Making Meaning of May 4

May 4, 1970, Kent State Shootings Site
National Historic Landmark Nomination: Statement of Significance

On May 4, 1970, members of the Ohio National Guard fired on Kent State students dispersed from an antiwar rally, killing Allison Krause, William Schroeder, Sandra Scheuer, and Jeffrey Miller, and wounding nine others, Alan Canfora, John Cleary, Thomas Grace, Dean Kahler, Joseph Lewis, D. Scott MacKenzie, James Russell, Robert Stamps, and Douglas Wrentmore. In 2016, the US Secretary of the Interior recognized the enduring national significance of the Kent State shootings site by designating it a National Historic Landmark (NHL).

The Statement of Significance from the NHL nomination posted here is a valuable teaching tool created by educators—some who experienced the shootings—and vetted by historians. It provides a comprehensive, well-documented, and reliable examination of the May 4, 1970, shootings through comparison to events throughout American history and set in the context of student protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Coverage includes Kent State demonstrations in 1977–78 aimed at preservation of the May 4 site, so that visitors would be able to understand what happened in this place. Such understanding supports recognition of patterns in society and history, which is the goal of the National Historic Landmarks program.

This Statement of Significance is provided to promote understanding of the Kent State shootings on May 4, 1970; enhance humanities education across the disciplines; and illustrate the meaning of May 4 for today.

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8. STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

Certifying official has considered the significance of this property in relation to other properties:
Nationally: X  Statewide:  Locally:

Applicable National Register Criteria: A X  B  C  D

Criteria Considerations (Exceptions): A  B  C  D  E  F  G  X

NHL Criteria: 1

NHL Exception: 8

NHL Theme(s): IV. Shaping the Political Landscape
   1. Parties, protests, and movements
   2. Governmental institutions
   3. Military institutions and activities
   4. Political ideas, culture, and themes

Areas of Significance: Social History
   Politics/Government
   Law

Period(s) of Significance: May 1–4, 1970; 1977–78

Significant Dates: May 4, 1970; July 12, 1977

Significant Person(s): N/A

Cultural Affiliation: N/A

Architect/Builder: N/A

Historic Contexts: XXXI. Social and Humanitarian Movements
   E. Peace Movements
   N. General and Radical Reform
State Significance of Property, and Justify Criteria, Criterion Considerations, and Areas and Periods of Significance Noted Above.

Introduction

In 1970, “student unrest was considered the major social problem in the United States.”¹ On May 4 of that year, Kent State University was placed in an international spotlight after a student protest against the Vietnam War and the presence of the Ohio National Guard on campus ended in tragedy when the Guard shot and killed four and wounded nine Kent State students. The May 4, 1970, Kent State Shootings Site is nominated as a National Historic Landmark under Criterion 1. This property is also eligible for consideration under Criterion Exception 8 because even though the events are less than 50 years ago, it is extraordinarily nationally significant, given its broad effects in: 1) increasing and broadening the base of protest against the Vietnam War and affecting public opinion about the war; 2) creating a legal precedent through a U.S. Supreme Court decision (which arose from the trials subsequent to the shootings) that public officials acting in the capacity of their office can be brought to trial for their actions; 3) effecting prompt change in military policy for civil disturbances; 4) causing the largest nationwide student strike in United States history; 5) achieving national prominence in 1977 and 1978 as a site of student protests to preserve a place in order to recognize and understand an important chapter in U.S. history; 6) and for the symbolic status the event has attained as a result of a government confronting protesting citizens with unreasonable deadly force.

The historical and social significance of May 4, 1970, is best understood within the context of the larger national student protest movement at the time. With roots in the peace movement and the civil rights movement of the early sixties, the student protest movement coalesced for college students in the burgeoning antiwar movement of the mid-sixties. On college campuses, the generation gap of the sixties was strongly felt, with those in positions of authority—parents, campus administrators, politicians, and law enforcement officials—squarely lined up on one side of the divide and rising numbers of students on the other. On May 4, the Ohio National Guard literally lined up on one side of the university Commons, with students gathered on the other. Most students were observers, many felt aligned with the general counterculture movement, and some were campus activists. While President Richard Nixon’s own comment on the shootings asserted authoritarian values and lacked sympathy—“This should remind us all once again that when dissent turns to violence it invites tragedy”²—this watershed moment spurred the spread of antiwar sentiment throughout the nation, crossing over the generation gap. What Nixon failed to see, his staff recognized: Kent State was one of the major symbolic events of the Vietnam War, marking the beginning of the end of Nixon’s presidency.³

During these war years, the legal aftermath of May 4 was well on its way to becoming one of the longest, costliest, and most complex set of courtroom struggles in American history, setting precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court.⁴ Thus, the significance of the May 4, 1970, Kent State Shooting Site is its contribution to shaping the political landscape in terms of protest and movements, government and military institutions, and political ideas and culture (NHL Theme IV). The historical events that occurred on the May 4 site relate specifically to civil rights and the national student protest movement that arose in the 1960s and 1970s. The Kent State Shootings Site encompasses two periods of significance: May 1–May 4, 1970, the four days of protest during which the shootings took place, and 1977–78, when protestors led the effort called Move the

Gym which sought to stop construction of a gym annex on the Kent State campus, which would lie partially within the site that they sought to preserve for its historical and social significance.

Student Activism in the Civil Rights Movement

Many historians contend that the modern civil rights movement had its beginnings in the early 1950s: in the desegregation cases leading to *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954 and the subsequent founding of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957 by Martin Luther King Jr., Ralph Abernathy, Joseph Lowery. Student protest as one aspect of this growing social movement was marked on February 1, 1960, when “four black students from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College staged a historic sit-in at a segregated lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina,” after which, “the spread of sit-ins and other civil rights activities aroused the conscience of the nation and encouraged many students to express their support for civil rights through nonviolent direct action.” The next month saw the formation at Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina, of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), dedicated to the fight against racial discrimination. Ella Baker, a veteran of SCLC, but dissatisfied with the lack of a leadership role for her under the Baptist mindset, was one of SNCC’s founders. Other SNCC leaders included John Lewis, James Forman, Robert Moses, Marion Barry, and Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture). SNCC, which bore the emblem of a black hand and a white hand clasped in solidarity, was closely linked to the SCLC through its dependency on that organization for funds. Funds and support also came from “Friends of SNCC” chapters on campuses outside the south, such as NYU, Chicago, and Berkeley. The year 1960 also brought landmark changes that would inspire further protests in which students played key roles: the Voting Rights Act, which outlawed discrimination obstructing voter registration, and *Boynton v. Virginia*, which ruled for the desegregation of interstate bus terminals and facilities. By May 1961, Freedom Riders, student protestors among them, began to test *Boynton v. Virginia*.

In one of the most notable events of student participation in the civil rights movement, college student James Meredith became the emblem of the testing of another institution, the racial divide in higher education in the South, which had remained solidly in place. Inspired by John F. Kennedy’s inauguration and driven by his own ideas of equality and citizenship, Meredith, a twenty-nine-year-old Air Force veteran, wrote the day after the inauguration to request an application for transferring from Jackson State, a college in which only African American students were enrolled, to the University of Mississippi, to which only white students had been admitted. Delays and legal sidesteps were employed to prevent Meredith’s registration, and a legal battle pitted the governor of Mississippi, Ross Barnett, against the NAACP. Finally, in late August 1961, the Supreme Court, with the backing of the White House, effectively overruled the openly segregationist Mississippi judges obstructing Meredith’s case. Comparable to Ohio Governor James Rhodes’ hard-line, inflammatory address the day before the shootings at Kent State, Governor Barnett declared: “No school will be integrated in Mississippi while I am your Governor. . . . There is no case in history where the Caucasian race has survived social integration.” On September 15, Attorney General Robert Kennedy made the first of many phone calls aimed to convince the governor to follow the law with minimal federal intervention, but that was not to be. On September 29, 1962, President Kennedy forced Meredith’s acceptance at the university. Nevertheless, with two thousand onlookers, the governor confronted Meredith on campus and denied his admittance. President

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5 Scranton et al., *President’s Commission*, 21.
9 Ibid., 65.
Kennedy forced the governor to allow Meredith to enroll and on September 30 officially federalized the Mississippi National Guard, despite concerns about their loyalty; confirmed that the governor had arranged for highway patrolmen to guard against the growing segregationist crowd in Oxford; waited for news that Meredith was safely on campus; and then made an address to the nation. Soon after, the crowd attacked Meredith’s federal marshal guards standing outside the Lyceum, and the patrolmen drifted away. Kennedy quickly ordered federal troops to intervene, but in the time it took them to arrive, two people were killed and hundreds injured in the vicinity of the Lyceum, which stood on the Circle, the common in the center of campus.11 Twenty-three thousand soldiers descended on Oxford, and the next day Meredith attended his first class. Soldiers remained at the University of Mississippi until Meredith’s graduation the next year.

Participation in the movement continued to progress. Students already had found and would continue to find support in organization-based efforts to promote positive social change. Further, across the country, new forms of conscious activity were rising on college campuses. Tom Hayden relates that in Ann Arbor in 1959, Robert Alan Haber was planning to revive a group with roots in the labor movement as a new civil rights group called Students for a Democratic Society. On February 1, 1960, Hayden felt that he was seeing “the historic events of the decade unexpectedly beg[ī]n” when “four unknown black students staged a sit-in at a segregated lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, and started what was soon called ‘the movement.’” He continues:

From that point until the August 1963 march on Washington, there commenced an era of unmatched idealism in America. The student civil rights movement took the moral leadership, showing how values could be translated into direct action. Students across the country became agents for social change on a larger scale than ever before. A new, more hopeful, presidency was in the making. In this brief moment of time, the sixties generation entered its age of innocence, overflowing with hope.12

After a period of learning, growth, and interaction with a range of student political organizations, including SNCC,13 Hayden and others convened in 1962 at Port Huron, Michigan, and declared the foundation of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) platform to be “participatory democracy.” This would be pursued through direct action, with efforts such as “organiz[ing] slum dwellers in northern cities.”14 Hayden, Haber, Todd Gitlin, Paul Potter, and Carl Oglesby (a former Kent State student) became early leaders of the SDS. Clearly alluding to JFK’s inauguration speech, the SDS doctrine opens with:

We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit . . . .

In addition to fighting racial and economic inequality, SDS decried nuclear armament, the military–industrial complex, depersonalization, and an apathetic and ineffective university system; these were values widely shared by college students by 1970 when the shootings at Kent State would occur. In 1964, the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project saw one thousand students from all over the country organized by SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and other civil rights groups arrive in the South to conduct a massive voter registration and summer school program. Mario Savio, the future leader of the Free Speech Movement at the University of California, Berkeley, was one of these students. The first of the Freedom volunteers were trained at Western

13 Ibid., 29–66.
14 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 22.
College for Women (now part of Miami University) in Oxford, Ohio, in June 1964. Later that same month, local law enforcement officials and Klansmen near Meridian, Mississippi, would take part in the murder of three of these civil rights workers.

