for it. Jack Hickerson and I fully agreed. Nobody else was prepared to go very far.

After a good deal of discussion, Article 2 was drafted to provide that: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations...by promoting the general welfare . . ."

When we tried this out on Senators Vandenberg and Connally, both, especially Connally, reacted violently. He said that the "general welfare" provision in the U.S.

Constitution had caused more litigation than any other provision in it. It could not be included in any treaty.

That Saturday afternoon Jack called in Mike Pearson[26] and Tommy Stone, the Canadian ambassador and minister, and the four of us concocted the present Article 2:

> The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Everyone bought it, although it was short of what the Canadians, and Jack and I, would have liked. The words "strengthening their free institutions" and "by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded," were, of course, intended to encourage efforts to oppose domestic communism, which was then a real threat in France. "Conditions of stability and well-being" were also anti-Communist and as close to "general welfare" as Connally and Vandenberg would buy.

Despite numerous efforts over the years by both the Canadian and U.S. governments, Article 2 was never gotten off the ground. In the early days the French made fun of it and sabotaged our efforts to promote cooperation. All they wanted was the U.S. guarantee to fight if France was attacked. On any economic matters the Europeans always said, and the Canadians and we had to agree, that the OEEC[27] was better qualified.

At the time of the spring 1952 Ministerial Council meeting in Lisbon, we had just imposed some restriction on imports of Canadian pulp and paper, which bothered the Canadians considerably. Mike Pearson[28] asked me if Washington would object if Ottawa invoked Article 2: "They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies . . ." I telephoned the department and got the reply that we wouldn't object at all. Mike advised Ottawa, but the Canadian government got cold feet and never raised the matter.

It was not until April 4, 1969, the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the treaty, that Article 2 was actually invoked. That was when President Richard Nixon proposed that under it NATO undertake to deal with the "challenges of modern society."

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[26] Pearson's biographer, John English, has pointed out that it was Hume Wrong who was the Canadian ambassador to the United States in 1949 and who was present at the meeting.

[27] Organization of European Economic Cooperation.

[28] Lester Pearson was Canada's secretary of state for external affairs from 10 September 1948 to 17 June 1957.

Despite some opposition on the grounds that the OECD[29] or UN were better qualified, NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society has come into being and is doing useful work. However, that is a very small step toward a true Atlantic community.

Articles 1, 7, and 8 merely showed due deference to the UN and presented no problems.

There was general agreement to Jack's thesis that the treaty must not be merely a piece of paper containing a specific obligation but rather must provide flexibility of implementation and the possibility of progressive evolution. The Europeans were also interested in speedy U.S. action in emergencies. There was no difficulty in getting agreement to Article 9:

> The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular, it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Since it could only "consider" matters of implementation, this raised no senatorial questions. Being "so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time," it satisfied the Europeans. In fact, it led to the establishment of the Permanent Representatives, originally considered to be deputy foreign ministers, but actually only ambassadors, who constitute "the Council in permanent session."

It was always understood that the council would be composed of foreign ministers. The Europeans were anxious to have a defense committee quickly and it was established early on. We also recommended, and everyone agreed, to establish a committee of finance ministers to finance rearmament. It didn't take long to find that the defense ministers in one room could reach unanimous agreement that everyone's defense budgets should be doubled while the finance ministers in the adjoining room were reaching unanimous agreement that they should be cut in half.

At Canadian initiative the council was expanded to include defense and finance as well as foreign ministers so they could all fight it out together. The only trouble has been, in practice, that most of the finance ministers won't come as they know they will be under heavy pressure if they do.

We carefully avoided any requirement in the treaty for unanimity, with one exception. That was the admission of additional parties to the treaty, which would, of course, increase everyone's obligations. That was readily agreed in Article 10, with the limitation that only "European" states could be admitted.

Article 11 started out to be a simple statement that the treaty should be ratified in accordance with the constitutional processes of each signatory. Senators Vandenberg and Connally, always anxious to assure the rest of the Senate that its prerogatives were safeguarded, added a key phrase so that the first sentence read: "The Treaty shall be ratified and *its provisions carried out* by the Parties in accordance with their respective

[29] Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development.

constitutional processes." This addition worried the Europeans a bit but they could not properly object, and the language was agreed.

Articles 12 and 13 about the duration of the treaty caused a great deal of argument. The Brussels Treaty was for fifty years and the Rio Treaty of indefinite duration, but any party could withdraw at any time after two years' notice. The French and the other parties argued strongly for fifty years; the senators were reluctant to go beyond ten. Eventually we hammered out articles 12 and 13 providing that the treaty would be of indefinite duration but that it could be reviewed at the request of any party after it had been in force for ten years and that any party could withdraw on one year's notice after it had been in force for twenty years.

It has at this writing been in force for twenty-six years and, despite all of de Gaulle's unpleasant noises, neither France nor anyone else has ever shown any desire to have the treaty reviewed. De Gaulle always emphasized that he had no objection to the treaty (i.e., the U.S. guarantee), but only to the idea of an integrated organization under it, which he considered a form of U.S. domination of France.

By September the draft treaty was practically complete. With masterly understatement the other governments and we bravely announced that a satisfactory basis had been found upon which to negotiate a North Atlantic Treaty. The Working Group had become a real band of brothers and most of us have continued lifelong friends.

The ambassadors and acting secretaries met again, and we let them argue for awhile over a preamble. We on the Working Group didn't give a damn what it said except that, at Jack's insistence, we beat down a French attempt to include a reference to cultural cooperation. I am not sure that we were wise. We, and the French, thought of it with a capital "C" (i.e. artistic, etc. cooperation) but, construed in the broader civic or sociological sense, it might have helped stimulate action under Article 2.

The best and briefest draft preamble was submitted by Eelco van Kleffens, the Dutch ambassador. Stalin's expansionist policies had given rise to the treaty, which was designed to stop their progress. Eelco suggested the preamble simply read "Dear Joe:"--it was a good idea.

During the fall the main discussion related to membership. The French wanted Italy included, despite the early World War II French crack that if Italy stayed neutral it would take five French divisions to watch the border, that if Italy attacked France it would take ten French divisions to defeat her, and that if Italy attacked Germany it would take twenty French divisions to save her. There was a certain amount of reluctance, largely on the grounds that Italy was not strictly speaking an "Atlantic" country. It was agreed, however, to include her on the basis of her strategic position in the Mediterranean on the flank of France and, more importantly, as a means to help combat internal Communist subversion in Italy.

Of considerable importance was the question of the "stepping stones"--the North Atlantic islands. In those days the range of planes was considerably less than it is today and those islands were considered of great importance should it become necessary to get U.S. forces to Europe in a hurry. The islands concerned were Greenland, which meant including Denmark, Iceland, and the Azores, which meant including Portugal.

During the summer Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had been negotiating a Nordic defense agreement, which the Swedes envisaged as a neutralist arrangement between the U.S. and the USSR. The neutralistic Danes were tempted but the stalwart

Norwegians saw clearly that the combined strength of the three Nordic countries would be powerless against Soviet aggression or blackmail and that only a U.S. guarantee would provide real security.

There was quite a bit of public controversy, with the Swedes vigorously advocating a neutral Nordic arrangement and with the Norwegians, naturally with our encouragement, advocating participation in an Atlantic arrangement. Wilhelm Morgenstierne, the Norwegian ambassador, made a speech in Minnesota in which he said: "Norwegians would rather die tomorrow on their feet than live a thousand years on their knees."

The Swedes inquired, privately, whether they would still be eligible for military assistance if they didn't join the treaty. Hugh Cumming[30] and I told them that they would, of course, be eligible--if there was anything left after everyone else's needs had been taken care of. The Norwegians prevailed, and the Danes and Icelanders came with them. They participated in the last few meetings.

The Portuguese presented a different problem. They were deeply suspicious of the larger continental countries, especially France, and of Britain, despite the latter's role as Portugal's oldest ally. The suspicion went back to the Anglo-French Treaty of 1889, which contemplated dividing up the Portuguese African possessions. It provided euphemistically that "if Portugal were no longer sovereign" over its territories, they would be divided as provided in the treaty. The Portuguese wanted no part of European unity, which they felt would be used both to take over her colonies and to undermine her basic sovereignty.

Having had this fully explained to me by the Portuguese Ambassador, my good friend, Teotonio Perreira, I drafted a personal message from Truman to Salazar[31] in which I still take a certain satisfaction. It stated that we understood and shared Portugal's reluctance to get involved in European integration or internal continental squabbles as our whole history showed. Like Portugal, we were an oceanic, seafaring, Atlantic power with a great interest in maintaining the security of the Atlantic area and not just the continent. It worked, and the Portuguese joined the negotiations in the very last days.

Despite Swedish allegations that we had pressured them to join, we never did invite them. We knew that they would decline. We simply told them that they would be at the end of the line if they wanted any military assistance.

We did invite Ireland, as an important stepping stone in antisubmarine warfare. We doubted that they would accept. They replied that they would be delighted to join provided we could get the British to give back the six Northern counties. We replied, in effect, "It's been nice knowing you," and that was that.

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[30] Hugh Smith Cumming, Jr. was the counselor of the American Embassy in Stockholm from 1947-50, counselor with the rank of ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1950-52, the deputy secretary general for political affairs of NATO from 1952-53, ambassador to Indonesia from 1953-57, special assistant to the secretary of state and director of intelligence for the State Department from 1957-61, and counsel to the Department of State from 1961-64.

[31] Dr. Antonio Salazar was the prime minister of Portugal from 1932-68.

All this time I had been keeping in close touch with the Joint Chiefs through their Strategic Survey Committee, of which Admiral Arthur C. Davis was chairman.[32] He was a crusty old seadog, and although most people were afraid of him, he and I got along fine.

The British-U.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff had ceased to exist after the war, but the British kept a large military mission in Washington with offices in the Pentagon. Nothing could convince the French that the Combined Chiefs setup was not still secretly in existence and that we and the British together were deciding worldwide strategy. The British were, in fact, closer to our military than anyone else but there was nothing formal about it.

The French insisted that the proposed Military Committee (on which all the parties would be represented) be supplemented and in fact dominated by an Anglo-French-American "Standing Group" at chiefs of staff level. Nobody else liked the idea, least of all the smaller European nations, but the French made such a row over it that the rest of us eventually agreed. It was not provided for in the treaty but was established anyway. At the last minute the Italians threatened for a few days that they would not sign the treaty unless they were included in the Standing Group. We laughed at them, and they came around.

Tradition provides that the terms of a treaty must be kept secret at least until signature, if not until it is actually sent to the Senate for approval. Jack and I felt that this would not do in the case of something so radically a departure from George Washington's warning against "entangling alliances." We had the Foreign Relations Committee with us, but it would help a lot if we also had a good deal of public support. We therefore took it upon ourselves to prepare public opinion.

John Hightower covered the State Department for the Associated Press and Frank Shackford for the United Press. Both were completely reliable and John in particular was a true statesman. They were naturally anxious for news of progress on the treaty. Every few days all fall I would call them up to my office and say in effect:

> Of course I can't say a word about the progress of the negotiations. However, as you know, the Rio Treaty is an excellent collective defense arrangement under the UN Charter. Article X of the Rio Treaty provides so and so.

They would then write that the Atlantic Treaty would contain so and so. Long before the treaty was signed a very good idea of its character and provisions had been given to the public. Jack and I thought it best not to seek approval of this course either from higher authority or from the committee, but we had the tacit approval of both. In fact, in November the department decided to make public a brochure discussing the need for such a treaty and what it should contain. I was assigned to write it, did so, and turned it over to the Bureau of Public Affairs for them to obtain the necessary clearances and handle actual publication.

Bureaucratic wheels turn slowly, and it was released to the public early in January. We got an immediate and outraged bellow from the president. Truman was

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[32] Arthur C. Davis advanced to the rank of vice admiral in 1951. From 1952-55, he served as the department's assistant secretary of defense for Internal Security Affairs.

preparing his State of the Union message and had planned to use exactly the same substance as the fourth of his principal points. We had stolen his thunder.

He told the department to come up with something else important in a hurry. After considerable head scratching, someone unearthed an old memo by Bob Schaetzel[33] proposing a program of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. It was dusted off, went to the White House, was accepted, and became the famous "Point Four" program.

In January 1949 the Democrats took over control of Congress and Dean Acheson succeeded the ailing George Marshall as secretary of state. Our first job was fully to indoctrinate Dean on the whys, wherefores, and provisions of the treaty. He learned fast. The second task was to butter up Tom Connally, who had succeeded Arthur Vandenberg as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and whose nose was slightly out of joint that we had worked so closely with the latter. Dean, Jack, and I had a number of meetings with him and with the committee. He was soon mollified and various committee members made some minor but constructive suggestions which were incorporated.

By the time the treaty was finally signed, the committee as a whole felt almost as if it were "their" treaty. Jack's strategy had certainly worked. So had Vandenberg's.

Finally the great day for signature--April 4, 1949--arrived. The ceremony would be held in the imposing but prosaically titled "Interdepartmental Auditorium" on Constitution Avenue. The president and Dean would sign for the U.S., the foreign ministers and ambassadors for the other member-states. The ceremony went off without any obvious hitches. The speeches of the foreign ministers were in English or French and then translated into the other, with the interpreter having advance copies. The Portuguese representative spoke in English but nobody, including the interpreter, could tell which language he was speaking. The interpreter repeated his speech in English by mistake, and nobody but the Portuguese knew the difference.

The Marine Band played and there were a few snide comments that its selections included "I Got Plenty of Nuthin'" and "It Ain't Necessarily So." On April 4, 1964, President Johnson held a ceremony commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the signing. I ran into Dean going up the stairs in the White House and made the mistake of reminding him of that last selection. After the president had finished his remarks, he called on Dean. I don't think that Dean had expected to be called on. In any case, he got up, hesitated a bit, and then recounted that the Band had played "It Ain't Necessarily So."

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[33] Robert Schaetzel was the special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for economic affairs from October 1950 until August 1954. Schaetzel served as foreign affairs officer from 1955-58, supervisor Foreign Affairs Office 1958-59, section chief Office of Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy 1960-62, special assistant Office of Undersecretary of State in March 1962, department assistant secretary of state for Atlantic affairs in September 1962, and reached his ultimate rank in September 1966 when he was assigned to Brussels as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

But back on April 4, 1949, when the ceremony was over, Jack and I and a little Air Force sergeant, who had been working with us on security, headed for the nearest bar, which was in the basement of the old Hotel Willard. After fifteen months of effort, worry, and tension the treaty was a fact. We could relax, grin at each other, and really enjoy a couple of bourbons.

Now we had to think about ratification. Everything seemed as propitious as months of work and cooperation with the committee could make it, but memories of what the Senate had done to the League Covenant haunted us.

First came the hearings. Dean Acheson did a superb job. In order to lean over backwards the committee had invited the two most vocal senatorial opponents of the treaty, Senators Forrest C. Donnell and Arthur V. Watkins[34] (both long forgotten) to attend with the same right to question witnesses as if they were members of the committee. They bored in on whether Article 5 constituted an ironclad obligation for the U.S. to go to war if war broke out in Europe. Without equivocating in any way, Dean reiterated and reiterated that in such an event the United States, acting by "constitutional process," would take "such action as it deemed necessary." The two opponents got no satisfaction. Vandenberg's and Connally's insistence on those two phrases paid off handsomely.

The other administration witnesses were: Louis Johnson, secretary of defense; General Omar N. Bradley, chief of staff of the Army; Bob Lovett, as former acting secretary; Warren Austin, our representative to the UN; and Averell Harriman, then head of our Economic Cooperation Administration.[35] The two opponents couldn't shake any of them.

General Bradley's testimony sticks in my mind as the perfect way to handle classified information. On the assumption that the general would not be able to answer in public session many of the committee members' questions, a public session was arranged for the morning and an executive session for the afternoon. Without revealing anything that should not have been revealed, he answered every question put to him in the public session to the complete satisfaction of the questioners, including Donnell and Watkins. The executive session was called off.

Then came the task of writing the committee's report. For several weeks Fran Wilcox, Bill Galloway, and I spent all day every day in the committee's back office and

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[34] Senators Forrest C. Donnell, Republican of Missouri, and Arthur V. Watkins, Republican of Utah, were members of the Eighty-first Congress.

[35] Louis A. Johnson was appointed secretary of defense on 28 March 1949, and was asked to resign by President Truman in September 1950, because of a continuous confrontation between Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Omar N. Bradley was chief of staff, U.S. Army, 1948-49, and chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1949-53. Warren R. Austin was the U.S. representative in the UN from 1947-53. Averell Harriman was appointed by President Truman as the head of the European Cooperation Administration's Office of the Special Representative in Europe in 1948. In 1950, Harriman left his position to become special assistant to the president.

lived on those awful ulcer lunches. Fran was a tough taskmaster, knew his committee, and kept in constant touch with its key members. Again, it paid off.

I was allowed to sit in when the committee considered the draft report and witnessed Senator Vandenberg's surprising feat of getting the committee to vote unanimously against a resolution affirming faith in Almighty God. What happened was this.

Through oversight on our part in arranging the signing, there had been no prayers at the ceremony and several religious souls had commented adversely in letters to senators, the department, and the press. Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey,[36] a kindly and religious old boy, suggested that the criticism might appropriately be countered if the Senate added a reservation expressing faith in Almighty God as part of its approval of the treaty. He offered a resolution to that effect.

Vandenberg went into action. No, sir. This treaty was going to be approved "clean as a hound's tooth." There would be no reservations or understandings of any kind whatsoever tied to its tail. The preamble to the treaty spoke of the "common heritage and civilization of their peoples." Certainly faith in Almighty God was a cardinal point in our common heritage. Let the committee's report say so emphatically, but let there be no reservations to the treaty. Then he put Senator Smith's resolution to the vote and everyone, including Smith, voted against it.

The committee's report was unanimously favorable.

Then came the floor debate and the need that "two-thirds of the senators present concur." Nose counts indicated that we were safe, but a fair number of senators were coy about it, and we dared not uncross our fingers.

The Capitol building was undergoing repairs to the Senate Chamber at that time and the Senate was meeting in the smaller, old Supreme Court Chamber between the two wings. On the afternoon of the vote I was there with a tally sheet.

The minute that the "ayes" passed the two-thirds mark I took off for the department without waiting to hear the final outcome, which would be 82 to 12.[37] I headed straight for the secretary's office. Dean already had a bottle of bourbon out and he, Barbara Evans, his long-time secretary, and Ernie Gross, the legal adviser,[38] were celebrating. I joined in.

On the second bourbon I said: "Dean, now that we've got this one wrapped up, let's go after a full Atlantic federal union."

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[36] Howard Alexander Smith, Republican Senator from New Jersey, was considered a disciple of Arthur Vandenberg. Vandenberg brought Smith onto the Foreign Relations Committee where he supported the passage of aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and numerous other bipartisan foreign policy issues. Smith was a senator from 1944 until his retirement in 1959.

[37] The actual vote count was 83 to 13 on 21 July 1949.

[38] Ernest A. Gross was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State in Washington in 1947. He served as assistant secretary of state in 1948.

Dean thought a few seconds and said: "I'd rather start with Britain, Canada, and ourselves." He did indeed take a step in that direction.

In agreement with the other two governments a tripartite committee was established to coordinate the economic policies of the three. Harry Labouisse was the U.S. member, Don Matthews the Canadian and, I believe, Lord Plowden the British.[39] Unfortunately, none of them had enough influence in his own government and the committee never got off the ground.

THE "O" IN NATO

The treaty entered into effect in August 1949, and we began to think about the first meeting of the council, composed of the foreign ministers, and about what sort of permanent organization would be desirable. In preparing for that first ministerial meeting I nearly cracked up. I had been working under considerable pressure for nearly two years and was dog-tired.

Phil Jessup, who was then a special legal consultant to the secretary of state and later the U.S. judge on the International Court of Justice, instituted a new method of preparing for conferences.[40] It was called "position papers"--on every subject which could conceivably come up. They had, as I recall, four headings: U.S. Objectives, Other Country's Objectives, Discussion, and Recommendations. The idea was good but the damned things had to be cleared with everybody and his brother in the department and with other departments. Phil instituted the method and then went off somewhere, and I was left to inaugurate it for that first meeting.

At that point I was so tired I would read a page and never remember even seeing it, let alone recall what it said. I thought I really was cracking up and asked for a checkup at the Naval Hospital in Bethesda. They sent me instead to the Navy Dispensary on Constitution Avenue for an examination.