In the fall of 1964 at UC–Berkeley, one of the earliest non-Historically Black College and University campuses to adopt the methods of brothers and sisters in the civil rights movement, students protested the university’s sudden invocation of a rule prohibiting political groups from soliciting on campus. When the university suspended eight students who tested the rule and arrested another nonstudent activist, students, including Mario Savio, staged a thirty-two-hour sit-in around the campus police car holding Jack Weinberg, the arrested nonstudent activist. Weinberg was a CORE organizer, veteran of Freedom Summer, and former graduate student in mathematics, who had set up a recruitment table on Sproul Plaza in defiance of the order. Within two months, a coalition of the political groups on campus formed the Free Speech Movement (FSM) and staged a two-day sit-in beginning December 2 in Sproul Hall, the university administration building. From the front steps, Savio gave his now historic bodies upon the gears speech to four thousand people in Sproul Plaza. The arrest of more than eight hundred people and charges of police brutality led in turn to the mobilization of huge numbers of students and faculty to support FSM goals, along with an unprecedented five-day student strike. By January 1965, Berkeley’s chancellor had taken a leave of absence, and rules governing student political activity had been greatly liberalized. However, university-imposed penalties and the decision by Governor Brown to send in non-university police were signs that authorities would become increasingly willing to use force against campus protestors.

Berkeley marked a passage in the student protest movement in another important way. According to the President’s Commission, protests at the university that originated in its Free Speech Movement “altered the character of American student activism in a fundamental way.” The commission identified Berkeley as the birthplace of the Berkeley Invention, “an authentic political invention—a new and complex mixture of issues, tactics, emotions and setting—that became the prototype for student protest throughout the decade.” The main characteristics of the Berkeley Invention were: the initiation by a core group of activists; the meshing of “major social and political issues with local university issues”; the disruption of the administration of the university; police intervention, which, in turn, rallied moderate students; and decision making among the protestors through consensus. “The high spirits and defiance of authority that had characterized the traditional school riot were now joined to youthful idealism and to social objectives of the highest importance.” The Berkeley Invention awakened the consciousness of the American Student; it signaled that a new generation had arrived. However, much of America would oppose this change.

Broader Social Protest and Authoritarian Response

In the second half of the sixties, racial discrimination spurred outbursts in the nation’s cities, while continuing to foster student protest. Law enforcement authorities responded with increasing violence. One especially egregious incident, which became known as Bloody Sunday, took place on March 7, 1965, outside of Selma, Alabama. While the civil rights movement had scored a major victory with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
largely dismantled Jim Crow laws, widespread voting disenfranchisement remained. Adam Fairclough notes that disparity was especially apparent in Selma where whites were slightly out-numbered by African Americans, but made up ninety-nine percent of the electorate. The local white Citizens Council, with the backing of racist officials—a sheriff (with a “posse” of “local roughnecks”), state judge, and Governor George Wallace—strongly resisted any effort to overturn the status quo. Angered by the February 17 killing of twenty-six-year-old voting rights marcher Jimmie Lee Jackson, the SCLC organized a fifty-four-mile march from Selma to the capitol in Montgomery “with the aim of placing the responsibility for Jackson’s death at Wallace’s door.”21 David Garrow describes the afternoon of March 7 when, despite disagreements between SNCC and SCLC, SNCC’s John Lewis joined Hosea Williams of the SCLC in leading five to six hundred marchers out of Selma. Upon cresting the Edmund Pettus Bridge, marchers saw fifty Alabama state troopers and several dozen of the sheriff’s posse, some on horseback, waiting three hundred yards past the foot of the bridge, just outside the Selma city limits. As the marchers approached, Major John Cloud of the state troopers ordered them to stop. Williams instructed the marchers to kneel and pray and asked to speak with Cloud, who said they had two minutes to turn around and go back. However, within one minute, not two, he instructed his troops to advance.22 Reporters from every major network captured the bloody attack that left more than 150 people injured. The widely distributed powerful images and footage spurred additional marches, national outrage, and real change. With President Lyndon Johnson’s support, Congress quickly passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Some feel that on the hallowed ground of the Edmund Pettus Bridge came the denouement of the civil rights movement. Roberts and Klibanoff see the march as the last major unified event of the movement. They turn to John Lewis, who stated, “‘After that . . . we just came apart.’”23

Later that year, in August, riots erupted in Watts, a predominantly African American community in Los Angeles, and other cities around the country. There were additional riots in Watts in March 1967, followed by riots in Newark, New Jersey, Detroit, and Minneapolis in July. National Guard units were activated in Detroit, Minneapolis, and Newark. Regarding events in Newark, the New Jersey governor’s Select Commission on Civil Disorders later found that “excessive and unnecessary force” had been used by the New Jersey National Guard.24 These incidents in part caused President Johnson in July 1967 to appoint a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders with Otto Kerner, former governor of Illinois, as chair. The commission’s findings on the 1967 riots held that they were not part of an organized conspiracy, but rather resulted from the accumulation of social ills, among them high unemployment, inadequate housing, racial discrimination, and police repression. Disruptions continued on college campuses as well. In May 1967, the National Guard occupied the grounds of Jackson State University in Mississippi following disturbances there.25 A known nonstudent civil rights activist, Ben Brown, was shot and killed when he exited a restaurant on Lynch Street at the time a demonstration was taking place. Demonstrations again would become notable at Jackson State in 1970 and would indelibly link Jackson State and Kent State.

Another center of student protest in the 1960s and early 1970s, although not highlighted by the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, was the University of Wisconsin.26 Protests at Wisconsin exhibiting characteristics of the Berkeley Invention began in May 1966 with a sit-in protesting Selective Service ranking and continued for several years to come.27 Students also felt that the university was complicit with the war

26 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 43.
effort, particularly due to its Army Math Research Center on campus in Sterling Hall. Army Math in Sterling supported over forty mathematicians and would itself be the target of subsequent protests, culminating in the bombing of that facility by the New Year’s Gang in 1970.28 In February 1967, Wisconsin experienced the first of two protests against Dow Chemical Corporation, the manufacturer of napalm and as such viewed as part of the Vietnam War machine. The second protest, set in the Commerce Building on the Madison Campus, began October 16 in response to Dow’s recruitment on campus and promised to be of a different scale than previous demonstrations.29 As SDS historian Kirkpatrick Sale describes, the protest was organized by an Anti-Dow Coordinating Committee, with members of the Committee to End the War in Vietnam and SDS playing prominent roles. On the second day, picketers entered the Commerce Building and declared an end to the recruiting. The number of protestors grew to three hundred and fifty and onlookers to two thousand. When students did not heed administrators’ demand to leave, police arrived in increasing numbers and eventually moved in, beating and clubbing the students and quickly clearing the building. Students outside, shocked into action by the brutality of the police began sheltering students exiting the building from arrest, yelling and chanting at the police. For the first time on a major college campus, tear gas was released on a crowd. This further angered the protesters, who began throwing rocks and bricks at the police. The police then released Mace on the crowd, and, reinforced with men from the county sheriff’s office in riot gear and police dogs, dispersed the protesters. Sixty-five students and seven police were treated at the local hospital.30

An hour after the protest, a large rally began on the library mall, comprised of an estimated five thousand students, who were ringed for protection by three hundred faculty members. Students complained of police brutality and agreed not to attend classes until Dow was forever banned from the university. Within a few days, however, the strike lost its initiative, sixteen students were suspended, and three teaching assistants were fired from their teaching jobs for joining the strike. Dow recruitment was temporarily canceled, and the crisis was over. None of the issues involved—recruitment, protest, police complicity, or violence—had been settled, and they continued to be in contention at Wisconsin for some time to come.31 Media in Wisconsin and elsewhere would portray the protest as a student riot.32

A significant feature of Wisconsin’s Dow protests, Matthew Levin points out, was their organization by an ad hoc committee. This served to limit the exposure of any one group to university retaliation, but also reflected the fact that no single group could command the attention of the entire campus. SDS was not the main force behind the Dow protest. This trend toward ad hoc organization was characteristic of many of the antiwar protests to follow on university campuses around the country, including the Kent State protest of May 4, 1970, which had minimal organization. The second Dow protest also reflected the change from “protest to resistance,” which was becoming a more prominent part of the student antiwar movement and would be more fully realized in the Columbia University demonstrations of the following year. This change, not surprisingly, served to solidify a conservative backlash against student protest; for example, Wisconsin state senator Edward Mertz suggested, “We should shoot them if necessary. I would.” Still, the Dow demonstration did galvanize student involvement, and the burned bodies of Vietnamese children now symbolized for many the horror of an unwanted war. At Wisconsin and elsewhere, broad segments of the student population were becoming more aware of the cooperative links between federal government, American corporations, and higher education in the war effort.33 As an afterword to the legacy of Wisconsin’s Dow protest, one of the onlookers in the crowd would become the leader of the New Year’s Gang that bombed Sterling Hall at the University of Wisconsin in August.

28 Sale, SDS, 370; Bates, RADS, 244.
29 Feldman, Buildings of the University of Wisconsin, 285; Sale, SDS, 369.
30 SDS, 370–73.
31 SDS, 373; Cold War University, 156.
32 Bates, RADS, 90.
33 Levin, Cold War University, 144, 124–25, 150, 157, 147–49.
1970, destroying the building and damaging twenty-six other structures, ruining nuclear physics and astronomy research projects, and killing a postdoctoral fellow in physics, Robert Fassnacht. The Kent State shootings were a strong motivator for the New Year’s Gang.34

**Shootings at South Carolina State University–Orangeburg**

In 1968, a year historians recognize as especially pivotal, at South Carolina State College (SCSC), a historically black college, students were well acquainted with the ultraconservative white attitudes and actions of Orangeburg County and had actively participated in civil rights protests as early as 1960.35 Well after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and at a time of increasing integration throughout the South, the All Star Bowling Lanes stood as “the most visible and volatile symbol of segregation in Orangeburg.”36 Student frustration centered on failed attempts to integrate this whites-only bowling alley close to campus in the city of Orangeburg. On February 8, after being rebuffed in their attempts to put out a bonfire, heavily armed South Carolina highway patrolmen, Orangeburg police, and the National Guard fired without warning into a crowd on campus of unarmed South Carolina State University student protestors. They wounded twenty-seven students and killed three students.37 The shootings were referred to as the Orangeburg Incident by white South Carolinians and as the Orangeburg Massacre by civil rights activists and the African American community.38 Jack Shuler comments that at the time the choice of the noun *incident* versus *massacre* lay at the heart of what happened at Orangeburg: use of the word *incident* situated the events somewhere in time—making it a part of an already past history—while the use of the word *massacre* admitted that something truly horrific happened.39 The pattern would be repeated.

Two attempts on February 5 and 6 by students to integrate the bowling alley were met by confrontations with law enforcement officers and arrests of protesters. Several hundred students approached the bowling alley to protest the arrests and grew more confrontational to the police who were now reinforced with the highway patrol. The latter began clubbing students, forcing them back toward the college campus. On the way back to campus, students broke windows of white-owned businesses and vandalized parked cars. Governor Robert McNair, who had been informed of the situation, issued a call for approximately two hundred and fifty Orangeburg-area National Guardsmen to report for standby duty. Authorities erroneously blamed outside agitators for the protests.40 These actions of the authorities moved the Berkeley Invention into place. The proximate cause of student unrest at South Carolina State College a segregated bowling alley, shifted to the actions of law enforcement and the National Guard once they had “invaded” the campus.41 Harsh treatment of student demonstrators widened the base of protest and further encouraged students to work together to assert their rights.