The examination was simple. You took your clothes off, were given a long form and took it around through Rooms A, B, C, etc. where various doctors tested you and filled out parts of the form. In about Room H there was a patient ahead of me, so

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[39] Henry R. Labouisse, Jr. was the coordinator for Foreign Aid and Assistance in 1949. Beginning in August 1951, Labouisse served as the chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in France. In 1952 he became the chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission. Following July 1953, he was appointed as the director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in France. As a result of discussions in the summer of 1949, a tripartite committee to discuss the coordination of economic policies was formed. The committee included Henry Labouisse, Don Matthews of Canada, and Sir Edwin Plowden of the United Kingdom.

[40] Philip C. Jessup, from 1950 to 1952, attended UN conferences and meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Jessup held the position beginning in 1949 of ambassador-at-large and was responsible for editing the "White Papers."

I sat down beside the doctor's desk. Under the glass top I saw a cartoon of a navy doctor examining a sailor and saying:

> That's the saddest story I ever heard. As soon as I get through drying my eyes I'll give you a ticket entitling you to five minutes of the Chaplain's time to cry on his shoulder. Now get the hell out of here.

Since then I have believed in miracle cures, for my own was instantaneous. The realization, that my trouble was merely being so God-damned sorry for myself, did the trick. I have never come anywhere near a breakdown since, but once in a while I have occasion to remember that cartoon and chuckle.

We prepared for that meeting altogether too well. Jack and I negotiated everything in advance with the embassies in Washington so completely that the ministerial meeting took exactly twenty-five minutes. There was a bit of ministerial grumbling at traveling across the Atlantic for a twenty-five minute meeting, but it was a good one. It would help if more meetings were that well prepared.

In those days there was also time for me to pay a little more attention to the regular business of Western European affairs. France was, of course, our principal headache, and Elim O'Shaughnessy had the French Desk.[41]

On the French Desk Elim was both a pain and a joy. One of our headaches was the French traditional evasion of taxes, a sore subject in Congress during Marshall Plan days. One day I sent Elim a dispatch from Paris reporting that French farmers paid practically no taxes. I penciled on it: "Do something about this."

At that time our papers were headlining some scandal about the potato growers in Maine getting fraudulent subsidies. I got the dispatch back from Elim with a note reading: "Let him who is without sin cast the first potato."

Another time I sent him a dispatch reporting that Air France had sold five planes to the Polish airline and asked that he raise hell about it. Elim came in with a grin and asked if I could think of a dirtier trick to play on anyone than to sell them some old Air France planes. A year or so later he brought me a clipping saying that the head of the Polish airline had been shot because three of the five planes had crashed, and the other two had never flown.

We were also worried about Communist strength in Italy, particularly before the first postwar elections. Red Dowling, later ambassador to Korea and Germany, assistant secretary for European affairs and, after retirement, director general of the Atlantic Institute, had the Italian Desk.[42] He came up with the idea of having leaders of Italian

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[41] Elim O'Shaughnessy was the assistant chief of the Division of Western European Affairs in Paris in 1948. From 1949 until 1951, he was in charge of French-Iberian Affairs.

[42] Walter Dowling served as the acting chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs from 1947-1949. He went on to serve as the counselor of legation in Vienna in 1949, U.S. deputy high commissioner for Austria in 1950, deputy high commissioner for West Germany in 1953, minister to the American embassy in West Germany in 1955, ambassador to South Korea from 1956-59, assistant secretary of state for European

communities in American cities get great numbers of Italo-Americans to write their relatives and families in Italy warning of Communism. It produced excellent results. At least there were hundreds of thousands of letters and the Communist vote was considerably less than we feared. Still, it continued to be more than 25 percent in every election since World War II.

Spain was another hot subject, with the leftists damning us for having anything to do with Franco and the rightists, particularly old line Republicans in Congress, damning us for not embracing him. I spent a fair amount of time personally on Spanish problems.

We had no ambassador in Spain, and Spain was not supposed to have one in Washington but they gave Señor Lequerica, a former foreign minister, the rank of ambassador and sent him to the U.S. as a Foreign Service inspector.[43] We could not object to that. However, he settled down in the embassy in Washington and stayed for several years. He never bothered with the State Department, but spent all his time, and a lot of money, wooing Congress.

One of the things he spent money on was a high-grade lobbyist whose name I can't remember but who used to invite me to lunch a lot oftener than I would accept. At one point he tried to bribe me, very subtly, by offering to have a high-powered public relations firm produce a series of articles praising the Foreign Service. I thanked him but declined.

One day he had me to lunch with a Republican Congressman Brown from Ohio, a staunch Taft man.[44] I remember Brown saying: "If that man Eisenhower ever lifts a finger toward the nomination, we'll wrap that redheaded WAC so tight around his neck he'll wish he'd never been born." They tried to in 1952, but Mamie announced that she knew all about the redhead and the slander fell flat.

During June of 1950 I was acting assistant secretary for Europe and two things happened. One was that the Bulgarians arrested and tortured a Bulgarian clerk of our legation. I had no previous dealings with Eastern Europe and got mad. I recommended that we break relations with the Bulgarians to teach them and the other satellites a lesson. We did break relations. How much of a lesson it taught them or anyone else I don't know but I'm sure it didn't do any harm. Years later by coincidence it was the Bulgarian no. 2 in Paris who began overtures to us through me toward restoring relations. We eventually did so.

Affairs in 1959, and U.S. ambassador to West Germany from 1959-63.

[43] José Félix de Lequerica was appointed director of embassies in 1948. This position enabled him to establish residence in Washington, where he headed the Spanish lobbying mission for two years.

[44] Clarence J. Brown was a member of the House of Representatives from the Seventy-sixth through the Eight-ninth Congresses.

On Saturday night June 25 Livie and Betty Merchant[45] and Marian[46] and I had gone dancing at the Chevy Chase Club and got home about midnight. Livie was then acting assistant secretary for the Far East. Shortly after we got home the phone rang. It was Livie, saying that the North Koreans had invaded South Korea. He took off for the department and didn't get home again for some seventy-two hours.

I went to bed but was down at the department early Sunday morning. There were several days of constant meetings on what to do. At first the policy was merely to evacuate Americans and to use what few troops and air power we had there to protect them-- but not to shoot otherwise. That quickly developed into a rearguard action north of Seoul, and more troops and air power were rushed over from Japan. The question quickly became: "Do we fight, seriously, or don't we?"

I confess that I was timid and worried about reactions in Europe. However, the prevailing opinion among the desk officers in EUR was that we should fight, and I so advocated. Jack Hickerson had recently become assistant secretary for the UN and urged strongly that we do. One evening three or four days after the invasion, Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, Frank Pace (then secretary of the army),[47] Jack, Livie, and I had a late dinner at the Metropolitan Club. The consensus was to fight. Dean, Averell, and Frank went over to the White House, and the president took the decision.

The next day the Russians made their great mistake of walking out of the Security Council, and Jack took lightning advantage of their absence to get through a resolution making it a UN war.

Doug MacArthur[48] was my deputy director of WE and quite an operator. He was a nephew of the general and his wife Wahwee was a daughter of former Vice President Barkley.[49] He therefore had pull in both parties.

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[45] Livingston T. Merchant was the department's assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 1949-51. From 1952-53, he held the rank of ambassador and was assigned as U.S. special representative in Europe and alternate U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council. From 1953-56 he served as assistant secretary of state for European Affairs, and from 1956-58, and 1961-62 he was ambassador to Canada.

[46] Mrs. Theodore C. Achilles.

[47] Frank Pace, Jr. was the secretary of the army from April 1950 until January 1953.

[48] Douglas MacArthur II became the chief of the Division of West European Affairs in 1949. He additionally coordinated the European Regulatory Affairs department, where he was instrumental in the development of NATO. He later served as counselor in Paris, 1951-53, counselor in Washington, 1953-56, ambassador to Japan, 1956-61, to Belgium, 1961-65, to Austria, 1967-69, and to Iran, 1969-72.

[49] Alben W. Barkley, former senator from Kentucky, was vice president of the United States from 1949-1953.

That fall we decided to set up a new division to handle NATO affairs, and Jack and I asked Doug to be its director. Doug hesitated just enough to show he didn't want it, but dutifully accepted. A day or two later I went to a cocktail party at their house and Wahwee, a bit drunk, gave me hell for trying to ruin her husband by "taking him away from his countries to deal with a half-baked international organization." Actually, it made his future career, but it didn't do NATO as much good as it did him.

Our concept was to keep whatever organization might be needed for implementation of the treaty as small and simple as possible. Some Europeans and some people in the department urged the adoption of rules of procedure. Jack said the hell with it--rules of procedure might require unanimity on some things and we were not going to be bound by any such foolishness. We would work by common sense. No government could be forced to do anything it didn't want to do but, on the other hand, no government could prevent others from doing what they wanted to do together. Over the years that concept has in general prevailed, although in practice the desire to achieve unanimity has come close to becoming a requirement.

The treaty itself called for a "Council . . . so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time" and a defense committee. We decided there had also to be a finance committee to work out burden sharing. Connally and Vandenberg, whom we were still consulting more or less as a matter of habit, agreed grudgingly but emphatically urged that no other machinery be established. They well recognized the prospect of Parkinsonian bureaucracy.

Since the council must "be in a position to meet promptly at any time" and foreign ministers on two sides of the Atlantic were not, in that prejet age, in a position to do so, it was readily agreed that they have deputies who would be stationed in the same place where they not only could but would meet at any and all times.[50]

So the Council of Deputies was created. Its members were definitely supposed to be deputy foreign ministers, with full authority to speak and act for their governments. It was a fine theory, but . . . .

We expected to have Averell Harriman as our deputy. Averell had been president of a railroad, a shipbuilding company, and an investment bank, administrator of the NRA, chairman of the Business Advisory Council, Lend-Lease representative (dispenser of billions) in Britain and the USSR, a member of the Combined Shipping Adjustment and Combined Production and Resources Boards, ambassador to the USSR and Britain, secretary of commerce, first representative in Europe of the Marshall Plan (dispenser of tens of billions), and was currently special assistant to the president. In the international bureaucratic world that record made him a runner-up to God Almighty, and the other governments would have had to produce at least ex-prime ministers or ex-foreign ministers to match him.

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[50] On 15 May 1950, the North Atlantic Treaty Council voted to create a permanent body of representatives directly beneath the foreign ministers, who would remain in session at all times. The organization created was the Council of Deputies, and Charles M. Spofford (U.S.) was elected as the first chairman of the Council.