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36 Bass and Nelson, *Orangeburg Massacre*, 15. The segregated All Star Bowling Lanes held a place similar to Lynch Street for students in Jackson, Mississippi (see discussion of Jackson State below).
40 Bass and Nelson, *Orangeburg Massacre*, 16–32. During this time, authorities targeted activist student and SNCC organizer Cleveland Sellers, who would be wounded during the shooting and erroneously charged afterward. Ibid., 7, 34–35, 50, 76.
41 Ibid., 25–29, 30–34, 50, 63.
On Wednesday, February 7, classes at Orangeburg were canceled. City officials came to a campus meeting as an alternative to a student march on city hall to present a list of grievances. With no real progress achieved through this meeting, students resumed throwing rocks and bottles from the front campus at passing white motorists, prompting police to set up a roadblock manned by both patrolmen and National Guardsmen with fixed bayonets. Protestors now made law enforcement the target of their missiles and set small fires in nearby buildings.42

On Thursday, February 8, classes resumed and “an almost eerie calm settled over the campuses of Claflin and South Carolina State colleges.”43 In the city, however, rumors were circulating that students intended to burn down the town and that black militants were moving in. Governor McNair activated additional National Guardsmen. At approximately 9:30 p.m., students succeeded in lighting a fire in Watson Street, and approximately two hundred students gathered on the nearby embankment and sang and jeered at the police and highway patrol. “For the students, the bonfire was an act of defiance, an outlet for frustration, at last a means of visible protest for grievances.”44 A few minutes before 10:30 p.m., firemen, protected by patrolmen and National Guardsmen, doused the bonfire. Students retreated and ran up the embankment toward campus, cursing and throwing several rocks and bottles as they went. A thrown white banister hit the nose and mouth of patrolman David Shealy, who fell. Shouts went out from several patrolmen that Shealy had been shot. No communication sufficiently reached the law enforcement authorities to prevent them from firing. After students had retreated to the vicinity of Lowman Hall, four hundred feet from the embankment, they began drifting back toward the embankment and the authorities who were waiting with weapons periodically raised and lowered. At this time, about five minutes after Shealy was struck, there were about as many law enforcement personnel as students: perhaps 150 students, 66 state highway patrolmen, 45 National Guardsmen, 25 agents of the State Law Enforcement Division (controlled directly by the governor), and several members of the Orangeburg police department in the vicinity of the embankment. When the students were about one hundred feet from the embankment, the highway patrolmen and at least one Orangeburg policeman opened fire with carbines, pistols, and shotguns,45 unexpectedly and without warning. Students at first thought the authorities were firing blanks to frighten them and learned too late that was far from the truth.46

The law enforcement members killed three students: Samuel Hammond Jr., aged eighteen, Delano Middleton, aged seventeen, and Henry Smith, aged eighteen. They also wounded twenty-seven students, many of whom were shot in the back. Most of the patrolmen said they had not heard an order to fire, but later their lieutenant, Jesse Spell, said he shouted “Now” to his squad before firing. About one hundred students broke into the SCSC ROTC building, took three rifles and ammunition, and took up defensive positions at the girls’ dormitory. Students were afraid the police might fire again, but were persuaded to give up their weapons after about twenty minutes. The next morning, classes were suspended indefinitely and students were told to go home.47

In the aftermath, the U.S. Justice Department arrived in the city, investigated, and charged nine patrolmen with “willfully” shooting and depriving those in the crowd “of life or liberty without due process of law”—a misdemeanor.48 Importantly, the ensuing trial was the first in U.S. history in which police were charged with excessive use of force “in controlling unruly campus demonstrations.” Composed of ten whites and two blacks, the jury found the defendants not guilty.49

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42 Ibid., 25–36, 37–47.
43 Ibid., 49.
44 Ibid., 57.
46 Ibid., 87, 149, 241.
48 Ibid., 156–57.
49 Ibid., 161, 185.
Many direct comparisons can be made between the events in Orangeburg and the events in May 1970 at Kent State, including the following:

- blaming radical outside agitators for disturbances and circulating rumors,
- increasing law enforcement response to the level of calling in the National Guard,
- students creating disturbances in town and protesting on campus,
- triggering the Berkeley Invention,
- an atmosphere of calm prior to the shootings,
- shooting into a crowd without warning or immediate provocation,
- students thinking authorities were firing blanks to frighten them,
- many students being shot in the back,
- irregularities related to use of weapons (collecting shell casings or swapping weapons),
- newspaper reports misrepresenting the shooting,
- insinuating there was a sniper,
- a generational and experience gap between the shooters and their victims,
- turning the city into an armed camp after the shootings, with troops, equipment, and a curfew,
- law enforcement authorities who did not have to “pay for the killing and wounding of the students in criminal or civil court,” and
- the site of the shooting being partially covered with a building.

White opinion on the Orangeburg Massacre was squarely with law enforcement and the governor. In his study *The Black Campus Movement: Black Students and the Racial Reconstitution of Higher Education, 1965-1972*, Ibram X. Kendi (formerly Ibram H. Rogers) writes, “As when officers killed students at Jackson State in May 1970 and at Southern–U in November 1972,” African Americans were “furious” about the Orangeburg Massacre. Bass and Nelson agree that the massacre strongly affected other historically black colleges.
prompting protests on southern campuses and elsewhere. The Southern Regional Council, a civil rights and research group, conducted its own investigation and concluded in its report of February 25 that there was no support for the governor’s claims that black power advocates were to blame, or that students had fired at the state police. The South Carolina State Advisory Committee of the Civil Rights Commission concluded that “without warning of any kind, the armed officers began to fire shotguns at the students . . . [and] most of the injured received their wounds from the back, apparently as they were fleeing.”

Nationwide, the shootings of students on the Orangeburg campus received relatively little coverage, and stories that did appear contained many errors. After the shootings at Kent State, then journalist for the Los Angeles Times Jack Nelson explained the lack of coverage of Orangeburg compared to Kent State in this way: “Another vital difference, of course, was that the Orangeburg victims were black. If they had been white, perhaps the nation would have learned something from ‘The Orangeburg Massacre.’” When Jack Nelson and co-author Jack Bass wrote The Orangeburg Massacre, they would offer further explanation of why coverage of Orangeburg was limited. In the Foreword to The Orangeburg Massacre, Thomas Pettigrew summarizes: “It was more in keeping with the national mood either to ignore the ‘incident’ or to accept uncritically Governor McNair’s strained explanation.” Again pointing to what Bass and Nelson argue in the book, Pettigrew adds that the Orangeburg Massacre, though a tragedy, received little investigation or coverage because it followed a succession of race riots in major northern cities; it appeared at a time when there was a “backlash” or polarization of racial opinion fueled by fear and uncertainty. Increased black militancy, as exemplified by the rise of the Black Panther party, was also a factor. One might want to keep in mind, though, that while the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest contextualizes its reports on Kent State and Jackson State amidst discussion of a number of other campuses, Orangeburg is not one of them.

Not only did the Orangeburg Massacre receive comparatively less national attention, but also the site was strongly and negatively impacted by the placement of an administration building and parking lot where the shootings took place. The Orangeburg shooting site is not on the National Register of Historic Places. However, portions of the adjacent campus and the All Star Bowling Lanes are listed on the National Register. There is also a comprehensive NRHP Multiple Property Documentation Form that describes events on the property and others associated with the Civil Rights Movement in Orangeburg County, 1955–1971. A permanent marker titled “The Orangeburg Massacre” installed on the slope down which the fatally wounded students were pulled to the sidewalk reads:

On February 8, 1968, after three nights of escalating racial tension over efforts by S.C. State College students and others to desegregate the All Star Bowling Lanes, 3 students died and 27 others were wounded on this campus. S.C. Highway Patrolmen fired on a crowd here, killing Samuel Hammond Jr., Delano Middleton, and Henry Smith. This tragedy was the first of its kind on any American college campus.

63 Bass and Nelson, Orangeburg Massacre, 92.
64 Ibid., 83.
65 Nelson, “Orangeburg to Kent State.”
66 ix; also see Bass and Nelson, Orangeburg Massacre, 83.
67 Foreword, viii–ix; also see Bass and Nelson, Orangeburg Massacre, 82.
68 Bass and Nelson, Orangeburg Massacre, 212.
Racial Conflict of 1968 Continues

On April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., was assassinated in Memphis, prompting an outbreak of racial violence in 125 cities across the country. Senator Robert F. Kennedy, viewed by students and others as a hope for the end to violence domestically and in Vietnam should he win the presidency, broke the news to an audience of African Americans in Indianapolis that had gathered for his scheduled campaign speech. Citing the loss in his own family, Kennedy acknowledged the bitterness that his listeners would feel over the death of King, yet implored them to continue to work together to change the country for the better. In Los Angeles eight weeks later, June 5, 1968, on the evening that he celebrated his victory in the California primary, RFK himself was assassinated.

On July 29, 1968, racial conflict broke out in the Glenville area of Cleveland in Northeast Ohio. The Ohio National Guard was brought in to assist the police, but this did not prevent extensive looting, arson, and eleven dead (including three police). In this context, on August 10, 1968, the Kerner Commission formally urged the improvement of riot control training for the National Guard. When the Democratic National Convention was held in Chicago later that month, street demonstrations were met by the Illinois National Guard and federal troops, which were used to support the police. The subsequent Walker Report would conclude that the resulting violence constituted “a police riot.” At the Republican Convention in Miami Beach, an undaunted Ralph Abernathy, successor to Martin Luther King as head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, led a demonstration to call attention to the plight of the poor in the United States. In late August, racial unrest in Ohio continued, with episodes of arson and looting in Lima and Middletown and the enforcement of a curfew in Akron, Ohio.

The Pattern of Student Protest and Law Enforcement Response

As racial unrest continued to spread throughout the nation’s cities in the latter half of the decade, the number of sit-ins, walkouts, and confrontations increased at U.S. universities. In late April 1968, the proposed construction of a gymnasium by Columbia University in a neighboring New York City park separating the campus from working-class Harlem initiated a major student protest at that university. It is the view of the President’s Commission that the demonstrations, sit-ins, and disruptions that took place at Columbia were important because they “illustrated the spread of the Berkeley Invention and the rising tide of student opposition to war and racial injustice” in the four years following the Berkeley FSM protests. However, according to the commission, at Berkeley the underlying demand was for a more open campus and the removal of restrictions on free speech as imposed by administrators, while at Columbia the goal “was not to make Columbia more neutral politically and more open intellectually, but rather to transform it into a revolutionary political weapon with which they could attack the system.”

The Columbia protests stressed three specific criticisms of the university: 1) sponsorship of Vietnam War–related research; 2) insensitivity toward the local black community as represented by the planned construction of a university gymnasium on a park between the campus’ Morningside Heights location and Harlem; and 3) authoritarianism in the form of arbitrary and unilateral administration rulings.

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70 “The Glenville Shootout and Ohio's several other racial disturbances of the 1960s illustrate the lack of opportunity for many people, especially African Americans, in Ohio's major cities during this era,” “Glenville Shootout.” Riots in Cleveland’s Hough area in the summer of 1966 were another notable mark in the succession of civil disturbances rooted in racial and economic inequality.

71 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:9.

72 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 35, 37.