Unfortunately, Averell didn't want it. He preferred to stay in the White House. The search began but we couldn't find anyone else with anything like so impressive a background, let alone persuade people to take it on.

The mantle fell on Chuck Spofford[51], a New York lawyer and partner in Davis Polk. Chuck was very able and an excellent representative, but no one in Europe had ever heard of him. For the Europeans it was a great letdown and they stopped hunting for supermen and designated ordinary ambassadors.

I was appointed Chuck's No. 2. As he was the "Deputy," I couldn't be "Deputy Deputy," so we created the title of "Vice Deputy." It was slightly odd, but I was given the rank of minister. I thereby missed out on the second modest ambition I'd had as a vice consul--to be second secretary and later counselor of embassy. I had gone past both while serving in the department.

In July of 1950 Chuck and I took off for London. It was still a Democratic administration and to keep things bipartisan Dean Acheson asked Vandenberg to name a representative to go along. He picked John Sherman Cooper, a former, and subsequent, senator from Kentucky. John rarely spoke unless asked to and then he usually asked a question--a most unusual senator. He was wise.

Chuck, John, and I stayed at Claridge's and breakfasted together every morning to map strategy. One of our immediate objectives was to get the Europeans quickly to build up additional military strength and, thanks to Korea, we had considerable success.

The British had provided two adjoining houses in Belgrave Square as headquarters. They also provided a British secretary for Chuck. At first she was the only member of the international staff.

We didn't plan to have any staff. The theory was that all the staff work would be done by the members of the national delegations working informally together. It would have avoided all the problems of international bureaucracy and provided a tight link between NATO decisions and action and national decisions and action. Some of that practice still survives and constitutes a major strength of NATO compared to most international organizations. Unfortunately, we were too optimistic in thinking we could defy Professor Parkinson. The first break was the need for a press officer. O.K. We got one, a Canadian. He needed an assistant. He got one. Then we needed an accountant, and got one. He needed an assistant, and got one. It went on from there until the NATO staff now numbers, I believe, well over a thousand.[52]

Initially, Chuck Spofford was asked to preside and did so for the first few meetings. He raised the question as to whether he should continue to serve or whether its members should preside in rotation. Everybody except the Portuguese agreed that Chuck should. The Portuguese thought so too but had instructions to the contrary from Salazar. We told him to get Salazar on the phone and get his instructions changed. He agreed to try.

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[51]Charles Spofford was appointed Chairman of the Council of Deputies in 1950.

[52] As of 1989, NATO Headquarters was staffed by approximately 2,660 full-time employees. There were roughly 1,000 members of the national delegations and military representatives, and in excess of 1,640 civilian members.

We adjourned the meeting and Chuck's British secretary put in a call to Salazar. She had troubles with the French telephone system, then the Spanish, and finally the Portuguese. This dragged on for an hour or more and the deputies were getting impatient and so was she. She got someone on the line and began giving him hell for the rotten telephone service. When she stopped for breath the voice said: "This is Dr. Salazar. What can I do for you?" The ambassador got his instructions changed.

Once the treaty had been ratified the controversy had gone out of it. The press forgot it. We couldn't seem to get them to print a word about it.

Shortly after we got to London, Chuck gave a luncheon for the principal American correspondents and broadcasters in London to try to get their interest. I sat next to Red Morrow of ABC and asked his advice. It was good: "It takes a person. Get a top supreme allied commander and you'll get publicity."

How right he was. We had discussed whether or not we needed a supreme allied commander in peacetime and decided that we did not. Eisenhower's appointment later in the year was due to entirely different reasons, but it worked out as Red had predicted.

Our colleagues on the Council of Deputies, though far from being deputy foreign ministers, included some good men. The Canadian was Dana Wilgress,[53] an able, sensible, and likable public servant. He had two "vice deputies": Sol Rae, his political one, later ambassador to Mexico; and Ed Ritchie, his economic one, later ambassador to Washington and permanent undersecretary for external affairs.

Derick Hoyer Millar was British deputy. He had been on the Washington Working Group and was thoroughly NATO-minded. He later also became permanent undersecretary of the Foreign Office. The Italian was Rossi-Longhi, who died shortly afterward.

For the first few meetings Belgium was represented by its ambassador in London and from then on by André de Staercke. André had been the prince regent's secretary while I was in Brussels and was an old friend. He is still (1971) Belgian representative and a pillar of NATO as well as its senior member by many years.

The Portuguese deputy was their ambassador in London. At an early cocktail party that Chuck gave for the group, I noticed a shy, quiet little chap standing by himself and went over to talk with him. He was Henrique Quieroz, the Portuguese vice deputy, and we became fast friends. He was later secretary general of the Foreign Office and died as ambassador to South Africa.

The outstanding representative was the Netherlander, Jonkheer A. W. L. Tcharda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, better known as Dr. van Starkenborgh, or simply Lee. He was the only one with a background comparable to Averell Harriman's. He had been ambassador, a cabinet officer, governor general of the Indies, and counselor to the queen. He was also a most remarkable man.

Lee van Starkenborgh soon became known as "the conscience of NATO," a role he performed for many years. He despised and mistrusted the French, was constantly

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[53] Dana L. Wilgress served as high commissioner for Canada at London from 1949-52, undersecretary of state for external affairs from 1952-53, and Canada's permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council from 1953-58.

calling their bluffs or chicanery. He never ceased to criticize the Standing Group as a mistaken symbol of nonexistent big power status for France, a vermiform appendix, and an affront to all the lesser nations. He was quick to jump on the U.S. for any pretentiousness or for applying pressure when we were wrong. He was always right, but so charming as well as forthright that he always carried the council and everyone, except the French, enjoyed being chewed out by him (and then getting their instructions changed).

The only rotten apple in the lot was Hervé Alphand--devious, unprincipled, charming or despicable at will, a supremely able French diplomat. He was "agin" most everything, shrewdly, sarcastically, or plausibly as he thought best. Later he was for many years ambassador in Washington and then secretary general of the Foreign Office.

His vice deputy was Etienne Burin des Roziers, a decent, sensible, honest, and able French diplomat who subsequently spent a number of years in obscurity but emerged as de Gaulle's chef de cabinet when the latter became president in 1958.[54] I have always thought, and still do, that he was a good NATO man and a helpful voice, for what it was worth, in de Gaulle's inner circle.

All that summer and fall Chuck and I commuted back and forth between London and Washington, about two weeks at each end. During the summer Marian and the children were up on the Cape, and Chuck usually stayed with me on Woodland Drive. One evening there had historical significance.

It had been apparent all along that the combined military power of NATO as a whole, while increasing slowly, was so far below that of the USSR as hardly to constitute an effective deterrent. The Pentagon was urging German rearmament to help fill the gap. The German Office in the State Department concurred. Most of the rest of the department was dubious, and our allies, especially the French, were strongly opposed.

One night we had a small stag dinner with Averell Harriman; General Alfred M. Gruenther, then director of the Joint Staff; Hank Byroade, director of the German Office in the department;[55] Doug MacArthur, director of the NATO Office, Chuck, and myself.

Sitting on the terrace after dinner we concocted a simple scheme. Averell, on behalf of the president, would write the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking whether they considered German rearmament essential. Al would reply for the chiefs that they did. The president would then direct State and Defense to get going, get Allied agreement, and proceed to rearm Germany. It worked, but neither quickly nor easily.

A NATO ministerial meeting was to be held in New York in September. Although the exchange of letters between White House and Pentagon was speedily completed, there were only two or three weeks left before the meeting to sound out and

[54] Étienne Burin des Roziers was the French delegate to the Council of Deputies, and served as acting French deputy representative.

[55] Henry A. Byroade was the deputy director of the Office of German-Austrian Affairs in March 1949, the director of the same office in October 1949, and the director of the Bureau of German Affairs from November 1949 to 1952.

soften up the British, who were hesitant, and the French, who were certain to go straight through the roof. They did.

The meeting began auspiciously from a nonsubstantive point of view. It was at the Waldorf and we were all staying there. As usual, we had a large delegation and there must have been a dozen or more Foreign Service officers from the department and various embassies in Western Europe. Most of us arrived the afternoon before the meeting opened, and we all knew where to find each other.

By eight o'clock at least fifteen of us had assembled in the bar and each had at least three drinks. Someone suggested we'd better get the check and divide it up. Elim O'Shaughnessy was among the group and surprised us by saying he'd take care of it, so he called for the check, got it, wrote a liberal tip on it, signed it "Dean Acheson," and tossed it back to the waiter. We never heard any more about it.

The meeting also began auspiciously for Dean. Louis Johnson was then secretary of defense and he and Dean hated each other with a passion. That evening Johnson's resignation was announced, and Dean had a number of celebration drinks. Bob Lovett became acting secretary of defense.

Substantively, the meeting began anything but auspiciously. As soon as the formalities were over Dean announced that we considered the state of Western defense forces so weak that only if supplemented by German rearmament could they constitute a credible deterrent.

Robert Schuman was the French foreign minister[56] and Jules Moch the defense minister.[57] Moch's eldest son had been a resistance fighter, caught by the Nazis and shot against a wall in Paris. Moch vowed that Germany would be rearmed only over his dead body.

There were three days of discussion which got nowhere. Then, I believe at Schuman's suggestion, the meeting was adjourned for a week to enable each delegation to go home for personal consultation. As he was saying good-bye to Dean, Schuman said: "I understand your belief in the need for German rearmament but the French Assembly will never approve it as such. I will go home and try to figure out some way of filling the need."

When the meeting reconvened a week later Schuman proposed creation of a European Defense Community (EDC), to include Germans but only in an international force integrated down to the squad level, with no national staff or other military organization. That was to keep us occupied for the next four years.

The concept was approved as a basis for study. It was also agreed that study be given to appointment in peacetime of a supreme allied commander who would

[56] Robert Schuman was the premier of France from November 1947 to July 1948, and served as minister of foreign affairs from 1948-53. He was also the leader of the *Mouvement républicain populaire*.

[57] Jules Moch was the French minister of national defense from July 1950 to August 1951.

command both such national forces as were assigned to him and the proposed European force.

The Council of Deputies began discussion of the EDC concept while the French set up a working group in Paris to begin formulating concrete plans for it. The working group was at about the lieutenant colonel level, ample evidence that no one took it any too seriously.

In the Council of Deputies only the French pushed it very hard. Alphand, who couldn't have liked the idea less, pushed it ably. We opposed it as dangerously delaying German rearmament. The British, Belgians, and Italians were mildly favorable. The Dutch were with us in opposing it.

One day van Starkenborgh surprised everyone by coming out in favor of it. After the meeting I asked him why his instructions had been changed. He said:

> It's simple. If France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy form some kind of a union and the Netherlands is not included, all the trade that now passes through Amsterdam and Rotterdam would go through Antwerp and Bremen. It's as simple as that.

And it was. We continued to oppose the EDC. The low-level group in Paris continued work on the enormously detailed and complicated draft treaty.

All that fall we discussed the EDC with Alphand and the French Foreign Office gradually eroding our position. Somewhere along the line Washington decided that perhaps it was the most likely way to get agreement on German rearmament and that, even if painfully slow, it might also turn out to be the quickest way. We began to support it and urged the others to get on with it.

The next ministerial meeting was in Brussels in December 1950. By then it had been definitely decided that a supreme allied commander should be appointed. He obviously had to be an American. We did not object, certainly our military did not, but neither did we have any particular desire that he be American. Certainly we did not insist that he be--the Europeans simply could not conceive of his being of any other nationality.

There were basically three reasons. First and foremost was the European desire to keep the U.S. firmly imbedded in the defense of Europe. Second was the total inability of the various European countries to agree to a supreme commander of any other European nationality. Third was the need to have the supreme commander have recourse to nuclear weapons.

There was never any question as to the man. Eisenhower was not only the conquering hero who had won the war; his ability to make a staff of more than one nationality ("I don't give a damn what nationality they are. If they don't work together, they're out.") work together was legendary. And he was an inspiring leader with an almost uncanny ability to come up with the right answers. The December 1950 ministerial meeting in Brussels named him supreme allied commander. Europe and everyone felt better.

The meeting ended a few days before Christmas, and we flew home in two planes, one the president's and the other that of the secretary of defense. (The secretary of state has never yet rated one--he has to borrow one of the other two.) I came home with the secretary of defense.

It had snowed a lot, thawed, and frozen; the runway was a mass of deep frozen ruts. When we got there, the fog was so thick that we couldn't see the planes, or the wing tips after we got in them. We sat for an hour or so and then took off.

I was sitting with three Air Force colonels, which was a mistake. As we bumped further and further down the runway, I could see and feel each of them tense up as if they wanted to jump out. We eventually got into the air and those colonels were actually sweating. One of them remarked that he hoped we'd stay up as there wasn't an open airport anywhere in Western Europe.

We headed for the Azores and landed there in beautiful weather. The PX afforded a chance for a little last minute Christmas shopping, mostly Portuguese gold filigree jewelry.

Doug MacArthur was assigned as political adviser to General Eisenhower. I have wished many times in later years that Doug had been named our no. 2 representative in NATO instead of me the previous summer. Had he been, I would probably have gone as political adviser to Ike, and I think there would have been a big difference in the course of events.

Ike was not only a hero as supreme allied commander, in a position to get almost anything done, he was also a fervent idealist with a strong sense of mission. In talking with senators, the press, and others, he would unceasingly emphasize the necessity of integration, of unity, European and Atlantic, not only military but in all fields. Doug lacked any commitment to the "Atlantic." A "hard-boiled realist" and rather a political opportunist, he followed the popular political line of insisting on European unity with a minimum of U.S. (Atlantic) involvement. His influence with Ike was exerted wholly in that direction. In that place, my efforts would have been wholeheartedly in the Atlantic direction. Ike put more and more emphasis on "Europe," but he never ceased to be a deep believer in Atlantic unity as well.

Early in the year Ike set out on a round of courtesy calls to each NATO government. Doug, of course, was with him, with a large black briefing book on each country: the names of the prime, foreign, and defense ministers, what party was in power, how strong the Communists were, etc. It was his responsibility to keep Ike properly briefed. Doug recounted later that the bridge game started before the wheels were up on each flight and didn't stop until they were on the runway at the other end; he never had a chance even to open a book, let alone brief Ike. But Ike didn't need it. He charmed everyone.

Ike picked Al Gruenther as his chief of staff, and Al came to Paris to get the French to provide a suitable site and facilities for Supreme Headquarters. Naturally, the French badly wanted those headquarters in France and were cooperative--for the French--but they still dragged their feet to get as good a bargain as possible. After two weeks Al let it be known on a Monday that he was going to London on Thursday to look for a site there. On Wednesday he had everything he wanted from the French.

Now that we had a supreme allied commander the effort to develop integrated forces and logistics, arms standardization, and rationalization of arms production began. It was far from easy.

One outstanding success, due to Al Gruenther's insistence, was establishment of the NATO Defense College. Al insisted that field grade officers, those who were going to be generals and admirals, must be taught to work together. They have been, and most

of those who have had the experience either at the college or at SHAPE, became lifelong members of the team.

One other quite successful operation was negotiation of a "NATO Status of Forces Agreement" to cover members of the armed forces of one nation stationed on the territory of another. It was a highly legal matter but, since most of the forces concerned would be American and most of the others, including the French, badly wanted American troops there, we got what we wanted without too much trouble.

Most other aspects were less so. We tried, for instance, to get the Dutch to concentrate on their navy rather than their army. No luck. We set up technical standardization task forces, but several years' work produced only such meager results as standardization of the colors on different parts of the wiring of a jeep's ignition system and reduction in types of aviation fuel from 102 to 23.

On rationalization of production we hoped, for example, to have the Belgians make all the rifles, the French the antitank guns, the Italians the trucks and so on. Nothing happened for a long time and then suddenly the French army ordered 10,000 Fiat trucks. We were exultant--until we found out that the wife of the then French minister of war was the sister of a top executive of Fiat. Oh well. I guess integration has to go deep into the human and biological realm before it gets far in the material one.

There was, of course, need for an integrated logistics system of airfields, pipelines, supply dumps, and warehouses. Naturally most of it had to be in France. The word "infrastructure" came into use. It was defined as "coming from 'infrastructure,' an old French word meaning 'somebody else has got to pay for it.'" A concurrent definition of logistics, incidentally, was: "What the war goes better with if you got than if you ain't."

There was inevitably great argument as to what share each government should bear. We fought over it for months in the deputies and brought it to a head at the spring 1951 ministerial meeting in Lisbon. Lord Ismay was British defense minister, Jules Moch the same in France, and Bob Lovett our secretary of defense. Everybody had rigid instructions. A great deal of argument narrowed the gap between total agreed and total needed but it was still fairly wide. Al Gruenther passed Bob Lovett a note reading: "Headline in *N.Y. Times*: Lovett sits on hands while plate is passed at Lisbon."

Bob came up a little beyond his instructions. Actually, it was Pug Ismay[58] who took the bull (in this case John Bull) by the horns and announced that, despite his instructions, he would undertake to have Britain fill the gap. He was a hero.

One night during the meeting Mike Pearson, then Canadian foreign minister, consulted me privately. Washington had just imposed some new restriction on imports of Canadian wood pulp and Ottawa was upset. What would Washington think if he invoked the words "eliminate conflict in their economic policies" in Article 2 against us?

[58] In 1951, Hastings Lord Ismay, secretary of state of Commonwealth relations, was sent by Prime Minister Churchill as the acting minister of defense to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon. On 12 March 1952, it was announced that Lord Ismay would be appointed secretary-general of NATO and vice chairman of the North Atlantic Council.

I phoned Washington and got back word that they wouldn't mind in the least. I told Mike, but Ottawa got cold feet and missed a golden opportunity to set a precedent that could have been very far-reaching.

NATO's international staff had been growing like Topsy, on Parkinson's model, but it was a headless hodgepodge of members of delegations and supposedly international civil servants. Now that there was a supreme allied commander, it was agreed that it should be headed by a top-flight civilian secretary general. The usual delegates' lounge politicking produced unanimous agreement that it should be Sir Oliver Franks, then British ambassador in Washington.[59]

The council convened at ten o'clock one morning and, as the first order to business, Sir Oliver was elected secretary general. Sir Anthony Eden asked for a recess of ten minutes to inform Sir Oliver. He called him on the phone--it was then 5:15 a.m. in Washington--and a rather sleepy and disgruntled Oliver asked: "What's all this about? Secretary general of NATO? Why didn't someone mention this to me before? I have no idea whether I want it or not." The Foreign Office had assumed unanimous approval of Franks and had forgotten to consult him about it.

"My God," said Eden, "The Atlantic Council has just elected you unanimously."

"I don't care," replied Franks. "Give me a few days to think it over."

"Look," said Eden. "I've recessed the council for ten minutes to inform you of its decision. How about it?"

"I'll call you back."

"When?"

"I don't know."

"For God's sake, no more than two hours."

"All right."

In two hours Franks called back and said: "Thank you very much. I appreciate the offer but I'm not interested."

Consternation in the council. No one had thought of anyone else. There was a quick coalescence on Mike Pearson and off went a telegram to Ottawa asking its approval. The next morning came a negative reply, which did not state but clearly implied that Ottawa would not be second choice after London had declined.

More consternation. Then it was generally agreed that Paul-Henri Spaak[60] would be the answer to the twelve maidens' prayers. Generally agreed to by all except

[59] Sir Oliver S. Franks was the British ambassador in the United States from 3 June 1948 to 13 February 1953. Franks was recommended for the position of secretary general of NATO by Dean Acheson. This was obviously a compromise to appease the British, for the U.S. had won "administrative compromise" and Paris had been selected over London as headquarters. His appointment was announced before asking Franks's acceptance. When Franks declined the position, it was awarded to Lord Ismay.

[60] Paul-Henri Spaak served as Belgian prime minister from 1938-39, minister of foreign affairs 1939-57, secretary general of NATO 1957-61, and vice premier of Belgium and minister of foreign affairs 1961-66.

France. Spaak had recently made a speech that upset the French, a speech to which I'm afraid I contributed.

Spaak had been awarded an honorary degree by the University of Pennsylvania. At his suggestion I had been invited to attend the ceremony. The night before Spaak had asked me whether he should take a strong line in favor of integration. I had strongly recommended that he do so. I had thought he was talking about Atlantic integration but he was thinking about European integration and his speech had been a bitter attack on the French for holding it up.