73 Gitlin, Sixties, 306; Sale, SDS, 434; Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 36.
Student Power and Black Power proponents presented an escalating series of demands resulting in the cancellation of classes and the sealing off of the campus. Direct action at Columbia began on March 27 with a hundred-strong delegation to Low Memorial Library (the administration building) with an anti-IDA petition. In return, the university put on probation six SDS chapter leaders (the IDA Six). Two weeks later, a service honoring the late Martin Luther King was disrupted to argue that an institution taking over black property in Harlem for its own purposes was not in fact honoring King at all. This was soon followed on April 23 with the occupation of Hamilton Hall by a coalition of black and white students. In his chronicle of the sixties, Todd Gitlin notes, “The movement, reeling, found fresh inspiration” when “nineteen days after King’s assassination came the student occupation of buildings at Columbia University.”

Stephan Bradley, author of *Harlem vs. Columbia*, writes that Dean Henry Coleman was held hostage in his office in Hamilton, an administrative and classroom building, as part of the protest. A joint Steering Committee made up of student leaders presented six demands: amnesty for the IDA Six, termination of the IDA affiliation, a repeal of a ban on indoor protests, the university’s cooperation in dropping police charges against protesters, and a permanent halt to the construction of the gym. The protesting black students, wanting to make race an issue the university would have to deal with, subsequently asked the white radical students to leave Hamilton and start their own demonstration on the university’s attempt to build the gym elsewhere. Those students moved on to Low Memorial Library, the centrally located administration building, and set up camp in the presidential offices. This was followed on April 24 by the taking of Avery Hall (School of Architecture), on April 25 of Fayerweather Hall, and on April 26 of Mathematics Hall—altogether five campus buildings occupied by students. Gitlin observes that during the occupation there were clear attempts to destroy the symbols of the Establishment, for example by smoking President Grayson Kirk’s cigars, drinking his sherry, and pirating or liberating documents, but in no case were acts of violence committed against persons. The occupation took on the air of a community festival, with students of both sexes moving in, holding ideological and technical debates, eating, sleeping, and even performing a wedding.

After eight days of negotiation, the administration called in the police. In the middle of the night of April 30, over a thousand city police raided the occupied buildings, forcibly removing the protestors from university property and arresting more than seven hundred—three-quarters of them students. More than two hundred young people were injured in the arrest.

The police attack coming on the eighth day of the occupation, and with the full approval of the Columbia authorities, was not extraordinarily brutal compared to the treatment dealt to ghetto minorities, the gunning down of unarmed students at Orangeburg, or even the precedents at Berkeley, Wisconsin, and Oakland. But the grim, methodical cruelty, the indiscriminate use of force on any nearby body, the injuries to more than two hundred young people, the mass arrests of more than seven hundred people, and the presence of reporters from every known media, combined to give it a special impact on the students involved, on the flabbergasted faculty, on campuses elsewhere, and on much of the nation beyond academe. It was one more example of students putting themselves on the defensive . . . . It was also one more link in the chain of evidence—the police riot at the Democratic Convention would be another one—that active dissent would not be tolerated by the state and violent repression would be.

Despite the harsher tactics of law enforcement, it was clear that by the end of April that the students had accomplished their goals: they had stopped construction on the gym and radicalized the student body. What

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75 Gitlin, *Sixties*, 306.
78 Sale, *SDS*, 438.
followed was a month-long student strike demanding more university reform. Sale comments that “Columbia 1968 was the most significant student rebellion to date, surpassing even Berkeley 1964. . . . America’s children had not only awakened from the American Dream but were preparing to move on to actually destroying all it stood for. Columbia quickly became the symbol of all campus protest, and it energized the news media, angered the politicians, terrified the academics, and inspired the students.” The Weather Underground Organization, colloquially known as the Weathermen, was beginning to take shape. A faction of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Weathermen was a militant radical left-wing organization. Accused by the media of using classic revolutionary techniques, SDS was now pointed to as the “prime mover” of campus revolts across America. This characterization would become significant to the response of authorities in Kent, Ohio, in May 1970. In addition, the Weather Underground Organization, colloquially known as the Weathermen, had splintered from SDS and was beginning to take shape. Different from SDS, the Weathermen was a militant radical left-wing organization. Failure in many spheres to observe this distinction also influenced response to student protest.

Gitlin contends that the confrontation at Columbia signaled four important transformations in the student movement. First, “deference and civility were resoundingly dumped” as students simply took matters into their own hands, taking over buildings, holding administrators hostage, and taking and destroying university property and records. Second, the movement replaced the university’s imposed culture with their own, building a residential community of protest and freedom in improvised spaces within the buildings they had appropriated. Third, the administration used the police, and police brutality, to violently oppose the student agenda. As at Berkeley earlier, these tactics had the effect of galvanizing and broadening student opposition to the administration’s position. Finally, the press sided solidly with the administration and “built a containing wall against the radical tide.” Many of these journalistic accounts were false or exaggerated to the extreme. For student protesters, and similar to what happened at Berkeley, this merely confirmed their beliefs that the university was indeed part of a larger system of social domination that must be torn down. It is interesting that much of the Columbia protests centered on the construction of a gym by a university administration appearing to disregard the symbolic importance of that ground to others. This would be the root issue in the Move the Gym protests at Kent State a decade later.

On May 3, 1968, African American students at Northwestern University seized the business office and demanded separate black housing, more scholarships, a greater number of black faculty, and courses designed specifically for African Americans. The university agreed to these demands. That same month, students at Stanford University occupied a building to protest the suspension of seven students who had led a demonstration the preceding fall against CIA recruitment on campus. In 1968, students also seized the administration buildings at the University of Chicago, Ohio State University, and Howard University. The trend continued in 1969 at Harvard University, where student concerns included university policies on ROTC and ownership of working-class housing. On May 7, 1969, paralleling the situation at Northwestern University the previous year, students at historically black Howard University seized eight buildings and forced the university to close.

By 1970, public officials and administrators at universities across the country were well schooled in the history and lessons of the Berkeley Invention. However, the central concern of the authorities was the issue of civil

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80 Sale, *SDS*, 441, 447, 442.
82 Gitlin, *Sixties*, 308.
84 Gitlin, *Sixties*, 309.
85 Mayer, *Commission on KSU*, 1:5.
disturbance, not civil disobedience directed at social injustice. They steeled themselves for an escalation of events and vowed to act forcefully. In May 1968, Governor Ronald Reagan of California ordered the destruction of People’s Park at UC Berkeley. Gitlin comments, “The repression was so brutal.” For those who paid attention to Berkeley, the sense of white exemption died there, a full year before Kent State. Two years later, on April 7, 1970, Reagan tried to rally support when addressing an audience of alumni of the University of California system by pronouncing that radical student protestors should be told, “If it takes a bloodbath now let’s get it over with.” “The ‘bloodbath’ statement caught nationwide attention, and was interpreted as Reagan’s desire to have a confrontation with students.” A decade later, still asked by the public about his remark, Reagan explained that his figure of speech was misunderstood; he meant that the university administration would have to “take their bloodbath” by exacting firmer discipline on the dissenters:

This was during the period when Wheeler Hall was burned and when an attempt was made to set fire to the great university library. The university administrators had tried to discuss the differences with the dissenters. But as dissent grew into violence the university administrators were finally coming to the realization that the dissenters were going beyond dissent and did not want a reasoned discussion on their differences and they, the administrators, were in effect indulging in appeasement. I then said these administrators had come to realize the error of their ways and now knew they had to deal directly with the violence. And that is where I used, as a figure of speech, the expression that they, the administrators, knew they were going to have to take their bloodbath by resisting the rioters with expulsion, suspension, etc.

Significantly, Reagan borrowed Nixon’s pronouncement on Kent State—“when dissent turns to violence it invites tragedy”—as he sought to correct the historical record. Still, there was a discernable, executive-level perspective on student protestors, and the President’s Commission made a key point in recommending that “public officials at all levels of government recognize that their public statements can either heal or divide. Harsh and bitter rhetoric can set citizen against citizen, exacerbate tension, and encourage violence.” Nixon’s Vice President Spiro Agnew, of course, was notable for such rhetoric against antiwar protestors, calling them, “‘home front snipers’” and referring to colleges as, “‘circus tents or psychiatric centers for over-privileged, under-disciplined irresponsible children.’”

The Vietnam War Escalates, Student Protests Escalate

As student activism became more visible across the nation, its concerns for social justice intertwined with the escalation of the Vietnam War. The peace and student civil rights movements became a focused antiwar movement. The President’s Commission noted:

86 There were exceptions, as at Yale, where police, administrators, and protestors made provisions to stave off potential violence at a planned rally in support of the Black Panthers on May 1, 1970 (Paul Bass and Doug Rae, “The Panther and the Bulldog, The Story of May Day 1970,” Yale Alumni Magazine July/Aug [2006], http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2006_07/panthers.html).
87 Gitlin, Sixties, 361.
89 Ibid., 191–92.
90 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 10.
The growing frequency with which campus protest reflected the Berkeley scenario was largely the result of the emergence and development of three issues: American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia, the slow progress of American society toward racial equality, and charges of “unresponsiveness” against the federal government and the university and against their “repressive” reaction to student demands.92

The United States began funding South Vietnam’s war efforts in 1955, soon after the generation that would protest the war was born. As that generation hit adolescence, John F. Kennedy, the youngest president in U.S. history told them:

The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

The student SDS authors of the Port Huron Statement heard in Kennedy’s inaugural speech and saw in his sending of advisors to South Vietnam in 1962, the year of their statement, a perpetuation of the military-industrial complex against which Kennedy’s predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, had cautioned the public. Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, who had hoped to found his legacy on attacking poverty, would go down in history instead for his escalation of the war. Johnson sent the first U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in March 1965. That month saw the first SDS-sponsored teach-in, held at the University of Michigan and followed by thirty-five others throughout the country. In April came the first major antiwar demonstration of the Vietnam era—a march on Washington organized by SDS, SNCC, and other activist groups, in which approximately twenty-five thousand people participated. As Gitlin experienced it, the crowd felt the best speech of the day was delivered by Paul Potter, then president of SDS: “His argument was that the brutality manifested in Vietnam was connected to the brutality of American society and that in order to stop the war we had to change the system.”93

1965 also marked a renewed connection of civil rights leaders, notably Martin Luther King Jr., with student protesters and the antiwar movement. Coretta Scott King had been active in this area going back to her student days at Antioch College in Ohio when she worked for the Women’s Strike for Peace. MLK often asked her to appear at peace demonstrations in his stead, especially prior to his strong and very public anti-Vietnam Riverside Church speech, regarded by some as one of the finest of his career.94 The formation of the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in 1966 further marked a clear “coming together of the civil rights and anti-war movements,” with numerous former SNCC organizers such as James Bevel and Bernard Lafayette now coming north to work in the growing antiwar campaign.95

Despite increasing protest, the war continued to escalate. Stanley Karnow relates that by the end of 1967, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam increased from two hundred thousand to half a million. As it had been for the civil rights and student movements, 1968 was a decisive year in the Vietnam story. In late January, the Tet offensive began with well-coordinated, widespread attacks by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong guerilla forces on more than one hundred South Vietnamese cities and towns, including the historic city of Hue. In Saigon, the American Embassy was attacked and five soldiers were killed. After three weeks of fighting, Hue