There were twelve members of NATO at that point and eleven of them were strongly in favor of Spaak. The French were not. Alphand went to work and convincingly demonstrated his ability. He started with the British. A Britisher, Franks, had been first choice. Since NATO headquarters were moving to France, didn't London feel it important that a Britisher be secretary general? The British said they would be glad if a Britisher were chosen.

Then Alphand went the rounds saying Spaak, while personably distinguished, would not do and that the British insisted on a Britisher. He put it across and got the Council to vote that the secretary general should be British.

That put the ball back in the Foreign Office. They came up with first one and then another name, both lame-duck diplomats of whom they wanted to get honorably rid. Chuck and I pooh-poohed both without even mentioning them to the Council. We went to Roger Makins and Bob (Sir Pearson) Dixon, the two top permanent officials of the Foreign Office and told them that Britain really had to come up with someone outstanding or we would go for a continental. Bob arranged for Chuck to see Churchill and the latter saw the light: "Ismay is my good right arm but you can have him."

Ismay it was and he did wonders for NATO.

At the beginning of July Ike came to London to be given the Freedom of the City at a luncheon at the Guildhall. Marian and I were there and heard his inspiring speech. It was a sermon on the absolute necessity of European unity and particularly on a European Defense Community. I could see Doug MacArthur's hand very clearly.

The speech made headlines and produced an earthquake in the Paris negotiations for the European Defense Community. Hitherto they had been conducted by lieutenant colonels and majors and first secretaries who had argued mildly and interminably about minor points. Suddenly the negotiations were taken over by full generals and ambassadors, and the arguments became serious and sharp. From then on all the governments concerned took them seriously.

The December 1951 ministerial meeting of the council was held in Rome and, in November, Mike Pearson and I had flown over to Paris from London to talk to Ike about the arrangements. Mike, by rotation, was chairman of the council, and I was batting for Chuck who was ill. Mike was foreign minister, and we flew over in his plane. (The Canadians have more respect for their foreign minister than we do for ours.) We circled over Le Bourget in heavy fog for an hour or so, then circled over Orly for quite a while before we were allowed to land.

We heard the explanation. The United Nations Assembly was convening in Paris the next day. Molotov and a plane of Soviet officials were also trying to land and had been circling around in the fog with us for an hour or so until someone had been

gotten out from the Soviet Embassy who could speak enough French, English, and Russian to talk the plane down. We were glad to be down.

We got out to SHAPE at lunchtime and were taken into Ike's office for cocktails. This was in November 1951, about three months before Ike came home to go after the Republican nomination for president.[61] When we entered his office he was grinning from ear to ear. We asked why.

"There was a fellow in here just now," said Ike, "who offered me $40,000 for one word."

"What was it?" we asked.

"He was a correspondent of *Colliers* and he offered me $40,000 for a yes or no answer to the question: 'Are you a Republican?'"

Ike was mightily amused.

Several months later Marian and I had lunch in the country with Geof and Drew Parsons and Spaak was there. The papers that morning quoted Ike as saying he wouldn't want to be president unless he were the candidate of both parties. Spaak spoke admiringly: "Ça, c'est la déclaration d'un vrai candidat."

Years later Eleanor Tydings, Senator Millard Tydings's widow, told me that while Ike was still president of Columbia, Millard had been tapped to go offer him the Democratic nomination. Millard came home and told her that Ike hadn't said yes or no but he was hopeful that he could be persuaded.

I was careful not to tell Ike's $40,000 story for several years. In 1960 I took Peru's Prime Minister Pedro Beltran to see him and stayed on for a few minutes after Pedro went out. I reminded him of the incident and said that I'd been careful never to tell about it.

"Hell," said Ike. "Tell it to anyone you want. I don't mind."

Ike truly wanted to be the candidate of both parties, the president of all the people. Unfortunately, that was his weakness. He wouldn't fight hard enough for the things that he knew were right, hoping to win the opposition over by persuasion.

That spring I had for the only time in my career the experience that happens all too often to senior Foreign Service officers--reading that your successor has been appointed and that you will be "reassigned." Chuck Spofford was resigning as deputy, Bill Draper would succeed him, and Livie Merchant would succeed me as No. 2. Oh, well.

King George VI died on February 6, 1952, and London went into mourning for the state funeral. You will recall the photographs of "the three Queens," two Marys and Elizabeth in their mourning. With many other diplomats we filed through Westminster Hall where the king's coffin lay in the semi-darkness, with huge candles at each corner and an elderly noble of the realm in uniform standing stiffly behind each candle.

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[61] Dwight D. Eisenhower resigned his command of SHAPE on 30 May 1952 and relinquished command to General Matthew B. Ridgway. Eisenhower also retired from the Army on 2 June 1952, enabling him to campaign for the presidential nomination.

George Perkins[62] was with us, and as the parade was passing, he took me aside, apologized for having had to announce Livie as my successor without consulting or notifying me and said that Jimmie Dunn,[63] who had just been named ambassador to Paris, had asked for me as his minister. Would I like it?

It was flattering but not wholly appealing. To me the French were a cynical, difficult, untrustworthy people and Paris a wicked and overly sophisticated city. In a flashback I thought of leaving the Paris embassy once with Phil Sprouse when he introduced me to a horrible blonde floozy and told me that she was the wife of a Foreign Service officer. I had thought that was what happened to Foreign Service wives in Paris. Later I found that she had been an actress, had married a young FSO, and had stayed behind and gone on the streets when he had been transferred to Saigon.

However, I said that I would, of course, be delighted. That afternoon I wrote Jimmy that I was enormously touched by his confidence but doubted that I was up to the assignment. In due course I got back a letter from Jimmy saying: "I've felt that way about every assignment I've ever had. If I'd let it influence me, I'd never have gotten anywhere. Delighted to have you."

Before we actually moved to Paris I went over for a day or two to reconnoiter and looked in on Woodie Wallner, the political counselor.[64] He and his wife, Monica, were old friends of ours. Merely making conversation I asked: "How's Monica?"

"She's better, thanks," was the reply.

"Oh, I didn't know she'd been ill. What was the trouble?"

"She had a concussion."

"A concussion? How did she get that."

"She fell off a roof."

"What was she doing on the roof?"

"Trying to rescue a cat."

That was typical of the Wallners.

Woodie was a distinctly cynical character, whose cynicism and bilingual French endeared him to the Parisians. He was also highly capable.

In May we moved to Paris, of course taking Margaret along.[65] Again we had a government house, a delightful one on the rue Emile Deschanel, on the Champs de Mars. Harry Labouisse came to Paris at the same time as minister to the OEEC and

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[62] George W. Perkins was the assistant secretary of state for European affairs from 1949-53.

[63] James C. Dunn was the ambassador in Italy until 27 March 1952, assigned as ambassador in France until 2 March 1953, and served as ambassador in Spain beginning 9 April 1953.

[64] Woodruff Wallner was the first secretary and then counselor of the embassy in Paris from 1948 to 1952.

[65] Margaret G. Waterhouse served as secretary and personal assistant for Achilles from August 1951 until July 1962.

inherited a huge house, which had been purchased for Averell Harriman. Harry was a widower, rattled around in it, and begged me to trade. I refused and have always been glad, as have my successors in the embassy.

We quickly began to learn the customs of the country. I told Woodie that I would like to have a staff meeting every day at two o'clock. He looked at me in horror.

"Do you want to change the eating habits and cut off the contacts of the whole embassy?" He reminded me that luncheon in Paris was a ceremonial rite that never began before 1:00 or 1:30 and never ended before 3:00 or 4:00.

Jimmie and Mary Dunn were the ideal ambassador and ambassadress from our point of view as well as old friends. Both Dunns were impeccable, gracious, charming, exceptionally able. Unfortunately, they made one initial mistake. He had been ambassador in Rome and when they came to Paris they brought several of their Italian servants with them. For some reason this annoyed the French, and the gossip started that they had also brought a cellar of Italian wines. That was wholly false but whispering went on. The Dunns were never really happy in Paris and went on to Madrid after a year.

After three tours in London, one dealing with the British in Washington, one negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty and the last tour in London with NATO, I had formed some rather unorthodox diplomatic habits. I trusted the people with whom I dealt, shared highly classified information with them freely, and was never let down. In Paris I naturally continued to do so. Those in the Foreign Office with whom I dealt were astounded. They were not at all used to being treated that way. As soon as they discovered that I was sincere and not being Machiavellian, they loved it and reciprocated wholeheartedly. Our relations were excellent and I was never let down on anything.

At first, Guy de la Tournelle was directeur général de la politique and Roland de Margerie his deputy. They were my principal contacts and became close friends. After a year or two Guy went to Madrid as ambassador. Roland succeeded him as directeur général and later followed him as ambassador to Madrid, later to the Vatican and Bonn. He had probably the finest and most distinguished mind I have ever known. We worked as closely together as if we were colleagues in the same office. Roland's deputy was Jean Daridan, later ambassador to Tokyo. Jean was a bachelor and good company.

At one point one of our marine guards was arrested on a charge of attempted murder. The accuser was a tart, and the incident had taken place in a little Montmartre hotel very early one morning. Her story was that he attempted to strangle her. His was that he had woken to find her removing his wallet from his trousers and had decided to scare her a little.

I took up the case with Jean. He said that they would be delighted to turn him over to us but the ministry of justice was being difficult. If the marine had diplomatic immunity (he didn't) or came under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (he didn't), they could, of course, turn him over to us, but legally they didn't see how they could. Did I have any ideas?

I didn't, but the case reminded me of a story which I told Jean. A chap was taking a girl into a house of assignation. As they went in she stumbled over the doorstep. He caught her and asked: "Darling, did you hurt your little tootsie-wootsie?"

Coming out a couple of hours later she again tripped over the doorstep. That time his comment was: "Pick up your goddam big feet."

Jean came back with the information that under French law a charge of rape could not be brought against any one man alone on the theory that a girl could defend herself against any one man if she wanted to. They turned the marine over to us the next day, and we flew him home.

I had only been in Paris briefly when Foster Dulles arrived for a couple of days to give a lecture at the Sorbonne but, more importantly as he told me, to talk to Ike and decide whether he should support him for president. Foster was then a senator.

Phil Sprouse[66] and I went to his lecture and sat in the front row to make sure he would notice our attendance. I was always tired in Paris, and unfortunately I slept throughout the lecture. Foster couldn't have helped noticing it, but he made no comment when we talked later. He asked me to have dinner with him alone, but Marian and I had a date with a correspondent and his wife which I didn't think I should break. Have often wished I had.