92 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 29–30.
was recaptured by South Vietnamese troops. General William Westmoreland sent a request for more than two hundred thousand additional troops, but the request was denied. Within a month, in late February, well-respected CBS television news anchor Walter Cronkite returned from Vietnam to predict that the war could not be won and would likely end in stalemate. Expecting middle America to agree, Johnson announced he would not seek a second term as president, leaving the Democratic nomination to his vice president, Hubert Humphrey, who was narrowly defeated by Richard Nixon. Nixon assured America that he, “would end the war and win the peace,” which some interpreted to mean that he now had a secret plan to end the war.96

In 1969, the long process of peace talks, which had begun January 25 of that year, continued in Paris, with expanded delegations including members of the Saigon government and the Vietcong. In June, President Nixon began withdrawing troops from Vietnam as part of his Vietnamization efforts. Nevertheless, antiwar protests continued, with huge rallies in Washington, D.C., in October and November, the latter rally drawing over half a million people. The diffuse leadership of such efforts was in the hands of groups such as Cleveland Peace Action, the American Friends Service Committee, the Black United Front, and the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. In mid-November, news of the My Lai massacre, which had occurred in 1968, was revealed by the press to the general public, generating protest on college and university campuses.97 For some, My Lai recalled the brutality of which Paul Potter had spoken during the first march on Washington in 1965. In addition to a general dissatisfaction with the justification for the Vietnam War, the increased relevance of the draft for college students brought immediacy to opposition of the war. One particular issue of contention for college student protestors was the request by draft boards for universities to turn over the academic records of draft-age students. As early as May 1966, there had been a major student sit-in in the Administration Building on the University of Wisconsin–Madison campus to protest draft deferment examinations. On March 4, 1967, a presidential commission had recommended comprehensive revisions of the Selective Service law, including termination of deferments for graduate students, the institution of a lottery system, and the calling up of 19-year-olds first. Subsequently, students around the country gathered around TV sets wherever they could find them the evening of December 1, 1969, to see where they and their brethren would hit in the first draft lottery since 1942—proof that Nixon’s plan to end the war was failing. A key feature of the Vietnam draft was a change from the draft-the-oldest-man-first policy for men aged eighteen to twenty-six to one that featured a random drawing, thus putting larger numbers of younger men at higher risk.98

In 1970, peace talks continued, some in secret, and the drawdown of troops continued. There was a sense that the war might be coming to an end. However, this all changed the evening of April 30, when President Nixon announced on national television that the United States had invaded Cambodia. This further proof that rather than ending, the war was spreading99 represented the worst of broken promises to the young, including the students of Kent State, who would join the eruption of protest at colleges and universities around the country. The protests at Kent State May 1–4 began as protests of the expansion of the war into Cambodia. William Shawcross in his book, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia*, indicates that Nixon was convinced at this point that the invasion of neutral Cambodia represented the kind of bold action that was necessary to make history, despite warnings from his advisors, but history has shown his policy here to be flawed, and, in fact, few enemies were found.99 Records of the so-called Daniel Boone squads and the Operation Menu missions also make clear that the United States secretly had been ignoring Cambodia’s neutral status for years prior to April 1970.100 Shortly after the shootings at Kent State, Nixon and Secretary of State Henry

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97 Ibid., 697–98.
98 Ibid., 624–27.
Kissinger did have doubts about their Cambodian policy, but Nixon said at that point: “Henry, we’ve done it. Never look back.” Shawcross notes, “Now Kent and Cambodia were to be forever linked.”

Activism and The Counterculture

By the spring of 1969, in the wake of the national organization’s splintering due to increasing internal political factionalism, the dissolution of SDS chapters began at many college campuses, including Brandeis, Berkeley, Columbia, Texas, Michigan State, and Kent State. Nevertheless, students throughout the country generally saw themselves as part of a counterculture that had infused American society in every corner. The spirit of the Summer of Love, a gathering of as many as 100,000 people in summer of 1967 in the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood of San Francisco, and its prelude, the Human Be-in, a rally in Golden Gate Park in January of 1967 which proclaimed Make Love Not War, had made its way to middle America by the summer of 1969. The Woodstock festival, “3 Days of Peace & Music,” took place in that last summer of the decade of the 1960s. Grounding her study of the sixties generation on Karl Mannheim’s “The Problem of Generations,” Rebecca Klatch asserts, “Like classes, generations represent an objective condition, regardless of whether individuals consciously recognize their commonality.” Those who “develop a subjective consciousness of their location, thereby becom[e] a potential force of social change.” A generation that attended college in unprecedented numbers, students in the sixties entered an environment that supported the questioning of traditional values and bonded with others who were experiencing the same changes. “Other significant factors in the formation of the 1960s leftist youth protest include the effects of affluence on the development of ‘post-materialist’ values, the significance of growing up in the nuclear age, and the spread of youth culture.”

“The counterculture was able to reach a much larger audience because of postwar America’s middle-class affluence.” Young people had more disposable income to spend on clothes and music and mass media had a new ability “to promote and disseminate youth culture[, thereby] further accelerat[ing] this generation’s collective identity.” Another component of the youth culture that “acted to unite individuals in opposition to straight society” was drugs. Both drug use and a loose “range of beliefs and practices” caused the counterculture to be dismissed or damned by at least the earlier SDS members, though other activist groups and

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102 Ibid., 153.
104 Gitlin, Sixties, 212.
105 Klatch, Generation Divided, 3–5.
107 Klatch, Generation Divided, 135.
109 Klatch, Generation Divided, 136.
individuals would embrace it.\textsuperscript{111} For the average college student, harassment for appearance and suspected drug use was more immediate than any disapproval by somewhat older activist members of the generation. “Such repression led to the delegitimation of institutional authority, radicalizing youth along the way.”\textsuperscript{112} Gitlin adds, “If you had started out smoking dope, growing your hair, discarding your bra partly to join the crowd and partly to shock adults . . . only to end up getting harassed and busted, it was natural to ask questions about the society that was treating you like a freak.” The police, restaurateurs, landlords, and city officials discriminated actively against “young people whose looks they didn't like.” “As old authorities lost their hold, politicians got mileage out of denouncing student radicals and hippies and black militants, all clumped together as battalions undermining the rule of the father-state and the family's own father.”\textsuperscript{113} Radicalization had its limits, however, as the rejection of the revolutionary and violent Weathermen faction by the mainstream SDS illustrated. Klatch shows that even those, such as member of the Weathermen Lynn Dykstra, who had “giv[en] themselves to the revolution with the whole of their lives” might draw a line. KIacht reports Dykstra’s outlook with: “By the time of the 1969 SDS convention Lynn had contemplated losing her life to the revolution: ‘It was more of a martyrdom feeling that we were right and they were wrong and if they shot us, it would just help our cause. But we weren’t trying to get killed. . . . None of us were that crazy.’”\textsuperscript{114}

### Student Activism at Kent State

Established in 1910 as a teacher-training school, Kent State Normal School (as it was originally called) was named for William S. Kent who donated the land for the original campus. (Kent was the son of the namesake of Kent, Ohio.) The university did not hold its first classes until 1912. These classes met in various extension centers in cities around Kent until 1913 when the first buildings on campus opened. The first class of 34 students graduated in July of 1914. Over the years since its opening, the university has added degrees and research opportunities at both the graduate and undergraduate level. The campus in Kent has grown to include more than 100 buildings, and the university has expanded to a number of regional campuses around Northeast Ohio.

By the second half of the twentieth century, Kent State, following a long record of social activism, was engaged in the student protest movement. Between 1965 and 1970, more than ten student groups were active on the Kent Campus protesting against the war and on behalf of civil rights issues.\textsuperscript{115} Representatives from these groups organized local events and participated in national-level protests as well. Activities of the Kent Committee to End the War in Vietnam (KCEWV), one action group, made frequent appearances on the front page of the student newspaper. The KCEWV began holding silent vigils on Wednesdays after the beginning of the war in 1965 and organized many rallies.\textsuperscript{116} In October 1967, the group recruited two hundred people to take part in the National Mobilization Committee’s national rally in Washington, D.C., and march on the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{117} On campus, the group protested being photographed—characterizing photographing as police harassment; the police in return contended that photos were taken to ensure that no “‘professional demonstrators’” (or “‘outside

\textsuperscript{111} Klatch, \textit{Generation Divided}, 135–57.
\textsuperscript{113} Gitlin, \textit{Sixties}, 216–17.
\textsuperscript{114} Klatch, \textit{Generation Divided}, 202–03.
\textsuperscript{115} Jennifer Leadbetter, “Student Activism,” Unpublished paper based on research from the \textit{Daily Kent Stater} (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 2002), 1. Thomas M. Grace, \textit{Kent State: Death and Dissent in the Long Sixties} (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016) examines the long history of social and political activism prior to and in the aftermath of the May 4 shootings, through the end of the Vietnam War.
\textsuperscript{116} Gary Smith “‘Kent Committee to End War’ Begins Program of Education,” \textit{Daily Kent Stater} (Kent, OH: Kent State University, October 29, 1965)
\textsuperscript{117} “KCEWV in D.C. Rally,” \textit{Daily Kent Stater} (Kent, OH), October 20, 1967)
troublemakers”") were participating in an on-campus demonstration, which would have violated university policy. In November 1967, faculty and graduate student members of the committee held a four-day “Vietnam school” on campus addressing the history of the war and its media coverage. For Veterans Day, the KCEWV vigil was part of a nationwide student protest against Dow Chemical’s production of napalm. In December, the group protested outside an induction center in Cleveland during National Draft Week. KCEWV started the new year by forming a group to counsel students on draft deferments.

Classes began at Kent State fall quarter of the charged year 1968 with cautioning remarks by President Robert White, aware—as any university administrator in the country would have been—that, “the year ahead could be difficult.” Fall enrollment topped twenty thousand on the Kent Campus, a considerable increase of more than seventeen hundred over the previous year. The term began on Jewish New Year, causing some faculty to cancel classes and some students to see the administration as insensitive. In October 1968, the Kent State chapter of Students for a Democratic Society emerged, “superseding the Kent Committee to End the War in Vietnam.”

On October 8, three hundred students took part in the Kent Free University, a teach-in organized by the campus SDS chapter. Kent State SDS members attended a campaign rally by Richard Nixon at nearby University of Akron, shouting, “we want truth,” “law and order, no justice,” and “Chicago.” The month ended with a visit from Columbia SDS leader Mark Rudd, who addressed one thousand on campus about Columbia’s student strike in the spring of that year. On November 13, 1968, a coalition led by SDS and Black United Students (BUS), the latter of which had been formed on the Kent Campus on May 21, 1968, staged a sit-in to block recruitment on campus for the police department of Oakland, California. The Oakland police department was notorious for its repressive treatment of the Black Panthers in their home city of Oakland, which also had been the site of an antidraft demonstration on October 20, 1967—the largest up to that time—during the nationwide Stop the Draft Week. After protestors against the Oakland police were brought up on disciplinary charges, 250 black students, “many wearing arm bands marked ‘unity[,]’ marched off campus” to leave for Akron, Ohio, “in a silent, peaceful demonstration” in support of the students threatened with dismissal and in protest of the denial of amnesty for those students. They returned after three days, when the university, citing insufficient evidence of disorderly conduct, dismissed its case against the students.