Jimmie Dunn took home leave that fall, and I had my first experience as chargé of a major embassy. It was a lot of fun. A chargé has many fewer social responsibilities than an ambassador but just as much substantive responsibility. The number 2 jobs in London and Paris are the two best jobs in the service.

George Vanier, the Canadian ambassador, was doyen of the corps and Mme Vanier was very helpful to Marian in coaching her on her duties as the wife of a chargé. He endeared himself to me by one unorthodox gesture. On the Yugoslav National Day Marian and I were arriving late at the Yugoslav reception and met the Vaniers just coming out. Vanier grabbed my hat and coat, saying: "Give me those. It took me forty-five minutes to get mine out of the cloakroom. Come around and pick them up in the morning." He was that kind of a man.

The Yugoslav ambassador, like most Yugoslavs I have known, was likable and had a good sense of humor. He had been a student at the University of Pittsburgh and told me with a grin that he had had a fine time there organizing Communist cells among the steelworkers.

The Papal Nuncio was also a very likable man, although I thought him a bit worldly and sophisticated for a senior churchman. I was surprised when he became Pope John XXIII, one of the outstanding popes of modern times. He and Bob Murphy[67] had been colleagues in Munich in 1923, had attended Hitler's beer cellar speech, and agreed that Hitler was a pip-squeak and no danger to anyone. Bob recalls that he could not resist reminding John of it after the latter had become pope. "Ah, yes," said his Holiness, "that was before I became infallible."

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[66] Philip D. Sprouse was the counselor of the embassy in France from November 1952 until September 1953.

[67] Robert D. Murphy was assigned to Paris from 1930 until the German takeover in 1940. He then briefly served as chargé d'affaires at Vichy. From 1944 to 1949 Murphy was U.S. political adviser for Germany, and from 1949 to 1952 he was ambassador to Belgium.

When Ike resigned to run for president, Al Gruenther succeeded him as supreme allied commander. Al was one of my favorite people and we were also fond of his wife Grace. She carried a pair of dice in her handbag and often enlivened an embassy dinner by starting a crap game in a corner after dinner. She was much more ladylike about it than it sounds, and her games were always popular.

Came the change of administration in January 1953, with Ike as president and Foster Dulles as secretary of state. I wished again that I hadn't gone to sleep in the front row at his lecture at the Sorbonne and that I had been able to have dinner alone with him that night. Jimmie Dunn was home on leave and I was in charge.

Word came that Jimmie was being transferred to Madrid and Doug Dillon[68] was being named ambassador to France. Doug Dillon, Foster told me later, was the only appointment that he had requested from Ike. Doug had had no previous governmental or foreign experience.

At that point I got two letters. One was from Mike Byington,[69] then home on leave, stating that Dillon wanted someone else as his number two because he had heard that I was not executive enough. The other was from David Bruce, newly appointed undersecretary,[70] to Jimmy, saying that, in view of Dillon's lack of experience, Ike and Foster had offered him Doug MacArthur as his number two. The latter asked Jimmie's recommendations as to what might be done with Achilles.

In Jimmie's absence I pondered that one and then swung at the ball. I wrote David that Jimmie was away and, since he wanted suggestions about my next post, I could tell him that I would very much like to be ambassador either to Portugal or Norway. I got no reply.

Shortly thereafter I read that Corrin Strong had been named ambassador to Norway. He had headed the District of Columbia Ike for President Committee. How much he contributed financially I had no idea.

Uncle George's words of 1923 came acutely to mind: "If you want to be an ambassador or minister, don't go into the Foreign Service. Stay home and go into politics. You'll get there a lot quicker."

But I didn't mind too much. I was already a minister, with good prospects of becoming an ambassador before too long, and I had no cause to regret my decision of 1931 that regardless of whether I ever became a minister or ambassador, I wanted a Foreign Service career.

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[68] Douglas C. Dillon was the ambassador to France from 13 March 1953 to 28 January 1957.

[69] Homer M. Byington, Jr. was the director of the Office of Western European Affairs from 30 June 1950 to 1953.

[70] David K. Bruce served as ambassador to France from 1949 to 1952. He was appointed undersecretary of state in 1952 and then U.S. ambassador to the European Defense Community (EDC). From 1957 to 1959 he was the ambassador to Great Britain. Following retirement in 1969, he represented the U.S. on the North Atlantic Treaty Council from 1974 to 1976.

Doug MacArthur's and my interests coincided at that point. I loved my job in Paris and wanted to keep it. Doug had just gotten installed in a house in Washington and was looking forward mightily to his assignment as counselor of the department with his primary function being liaison, or personal political adviser, to Ike. He let it be known that he wanted to stay in Washington and succeeded. I stayed in Paris.

Doug and Phyllis Dillon came by sea, arriving at Le Havre early one morning. Marian and I and Bill and Eunice Draper (Bill being ambassador in NATO)[71] drove down the night before to meet them. We had supper at Rouen, and Eunice slept on my shoulder from there to Le Havre.

The French had provided the private railway car of the president of the Republic to bring them to Paris, so the six of us rode back freely and in comfort. I was sizing up Doug and could feel him sizing me up. We ordered martinis and when we saw the maître d'hôtel pouring a little gin into glasses of vermouth, we took over, got a teapot and ice, and mixed proper martinis.

The press was waiting for us at the Gare St. Lazare and Doug produced a pretty good statement in French, a language of which he had known little or nothing a few weeks before. He could learn anything fast and he did. He needed very little coaching from me.

Marian and I took them to the residence and got a severe shock. The department had made several thousand dollars available for the Dillons to fix up the residence, and I had given the FBO[72] people strict orders not to spend any of it until the Dillons arrived. I was horrified to find that they had gone ahead on their own, in the god-damnedest taste. The entrance hall and dining room had been slightly austere but striking in off-white stone, and FBO had painted both a horrible dirty brown. They had committed a number of other crimes. I heard later that Phyllis wept as soon as she was alone. The Dillons spent many thousands of dollars of their own money to undo the damage.

I thought it best to have a heart-to-heart talk with Doug as soon as possible in an attempt to ascertain whether he would want to keep me or replace me. So the next morning in the office I went in to discuss a lot of things, including my conception of the role of a number two.

It was primarily to give the number one the best advice he could and to keep him out of trouble. In case of differences of opinion the number two must never be a yes-man but rather argue to the best of his ability. If he was nevertheless overruled, he must accept it and carry out orders.

Doug agreed and I stayed. Neither of us said anything about administering the embassy. Tacitly I acted as chief of staff substantively and left the administrative administration to Graham Martin, the administrative officer. It worked.

During the first two weeks after the Dillons arrived, I had a number of stag lunches for him with members of the cabinet, the Foreign Office, the press, and the

[71] William H. Draper, Jr. was the U.S. ambassador to the NATO Council from 1952 until 1953.

[72] FBO refers to the Department of State's Division of Foreign Buildings Operations.

National Assembly. Doug's family owned the Haut Brion vineyard in Bordeaux, one of the best in France. I debated whether to serve Haut Brion at those lunches and decided it would be more tactful not to. After the second gathering, Doug asked whether if he sent me a couple of cases of Haut Brion, I would serve it. I said I would be delighted and did thereafter. He always served it at the embassy, including the rare and delicious white Haut Brion. The latter was very hard to buy and once when Doug's father was visiting at the embassy, I had visions of promoting a case or two and asked him where I could buy it. He growled: "We make very little of it," and that was that.

Madame Vanier, the wife of the doyen, had been very helpful in coaching Marian on diplomatic etiquette as applied in Paris and she and Marian coached Phyllis. She was a charmer and she and Marian became close friends.

When Doug made his first speech in Paris, at the American Club, I walked over with him. As we were going down the front stairs of the embassy, I asked if he had his speech with him. He felt in his inside pocket and said he had but that it was just as well to check. He recalled that once when he had been manager of a Harvard football team he had the team on a private railway car en route to New Haven for the big game. When the conductor came through and asked for the tickets, Doug felt in his inside pocket and remembered with horror that he had left them on his bureau. He tried to talk the conductor into accepting his word that he had the tickets and would send them. The conductor was adamant: "Pay the full fare for this crowd and the private car or I'll take it off at Providence." Doug had to go through the train and raise the whole amount from affluent alumni against his IOUs.

I recall a number of other speeches at the American Club. A notable one was by Jean Desy, the Canadian ambassador. He began:

> "Speaking as an American, I wish you people from south of the border would find some other way of describing yourself that would cause less confusion."

Another was by General Gruenther, who always made an excellent, informal, and hard-hitting one. The day he spoke at the club there was one old sourpuss present who didn't like what he said and told him afterwards in some detail that he'd never heard a worse speech. Al recounts that a mutual friend was standing with him and sought to soften the blow by saying: "Don't pay any attention to him. He never thinks for himself. He only repeats what he hears everyone else saying."

When Alan Kirk[73] had been in Paris right after the Liberation, he had gotten to know Raymond Beaudouin, a wine dealer and Secrétaire Général de l'Académie de Vin de France. Alan had bought wine from Beaudouin for years, and we had formed a similar association when we were in Brussels.

The French press, favorably impressed by the Dillon family's ownership of the Haut Brion vineyard, frequently referred to him as "l'Ambassadeur vigneron," the "wine-growing ambassador." Beaudouin invited him as the guest of honor at the 1952 annual

[73] Admiral Alan G. Kirk was the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, France, in September 1944. He was appointed ambassador to Belgium and minister to Luxembourg in 1946. From 1949 to 1952 he was ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union.

luncheon of the Académie. He also invited three others of us from the embassy, Phil Sprouse, Bob Joyce[74] and myself.

The luncheon was held at Lasserre, a very swank restaurant on the avenue Franklin-Roosevelt, whose cellar Beaudouin had stocked. It began at one o'clock and we all agreed that initially there were thirteen glasses at each place. More were added during the meal but there was no agreement as to how many more.

It was a small affair, perhaps twenty-five or thirty members of the Académie, all wine growers, restauranteurs or experts in some field related to wine. At first the wines were new, getting older and finer as we went on. There was much rolling of wine in the glasses, sniffing, sipping, and commenting. The members, contenting themselves with sipping, usually left a fair amount of each in the glass. The Americans did not and finished each glass.