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119 “4 Days, 18 Discussions: KCEWV School to Probe War” Daily Kent Stater (Kent, OH), November 3, 1967.
120 Sue Daly, “Napalm Producers: KCEWV Protest Dow” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, November 1, 1967; Barb Hille, “Campus Group Urges Disposal of Vigil Pix” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, November 2, 1967).
121 “KCEWV to Protest at Induction Center” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, December 6, 1967).
123 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:10.
In the spring of 1969, SDS members began a concerted campaign against university policy, demanding: 1) the abolition of campus ROTC; 2) the termination of the Liquid Crystal Institute, a center of study founded in 1965 which combined basic and applied research on liquid crystal technology; 3) the removal of the state crime laboratory from campus; and 4) the abolition of the degree program in law enforcement. In April 1969, a disciplinary hearing was scheduled for students who attempted to post these demands on the Administration Building—which had led to immediate revocation of the SDS charter. Two hundred supporters were met by about fifty counterdemonstrators outside the Music and Speech building where the hearing was to be held, and a scuffle ensued. Inside, the hearings were disrupted and shut down. The campus police sealed those protestors who had entered inside the Music and Speech building and turned fifty-eight over to the Highway Patrol for transport to jail. Four SDS leaders were eventually convicted of assault, battery, and inciting to riot and were sentenced to one year in the Portage County jail.132

Despite revocation of their charter, members of the Kent State SDS chapter remained active through the remainder of the 1968–69 academic year. On April 28, 1969, well-known SDS national spokesperson Bernardine Dohrn helped lead a teach-in regarding the four demands made by the Kent State SDS two weeks earlier.133 On May 22, members of the Kent State SDS chapter attempted, unsuccessfully, to break up an ROTC review. The federal government evidenced its interest in Kent State. The Federal House Committee on Internal Security held two days of hearings on the activities of SDS, during which President Robert White and Chester (Chet) Williams, director of safety and public services at Kent State, were among the witnesses on June 24. Williams indicated that campus police were not sufficient to deal with mass violence, but also stated that arrangements of cooperation with local police and security organizations were in place and had previously been successful.134 On campus, President White asserted that the university would follow a policy of arrests and suspension for those involved in further disruption.135 White further commented:

Kent State University undeniably faces a crossroad. . . . Universities have never before faced the assaults of the present. They produce tensions and strains, and exact a cost in many ways. Kent State University has become an open and announced target. That seems to be the unfair reward of those institutions which have been the most open.136

The discussion over police and administrative responses to student demonstrations continued at Kent State with the submission of a position paper on September 8, 1969, to President White by Barclay McMillen, a faculty member in political science and the president’s assistant. McMillen emphasized “personalizing the university” as a strategy for combating student disaffection and potential police excesses.137

The University opened for academic year 1969–70 without special note on September 29, 1969. Then on October 15, 1969, Kent State University students participated in the National Moratorium, a massive nationwide protest of the Vietnam War, purported to be the largest antiwar protest to that time in United States history. The Daily Kent Stater reported that thirty-five hundred students from the Kent Campus participated in activities including a rally on the Commons and a march into the downtown area.138 A second National Moratorium was held November 15, 1969, in San Francisco and Washington, D.C. Arriving on the bus organized by the campus Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) chapter and in cars and vans, Kent State

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133 John Darnell, “Discuss SDS Demands at Teach-In” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, April 30, 1969).
134 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 4:60–63.
136 Ibid.
137 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:13.
students were counted in the crowd of half a million at the Washington demonstration. That fall also featured such local protests as the serving of a thin broth of unseasoned pumpkin soup to passersby in front of the student union. The soup, identified as staple fare of the Vietnamese diet, was meant to symbolize the simplicity of the nation of farmers upon which the United States swept down with its military power and technology.

Toward the beginning of the second half of the academic year of 1969–1970, the national SMC, along with the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, organized a National Student Anti-War Conference at Case Western University in nearby Cleveland for February 1970. Organizers declared that the three thousand attendees represented "the biggest gathering of radicals in the U.S." The Kent SMC chapter planned on participating in the April 15 National Student Strike of high schools and colleges throughout the U.S. and on holding a series of smaller protests in the week leading up to the major protest. The theme for the mass antiwar events was “Bring all the GI’s Home Now.” The first April event at Kent State, however, was a speech on the tenth by Jerry Rubin, an outspoken YIPPIE leader, a national figure who attracted a crowd of about two thousand to a rally on front campus calling for the young of the white middle class to “rise up,” because “being young in America is illegal.” April 16 saw an encounter between police and marchers at the AT&T building in Downtown Kent. On the first April 22 Earth Day, students, campus and county law enforcement authorities, the county’s Animal Protective League, and a Portage County prosecutor all showed up in front of the student union to stop the napalming of a dog, as announced in a Social Problems class session by Robby Stamps, who later would be wounded on May 4. The possession of napalm was a federal offense. Revealing “There is no napalm. There is no dog,” one of the six students who had conceived the protest upbraided the crowd for being willing to stop injury to an animal but not willing to take action to stop the use of the napalm on people in Vietnam. The four SDS leaders convicted in the Music and Speech incident of April 8, 1969, were released from jail on April 29. The Daily Kent Stater ceased publication that spring on April 30, but student photographers would be crucial in documenting the events to unfold beginning the next day.

**Historiography**

The recounting of what happened on May 4, 1970, for many is not history, but memory. Claire Bond Potter and Renee Romano categorize events such as the shootings on May 4 as “recent history.” Writing about the recent past comes, they say, with “the dilemma of crafting a narrative of events that have no clear end and can be ongoing.” The past is still present, and “history can ‘talk back’ to the historian.” Facing this reality, historian Arthur Schlesinger said he was “willing to take his chances on writing history from ‘a zone of imperfect visibility.’” Julia Rose terms the genre “difficult history.” “Interpretations of difficult histories in museums and at historic sites,” Rose says, can offer “authentic evidence” and provide visitors opportunities to “expand their understandings of the history.” “When learners come to understand the circumstances of mass violence and oppression, they are more likely to ask questions and demand to know more about the history and the

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139 Leadbetter, “Student Activism,” 7.
140 “Radicals Plan April Anti War Rallies” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, February 17, 1970).
141 “Rubin to Speak Here Today” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, April 10, 1970); Michener, Kent State, 179.
142 Judy Greiner, “Police, Marchers Clash at AT&T” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, April 16, 1970).
144 Stamps, “Save the Pooch,” 122.
145 Bob Carpenter, “‘Kent Four’ End Sojourn in County Jail” (Kent, OH: Daily Kent Stater, April 30, 1970).
people affected by the history, then and now.” Nearly all visitors arrive at the May 4 site with logical notions about what happened. If the guardsmen shot, they have reasoned, it must have been because the students were rioting, thus inciting such violence. When visitors learn the documented evidence of what happened, they reach evidence-based conclusions on their own about the sequence of events. The distances between the Pagoda from where guardsmen shot and the markers where the slain students fell testify without words to the historical truth. Further authenticated evidence is available within the May 4 shootings site through the May 4 Visitors Center museum and documentary, Walking Tour and documentary, and educational brochure. The short history below, “The Day the War Came Home,” first was drafted in 2009—early in a lengthy and inclusive consultative process that began in 2007 and extended through 2013, when the May 4 Visitors Center was dedicated during the Forty-Third Annual May 4 Commemoration. (Appendix 1. provides a description of the consultation process.) The narrative continues to be a living thing. In 2016, key unanswered questions remain and varying viewpoints and interpretations exist. Narrative in “The Day the War Came Home” acknowledges open questions and varying interpretations, while sharing what is known now. Questions should continue to be asked, so that they might become, in Rose’s words, “pathways to social justice.”

The Day the War Came Home

At Kent State in 1970, interested authorities (campus, local, state, and national) were better acquainted than most students with the broad recent history of the student protest movement. With a perspective informed—consciously or culturally—by the Berkeley Invention, these authorities viewed the student protest movement as both deeply organized and mobilized in the form of so-called outside agitators bent on violence, who were to be suppressed with every available measure. On Friday, May 1, two peaceful demonstrations took place on the Kent State campus following President Nixon’s televised announcement of the invasion of neutral Cambodia on April 30, 1970. First, in an antiwar demonstration, campus graduate students in history symbolically buried a copy of the Constitution (Nixon had murdered it) at the base of the Victory Bell. Near the conclusion of the rally, undergraduate student Ken Hammond, who had been aligned with SDS, spoke up to call for a rally on Monday, May 4, so that students could further consider the escalation of the war—evidenced by bombing within the border of Cambodia—along with any response to this news from the university administration and whether Kent State should join a national student strike. Second, the campus group Black United Students held a rally to protest the violent tactics used by the Ohio National Guard against students of color at Ohio State University during an antiwar demonstration the previous evening. Black students cautioned their peers to stay away from any gatherings over the weekend. That Friday night, prompted by a mix of political protest and high feeling from the first warm spring night, several disturbances occurred, including a small trash fire started by members of a motorcycle gang who were doing tricks on their bikes in the middle of the street, individuals stopping cars to ask drivers their opinion of Cambodia, and one or more beer bottles thrown at police cars. For a long stretch of the evening, police cars stayed out of the area as the mayor amassed additional forces from a neighboring police department and the county sheriff’s department. When law enforcement began clearing the streets with squad formations and tear gas, some in the crowd took on a harder political edge and broke windows in business buildings, aiming particularly to harm those that might be profiting from the war effort, but breaking windows in local businesses as well, resulting in $10,000 in total damages. The mayor declared a state of emergency and ordered the bars closed, which forced hundreds more students, now disgruntled, onto the streets and into the midst of a police action. As much of the crowd was forced eastward along Main Street toward the Kent State campus, the mayor called the governor’s office to report—erroneously—that SDS had

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147 Julia Rose, Interpreting Difficult History at Museums and Historic Sites (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 25, 49.
148 Ibid., 28, 50.
149 Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 1–2.
150 Ibid., 2.
taken over a part of the city. The governor, in return, dispatched an Ohio National Guard liaison officer to Kent. Sixty people were arrested, “not an unusually large number for a weekend evening in downtown Kent.” The remainder of the night was quiet. The President’s Commission concluded:

The pattern established on Friday night was to recur throughout the weekend: There were disorderly incidents; authorities could not or did not respond in time to apprehend those responsible to stop the incidents in their early stages; the disorder grew; the police action, when it came, involved bystanders as well as participants; and finally, the students drew together in the conviction that they were being arbitrarily harassed.

While it may not be possible to align all features of the Berkeley Invention with the night of May 1, 1970, in downtown Kent, one factor clearly applies: “police intervention, which, in turn, rallied moderate students.” Many did feel “arbitrarily harassed,” and many would turn out in greater numbers as demonstrations continued on campus for the next three days. Among these varying groups of demonstrators, many already felt rankled by Nixon’s Cambodia invasion as the breaking of a promise to end the war. Many would continue to be disturbed by what they perceived as unjust law enforcement responses to their expressions of dissent.