There was a candid photographer present throughout the meal, and the progression of his shots was something to behold. I could easily blackmail Doug with a set. There was one of me, along about the dessert, in which my hair appears positively Afro but I still maintain it was due to a fern on the window sill behind me.

After lunch various types of brandy were served and that went on for quite a while. About 5:30 we broke up and on the sidewalk outside we counted the roll of our embassy contingent. We were all present, accounted for, and vertical except Bob Joyce. Phil went back to look for him and found him at the bar loudly proclaiming that it was cocktail time and he wanted a martini. Phil dragged him out.

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

The new administration brought heavy pressure for realization of the European Defense Community. At the next ministerial meeting of NATO, Foster Dulles and some of the U.S. delegation, after a dinner at the residence at which I was not present, held a pool on when the EDC would come into being. Livie Merchant, then assistant secretary for European affairs, distinguished himself for both foresight and guts by predicting "never."

At that same meeting Foster made his famous "agonizing reappraisal" statement. It was at a press conference, which I attended, at the end of a session of the council. Unless the EDC came into being, said Foster, the U.S. would have to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of its whole relationship with Europe. The reaction was instantaneous and violent. Not only the French press but the press everywhere in Europe resented it bitterly as blackmail.

I was in charge of the embassy at that point. The next day Martin Herz of the political section drafted a telegram which accurately described the reaction. He showed it to me, and I approved it. Before sending it, however, I took it out to the NATO meeting to show to Livie. He read it while Doug MacArthur, counselor, and Carl

[74] Robert P. Joyce was a member of the policy planning staff of the State Department from 1948-1952, and counselor of the embassy in Paris, 1953-1956.

Macardle, assistant secretary for public affairs, looked over his shoulder. They all said, practically as one: "My God, you can't send this."

I said: "The hell I can't. It's my duty to report on what's going on and I'm certainly going to."

However, Livie finally talked me out of it on the grounds that the secretary and every high official in the department concerned with European affairs was in Paris and knew what happened; the telegram would merely be used in Washington by those unfriendly to the secretary to damage him. Couldn't I hold it for a couple of days to see if the criticism didn't moderate?

I did and it did. But the episode has always been on my conscience as the only time I ever pulled my punches in reporting as a result of pressure.

For the next year U.S. pressure for the EDC was strong. It was led primarily by David Bruce, first as undersecretary and later as ambassador to the Coal and Steel Community. He had some devoted disciples, including Tommy Tomlinson,[75] the treasury attaché in Paris, and Bob Bowie[76] in the department.

Doug Dillon and I were never wholly sold on it but tried loyally to urge it. My own urging, I must confess, was less than wholehearted, and I always coupled it with advocacy of a closer Atlantic relationship in all fields as, indeed, Ike had always done at SHAPE.

At that time one of the leading opponents of the EDC in the National Assembly was Michel Debré, later prime minister under de Gaulle. His opposition he said, and I believed him, was due to his belief that Atlantic integration was more important than European. We became good friends and I have always believed that he was, and is, a good Atlanticist despite a very widespread feeling that he was anti-American and more Gaullist than de Gaulle.

In June came the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China, the most unpleasant conference I ever attended. Foster headed the delegation initially, to be succeeded by Bedell Smith.[77] Livie Merchant, Doug MacArthur, Bob Bowie (head of the planning staff), Herman Phleger (legal adviser), Walter Robertson (assistant secretary for the Far East), and I were senior advisers. Alex Johnson was secretary of the delegation. Eden and Bidault headed the British and French delegations.

Every morning the three tops, each accompanied by two or three advisers, would meet at one or the other of their three villas. Nobody had any good ideas. Foster was Presbyterian, Bidault sharp but flighty and superficial, and Eden in poor health and taking a very dilettante attitude that we must get agreement on something, no matter what.

[75] William M. Tomlinson was the finance and economic adviser of the embassy in France until August 1952. He then served as the United States deputy representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

[76] Robert R. Bowie was the director of the policy planning staff from 1953-1955 and assistant secretary of state for policy planning from 1955 to 1957.

[77] Walter Bedell Smith was the director of the CIA from 1950 until 1953, and undersecretary of state from 1953 to 1954.

The British recommended that Indo-China be split into four parts: Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam. Nobody liked the idea but nobody could think of anything better and that was what was eventually done.

That conference was the only time that I ever encountered Communist Chinese. We were strictly forbidden to have any contact with them but naturally saw them around. In contrast to the perpetually dour and gloomy Russians, the Chinese were usually laughing together and obviously enjoying themselves. Quite a few of them were young and looked as if they had gone to Yale, Columbia, or some other U.S. college. They probably had. Chou En-lai headed their delegation and was an impressive though very taciturn figure. He looked exactly like press photos of him.

Our security people had a new recording device that they wanted to try out. It was about the size of an amateur movie camera. They asked me to take it into a meeting to try out, which I did, concealing it in a large manila envelope. When I turned it on the damn thing began to tick loudly and I envisaged all manner of embarrassment so after a few minutes I turned it off and left it off. What it had recorded was unintelligible.

Bedell Smith arrived after a long, hard flight and Foster left concurrently. Bedell was in bad health, including stomach ulcers, and went to bed early that night after several bourbons and sleeping pills. He had barely gotten to sleep when his phone rang and the voice at the other end said: "Bedell? This is Winston."

Bedell replied: "I'm sorry, Mr. Prime Minister. I'm drunk, doped, and practically asleep. I'll call you in the morning."

It was an unhappy conference. Typical of it was one little episode that I recall. One noon several of us were having cocktails on the terrace outside the hotel when Livie came out all alone, walked across the street and sat down on some steps with his head in his hands looking dejectedly down into the Rhone.

The day before I got back to Paris the French National Assembly had decisively and finally rejected the EDC. Robert Schuman was a great man but he had been mistaken in thinking that the Assembly would prefer an integrated European army to the prospect of a German one. He was wrong. The Assembly preferred to keep a French army even if the Germans had one too.

A day or two later David Bruce invited me to lunch alone at his house and produced not only an excellent lunch but a very special wine. I knew he had something important on his mind. He did.

The "European" solution of the EDC had failed, said David, now we must work for the "Atlantic" solution of tying Germany into NATO. I refrained from saying that for years I had thought that the right answer but expressed hearty agreement. David and I became allies.

Mendès-France had become prime minister[78] and was deep in Washington's doghouse as the villain who had sabotaged the EDC. He had maintained that the Assembly would never approve it unless it were made much less supernatural and he was right. When Spaak and everyone else refused to make it less so, he presented it as agreed and the Assembly refused.

[78] Pierre Mendès-France was premier of France from June 1954 to February 1955.

Way back in the days when NATO came into being and eclipsed the Western European Union structure resulting from the Brussels Treaty, friends in the British Foreign Office had maintained that the WEU should not be abandoned but might be a useful link between the U.K. and the continent. They were right.

The Brussels Treaty had actually been aimed at the USSR, but ostensibly it was directed at Germany. Now they dusted it off and Eden proposed that West Germany be admitted to NATO but also to the WEU where its rearmament would be subject to detailed restrictions and safeguards. We welcomed this and so did Mendès-France. So he said. Not many people believed him.

As chargé it was my responsibility to deal with him and to promote French Assembly approval of German membership in both NATO and WEU. The department also naturally wanted to know what manner of man this Mendès-France was, what made him tick, and whether he could be trusted. I talked with him many times and did my best to form an opinion but I still haven't.

Every time I talked with him I came away convinced that he was honest and sincere and would do his best to get them approved. A couple of hours later my suspicions of him would be strong again. He kept his word, he got them approved exactly as he said he would, but I still don't trust him.

During that period when German membership was still pending I sat in on an occasion where a wisecrack had a real impact on the course of history. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber had me for lunch with Mendès and a *Time-Life* correspondent who had just been in Germany. There were just the four of us and the conversation was all about whether or not West Germany should be admitted to NATO and what the Assembly would do. At one point Mendès asked the *Time-Life* man: "If the Assembly refuses, surely the U.S. would not go ahead and rearm Germany unilaterally?"

He replied: "I've just been in Germany and seen the equipment for four German divisions in U.S. supply depots. You can't put toothpaste back in the tube, can you?"

It rocked Mendès visibly. Mendès got the Assembly's approval and was then thrown out. Edgar Faure[79] succeeded him as prime minister and had the job of getting Senate approval, a secondary hurdle but still a real one, where defeat would have upset the apple cart. Naturally I and everyone on the political side of the embassy was exerting every possible bit of influence we could. While the treaty was pending in the Senate I gave one of my regular quarterly lectures at the NATO Defense College. During the question period a French colonel asked what would happen if the treaty were not ratified. I gave a hell and brimstone reply to the effect that the U.S. would withdraw from Europe, the Germans would reach an understanding with the Russians, and France would become one of the Soviet Republics.

A couple of days later Woodie Wallner told me of a conversation with the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Senate who had privately expressed the view that if France did not ratify the treaty the U.S. would withdraw from Europe, the Germans would reach an understanding with the Russians and France would become another Soviet Republic. I could hardly believe my ears until Woodie remarked

[79] Edgar Faure was the premier of France from February 1955 until January 1956.

that the chairman had a nephew who was a colonel attending the NATO Defense College. That was a highly satisfactory experience.

The day the French Senate voted was the busiest I ever spent. It began with a call on the prime minister at eight o'clock before he was out of bed, naturally at his request. It ended late that night after ratification was successfully completed. In between were God knows how many conversations and all manner of extraneous matters which happened to come to a head. As I recall, I dictated more than twenty telegrams that day. Some woman from New York, the head of ANTA (I think it stands for American National Theater something or other) came in and spent an hour while I figuratively hopped up and down. Pink Pinkerton,[80] the head of a team of inspectors, finished his efficiency report on me and came in to read it to me. It was highly complimentary but I could hardly listen and was barely polite in my thanks.

But the day ended with the satisfactory conclusion of the four-year effort, which had begun in our garden in Woodland Drive in the summer of 1950, to get full legal authorization for West German rearmament. A few days later I received from a friend in the embassy in Moscow a copy of *Isvestia* with a translation of the leading article which denounced a Theodore Achilles, chargé of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, for exerting unconscionable pressure on the French government to accept the remilitarization of the German imperialist revanchists. It was the nicest compliment I ever had.

After the treaty was ratified, Paris seemed somewhat anticlimactic.

[80] Lowell C. Pinkerton served as Foreign Service inspector from 1951 until 1956.