Saturday, May 2, began with some students assisting shop owners in cleaning up glass from the broken windows downtown and a series of meetings as university and Kent city personnel planned for additional trouble and set curfews for the city and campus. The university worked with the National Guard liaison to plan how arrests would be conducted on campus: first the university would call on campus police, second the sheriff’s department, and third the State Highway Patrol. Liaison Lt. Charles Barnette warned that if the National Guard were called to assist, “it would make no distinction between the city and the campus and would assume complete control of the entire area.” Next, the university planned social activities on campus for students and distributed a flyer explaining the curfew and stating that peaceful assemblies were not banned on campus. Rumors circulated among officials of the city and the university that the campus’ ROTC building would be a target. Encouraged to do so by some townspeople and by Lt. Barnette, shortly after 5:00 pm, Mayor Leroy Satrom requested that the Ohio National Guard be sent to Kent. “Companies A and C, 145th Infantry and Troop G, 107th Armored Cavalry Ohio National Guard, mobilized on April 29, 1970, in conjunction with the Teamster strike and on active duty since that date, were alerted and prepared to move to Kent.” As a Guard unit rode down East Main Street, it was stoned by persons hiding among trees. Specialist 4th Class Ronald West of Troop G of the 2nd Squadron, 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment, was cut in the mouth by glass when a rock broke the windshield of a jeep in which he was riding, and several other guardsmen in the unit reported they were hit by stones or pieces of brick.” Tom Grace notes the strain of duty at the Teamster strike and comments on the rock throwing: “Troop G would not forget the battering.”

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152 Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, *This We Know*, 3–4; Mayer, *Commission on KSU*, 1:14.
154 Scranton et al., *President’s Commission*, 242–43.
155 Scranton et al., *President’s Commission*, 244–45.
158 Scranton et al., *President’s Commission*, 251.
159 Kent State: Death and Dissent in the Long Sixties, 216, 205.
At 7:00 p.m., students began gathering on the Commons. At 7:30, they were approximately six hundred in number. In attendance as observers, faculty marshals distributed the university flyer with curfew information. The group left the Commons, marched past the dormitories, and returned to the Commons, now numbering one to two thousand students and some nonstudents. The ROTC building, East Hall, as an emblem of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, became the focus of the demonstration. Beginning about 8:10 p.m., about a dozen demonstrators made a number of failed attempts to set the building on fire. After about thirty minutes, there was some level of fire in the ROTC building, which was not guarded by campus police as it had been the evening before when a student broke one of its windows. Kent city firefighters were notified at 8:49 of a fire at the building and arrived at 9:00 p.m. When firefighters arrived, protestors threw some rocks and tugged on and made some attempts to cut the hoses. Campus police remained away until 9:15, just as the firemen were leaving. A number of sheriff’s deputies and highway patrolmen also came to the scene. By all reports, the fire was out at this time. Tear gas was used to disperse protestors. Around 9:45, the ROTC building began burning again, this time “furiously” and to the ground, as the fire department returned, escorted by the National Guard. University Safety Director Chester Williams and Police Chief Donald Schwartzmiller admitted guardsmen onto campus and led them to the ROTC building. Until midnight, the Guard kept the campus cleared using tear gas and bayonets. Although it is generally assumed that the ROTC building was destroyed as a result of attempts by student protesters to burn the building, some suggest that the leveling of the building was the work of outside agents provocateurs. Responsibility has never been publically determined. Early chronicler of the events, James Best, observed, “There is little direct evidence that radicals were directly involved in Saturday night’s events. Certainly the bulk of the crowd at the fire was neither radical nor revolutionary.” Best also points to the President’s Commission, which found:

As the ROTC building burned, the pattern of the previous night was repeated—authorities arrived at the scene of an incident too late to apprehend the participants, then swept up the bystanders and participants together in their response. Students who had nothing to do with burning the building—who were not even in the area at the time of the fire—resented being gassed and ordered about by armed men. . . . Student resentment of the Guard continued to grow during the next two days.

The Guard was billeted in the gymnasium, and the athletic field south of Summit Avenue was used as a heliport. The Ohio National Guard in Kent and at Kent State was composed of troops from the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 145th Infantry Regiment. On the evening of May 2, they numbered 1,196 men, and arrived with full equipment, vehicles, and three helicopters. The Guard’s presence on campus added to the broader issue of the Cambodia invasion as a focus of discontent for many students.

Governor James Rhodes arrived on the Kent State campus the following morning, May 3, 1970, and declared that the university would remain open. At a morning news conference at the Kent fire station, the governor vowed to “eradicate the problem.” Rhodes used the harsh rhetoric of other public officials like Nixon, Agnew, and Reagan as he delivered a fist-pounding speech, cited previous violent protests at Miami University and

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162 Best, “Tragic Weekend,” 13; “Struggle to Recovery,” 5; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 16–17; Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 248.
163 Stone, Killings at Kent State, 66.
164 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 211–12.
165 Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 5–7.
166 Best, “Tragic Weekend,” 15.
167 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 253.
168 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:19; Bills, “Introduction,” 14; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 19.
169 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 1.
170 Davies, Truth About Kent State, 148.
Ohio State University, and typified protestors at Kent State as “worse than the ‘Brown Shirt’ and the communist element and also the ‘night riders’ and the vigilantes. They’re the worst kind of people that we harbor in America.” Rhodes vowed “to employ every force of law,” to “get to the bottom of the situation here at Kent—on the campus—in the city.” Following his fifteen-minute oration and before taking questions, Rhodes called on other officials to make statements. First, Adjutant General Sylvester Del Corso of the Ohio National Guard declared, "We will apply whatever degree of force is necessary to provide protection for the lives of our citizens and its property." Next, Robert Chiaramonte of the Ohio State Highway Patrol stated that he expected to see sniping next and pledged, "They can expect us to return fire." Third, Kent mayor Satrom confirmed, "We will take all necessary, I repeat, all necessary action to maintain order." Rhodes then met Kent State President White at the University Airport on Sunday morning to inform him of "a law-enforcement problem caused by 400 troublemakers who had descended on his campus with a view to closing it" and further that "the matter was out of White’s hands." From that point on, White "never doubted that the Guard had taken control over the campus," which university officials who attended the press conference also believed. Further, dismissing the county prosecutor’s urging that the university be closed, Rhodes asserted that doing so “would be playing into the hands of the SDS and the Weathermen.” Many attribute Rhodes’ tough law-and-order stance to his being at the end of a hotly contested race for the Republican nomination for a U.S. Senate seat. He would lose in the primary the day after the shootings. With Rhodes’ visit, the role of the National Guard changed from protecting property and assisting local law enforcement officials to one of breaking up any assembly on campus, peaceful or otherwise.

During the afternoon on Sunday, both students and townspeople walked around campus to see the sight of 850 guardsmen surrounding the burned ROTC building and posted throughout the grounds with bayoneted rifles. Rather than conveying any sense of impending violence, the atmosphere was, in author James Michener’s apt term, like a “carnival,” and archival photographs capture vignettes of students fraternizing with the soldiers. Sunday evening, students, when stopped by the National Guard at the campus boundary by reason of the city curfew, staged a sit-in on the northwest edge of campus at Lincoln and Main. Seeking to present demands to the president and mayor, including abolition of ROTC and removal of the Guard from campus, the protestors instead were misled by a student who “talked with police officials and then announced to the crowd that ‘the National Guard would be immediately leaving the front Campus . . . in response to their demands that they speak with Mayor Satrom, President White, and/or Governor Rhodes.’” Tricked into standing up and moving onto the sidewalk, they were dispersed with teargas and bayonets. Several students received bayonet wounds, and others were hit with rifle butts. The campus was noisy and confused during the rest of the night as helicopters hovered overhead. Some students were caught unable to return to their dormitories due to a hurriedly imposed campus curfew.

Another campus rally had been announced for noon on Monday, May 4. The approximately twenty thousand students at Kent State University attended their classes that day as usual, since school was in session, but there

171 “Governor Rhodes Speech on Campus Disorders in Kent, May 3, 1970,” Kent State University, Radio-TV Information (Kent, OH: Special Collections and Archives, Kent State University Libraries, Box 70, folder 27, May 4 Collection).
172 Ibid.
173 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 155; Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 8.
174 “Struggle to Recovery,” 5.
175 “Tragedy in Our Midst”; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 22.
176 Stone, Killings at Kent State, 72.
177 Michener, Kent State, 225, 256, 259.
178 Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 11.
179 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:21; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 26–27; Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 11.
180 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:22.
181 Davies, Truth About Kent State, 28.
182 Michener, Kent State, 327; Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 2, 12.
was nothing usual about the sunny, brisk spring morning. The preceding several days had seen earnest protest to the Vietnam War, a civil emergency had been declared in Kent on May 2, 1970, and was still in force, a curfew was in effect both in the city of Kent and on the Kent State University campus, and Governor Rhodes had given his “worst type of people” speech.183

Morning classes on May 4, 1970, began with somewhat higher than normal student absenteeism, but with a “superficial appearance of normality.”184 Several false bomb threats caused several classes to be canceled and one building to be evacuated. The Ohio National Guardsmen stood at their posts throughout campus in full gear with bayonetted rifles guarding the entrances to the campus, its buildings, and the burned remnants of the ROTC building. University president Robert White met at 7:00 a.m. with his cabinet and at 8:00 a.m. with the executive committee of the Faculty Senate. At the latter meeting he agreed to hold a faculty meeting to discuss the situation on campus.185 At 10:00 a.m., General Robert Canterbury of the Ohio National Guard called a meeting that was attended by the Guard legal officer Major William R. Shimp; university officials President White and Vice President Matson; Kent city mayor Satrom; Kent city police chief Roy Thompson and safety director Paul Hershey; and Major Donald E. Manly of the Ohio Highway Patrol.186 Because there was confusion over the two sets of curfew hours established for the city of Kent and the campus, it was decided that a single curfew from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. would be enforced by both. Also at this meeting General Canterbury commented that he wanted to withdraw his troops as soon as possible, perhaps as early as that evening. Toward the end of the meeting there was some discussion over the noon rally scheduled on the Kent Campus.187 There are differing accounts regarding the resolution of the decision to ban the rally according to testimony before the President’s Commission and later court testimony. For example, General Canterbury testified that the first time he learned about the May 4 rally was at the morning meeting when he had asked President White if the rally should be banned. White had responded that it should be, according to Canterbury. However, President White later refuted Canterbury’s claim, stating, “From past history, all know that my response would have been affirmative to a rally.” Confusion was evident in the minds of other participants at the meeting as well; some did not recall President White agreeing that the rally should be banned, but did come away thinking that the rally was banned.188 The university prepared a second flyer announcing a curfew, that the Guard was in charge of the campus and empowered to make arrests, and that all rallies were banned due to the governor having declared a state of emergency. Only the curfew information was true. Few students saw the flyer and word spread that there would be a rally on the Commons at noon.189

At 11:15 a.m., a meeting between the city, Kent State, the police, and military leaders was convened to address confusion over the banning of the rally, but by that time the Victory Bell was already ringing, summoning people to the rally on the Commons. At approximately 11:30 a.m., General Canterbury arrived at the Campus Administration Building—the headquarters for the Guard. Upon entering the building he said that the rally on the Commons was banned. “Major John Simons, chaplain of the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment, expressed concern that the students might be unaware that the noon rally had been prohibited. He [Canterbury] said a campus official told him that the University radio station would ‘spread the word.’” General Canterbury, who did not have time to change into his uniform, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles Fassinger, the highest-ranked officer in uniform during the rally, arrived at the Commons between 11:30 and 11:49 a.m. They saw the crowd growing larger, from about five hundred to around two thousand by noon.190 By 11:45 a.m., troops had taken

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184 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:22.
185 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 259.
186 Ibid., 260.
188 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 261.
189 Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 13.
190 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 261, 263–65.
their position around the site of the ROTC building at the northern edge of the Commons. There were one hundred and thirteen Guardsmen on the Commons at this time: fifty-one from Company A of the First Battalion, 145th Infantry Regiment; thirty-six from Company C of the First Battalion, 145th Infantry; sixteen from Troop G, Second Squadron, 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and ten officers. Troops were led by General Canterbury, Lt. Col. Fassinger, and Major Harry Jones.\footnote{Davies, \textit{Truth About Kent State}, 34; Michener, \textit{Kent State}, 329–30.} Canterbury ordered dispersal of the crowd; Fassinger ordered the troops to form a line near the ROTC site; and “those who had not already done so were ordered to ‘lock and load.’”\footnote{Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 263.} By all accounts the assembly was peaceful.\footnote{Ibid., 288; Stone, \textit{Killing at Kent State}, 75.}

At the time the rally was beginning, morning classes were ending. Many students were breaking for lunch or returning to their dorms. The Hub cafeteria in the student union, where students could go for lunch or to talk and relax between classes, was adjacent to the Commons and the remains of the ROTC building. With the Commons as the center and heartbeat of the campus, the crowd size grew quickly. The lie of the land encouraged onlookers as well: “The hills made a natural amphitheater from which students could watch events on the Commons floor.”\footnote{Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 265.} The motivation for those on the Commons at this time thus varied: some were protesting the continued occupation of the Guard and the treatment of students on \textit{their} college campus; some were continuing the protest lodged on Friday after President Nixon announced the expansion of the war into Cambodia; and others were curious passersby crossing the Commons on their way to and from class. Faculty marshals were present at the site of the rally, as they had been at rallies of the previous few days.

At 11:45 a.m., as the Guard formed up near the ROTC building; protestors were located around the Victory Bell five hundred feet to the east. Using a bullhorn, KSU police officer Harold Rice relayed Canterbury’s order for the crowd to disperse.\footnote{Ibid., 263.} The crowd may not have heard Rice, or, even if they did, they did not disperse. Next Rice was driven across the Commons in a military jeep accompanied by two guardsmen, “who rode ‘shotgun’ in the rear seat.” Rice used the bullhorn to announce, “Leave this area immediately. Please, for your own safety.” The jeep was met with shouts and jeers by the demonstrators, some chanting, “Pigs off campus!” “1, 2, 3, 4. We don’t want your fucking war,” “Power to the people,” and “Strike, Strike, Strike.”\footnote{Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 264; Stone, \textit{Killing at Kent State}, 77.} Some of the demonstrators threw rocks, with one hitting and bouncing off the jeep’s tire. The jeep went back to the line of guardsmen near the ROTC site. The crowd cheered. Protestors remained in place at the Victory Bell. Several gestured unfavorably to the Guard. The jeep went out two more times, each time being met with cheers as it retreated. The third time Major Jones ran out to the jeep and ordered it to return to the line of guardsmen at the northwestern corner of the Commons.\footnote{“Tragedy in our Midst.”}

The dispersal announcement did not disband the peaceful rally. General Canterbury next gave the order to disperse the crowd with tear gas. Lt. Col. Fassinger ordered eight to ten grenadiers with M-79 grenade launchers to fire two volleys of tear gas into the assembly.\footnote{Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 263; Stone, \textit{Killings at Kent State}, 76; “Struggle to Recovery,” 6.} This did cause some of those on the Commons to scatter and retreat slightly up Blanket Hill toward Taylor Hall. Some of the tear gas canisters fell short because of poor aim and the fifteen-mile-per-hour winds that were blowing from the southwest.\footnote{Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 264; Stone, \textit{Killing at Kent State}, 77.} Some of the tear gas canisters were thrown back in the direction of the line of the Guard. This caused some demonstrators to cheer and chant “Pigs off campus.”\footnote{Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 265.} At this point, another announcement was made over a loudspeaker for all to disperse.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{191 Davies, \textit{Truth About Kent State}, 34; Michener, \textit{Kent State}, 329–30.}
\footnote{192 Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 263.}
\footnote{193 Ibid., 288; Stone, \textit{Killing at Kent State}, 75.}
\footnote{194 Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 265.}
\footnote{195 Ibid., 263.}
\footnote{196 Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 263; Stone, \textit{Killings at Kent State}, 76; “Struggle to Recovery,” 6.}
\footnote{197 Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 264; Stone, \textit{Killing at Kent State}, 77.}
\footnote{198 Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 265.}
\footnote{199 “Tragedy in our Midst.”}
\footnote{200 Stone, \textit{Killings at Kent State}, 77.}
\end{footnotes}
Again, some responded with chants and jeers. According to the President’s Commission, “Many students felt that the campus was their ‘turf.’ Unclear about the authority vested in the Guard by the governor, or indifferent to it, some also felt that their constitutional right to free assembly was being infringed upon. As they saw it, they had been ordered to disperse at a time when no rocks had been thrown and no violence or wrong act had been committed. Many told interviewers later, ‘We weren’t doing anything.’”

At approximately 12:05 p.m., General Canterbury ordered the troops to advance on the demonstrators. Thirty Ohio State Highway Patrolmen stayed on the Commons ready to make any necessary arrests. As reported by Michener, General Canterbury said, “‘These students . . . are going to have to find out what law and order is all about.’” With gas masks on, bayonets fixed, and—unbeknownst to those at the other end of the Commons—rifles locked and loaded, with one round of ammunition in the chamber, guardsmen advanced toward the crowd. Company A was on the right flank, Company C was on the left flank and Troop G took the middle. As the Guard advanced, they launched more tear gas into the crowd. Because of the tear gas and the advancing armed troops, some of the demonstrators retreated up Blanket Hill between Taylor Hall and Johnson Hall; others retreated toward the east between Taylor Hall and Prentice Hall, and some retreated inside the buildings to put water on their faces or to avoid the tear gas. Once the Guard was near the Victory Bell, the troops split into two groups. Company C, accompanied by Major Jones, went up Blanket Hill toward the eastern side of Taylor Hall and blocked the passageway between Taylor and Prentice Hall. Troop G and Company A, led by General Canterbury and Lt. Col. Fassinger, followed the majority of demonstrators up Blanket Hill between Taylor and Johnson Hall.

After advancing up Blanket Hill, Company C on the left flank held a line between Taylor and Prentice Hall that prevented any demonstrators from returning to the Commons. Company A and Troop G upon reaching the top of Blanket Hill near the Pagoda (the highest piece of land), rather than remaining there to block reentry to the Commons, proceeded down toward the Practice Field. The demonstrators parted to let the Guard pass. Some of the demonstrators retreated down the hill toward Lake and Olson Halls to avoid being directly in the path of the Guard as they continued to advance toward the Practice Field. Other demonstrators found themselves on the Practice Field as they retreated in front of the Guard. On their march to the Practice Field the Guard slowed to give these students time to leave the area through a small opening in the Practice Field fence. This took some demonstrators to Midway Drive and a gravel parking lot near Dunbar Hall. Most students left the area entirely. At this point, the assembly on the Commons was in fact disbanded and General Canterbury’s purported mission accomplished.

Company A and Troop G advanced down the reverse slope of Blanket Hill past Taylor Hall, across an access road, and onto the Practice Field. Along the east side of the Practice Field was a six-foot chain link fence capped with barbed wire. At this time, in the view of the President’s Commission, “The feeling had spread among students that they were being harassed as a group, that state and civic officials had united against them, and that the university had either cooperated or acquiesced in their suppression. They reacted to the guardsmen’s march with substantial solidarity,” vocalized in epithets directed at the Guard. The Guard, on the other hand, “generally felt that the students, who had disobeyed numerous orders to disperse, were clearly in the wrong,” and the burning of the ROTC building seemed evidence of the destruction that students could cause.
The crowd split. Some of the more vocal demonstrators ended up in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot, but the majority of the crowd ranged along the balcony of Taylor Hall or onto the hill to the south of Taylor Hall overlooking the Practice Field above the access road. Both the Justice Department, which summarized the FBI Report, and the President’s Commission concluded that while the guardsmen were on the Practice Field, demonstrators threw rocks at them. Guardsmen threw tear gas canisters at the demonstrators in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot and toward those standing on the hill below Taylor Hall and threw some rocks as well. Some canisters were lobbed back at the Guard. Both groups’ reports speculated that a construction site at nearby Dunbar Hall provided stones to throw.208 The distance between the guardsmen and the students resulted in many of the rocks falling short. Four guardsmen claimed they were hit with rocks at this time.209 “The distances between the mass of the students and the Guards were later stepped off by expert judges, who concluded that students would have required good right arms like Mickey Mantle’s to have reached the Guardsmen with even small stones.”210

During their ten-minute stay on the Practice Field, some members of Troop G were ordered to kneel and point their rifles toward the demonstrators.211 The demonstrators in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot directly in the line of fire of the kneeling guardsmen were between one hundred fifty and two hundred feet away.212 Student Alan Canfora, who soon would be shot, went inside the Practice Field fence and waved a black flag to protest the Guard’s actions. Although the Justice Department and the President’s Commission both conclude that this was the time that the National Guard troops were receiving the most verbal and physical abuse, the Guard aimed their rifles but did not shoot in self-defense, an explanation they would later claim as the reason for the subsequent shootings on Blanket Hill. Major Jones, who had accompanied Captain James Ronald Snyder and the members of Company C to their position between Taylor and Prentice Halls blocking access to the Commons, “walked through the crowd to find out if General Canterbury wanted assistance.”213 Davies concludes: “If the demonstrators were as dangerous as Canterbury claimed after the killings, could a solitary officer have elbowed his way through them without some kind of incident? Yet that is exactly what happened.”214

At the time that Major Jones was on the Practice Field, Guard leaders formed a huddle that included Jones, Canterbury, and others, prompting some to speculate that it was at this time that tactics were developed that included firing directly on the demonstrators.215 Michener theorizes that there was not necessarily an order to fire given at that time, but reasons: “It seems likely, however, that on the football field, when the students were being obnoxious and stones were drifting in, that some of the troops agreed among themselves, ‘We’ve taken about enough of this crap. If they don’t stop pretty soon we’re going to let them have it.’” He further concludes, “It seems likely that some kind of rough verbal agreement had been reached among the troops when they clustered on the practice field.”216

The President’s Commission says that General Canterbury realized that there was nothing more his troops could do on the Practice Field so he ordered them to retrace their steps up Blanket Hill and then back down to the remains of the ROTC building on the far side of the Commons. Canterbury explained: “My purpose was to make it clear beyond any doubt to the mob that our posture was now defensive and that we were clearly

208 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 267; Stone, Killings at Kent State, 80.
209 Fourteen other guardsmen also claimed they were hit—mostly likely at this time as well, Stone, Killings at Kent State, 81.
210 Michener, Kent State, 336.
211 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 268; Stone, Killings at Kent State, 82.
212 Davies, Truth About Kent State, 41.
213 Stone, Killings at Kent State, 82.
216 Kent State, 361, 409–10.
returning to the Commons, thus reducing the possibility of injury to either soldiers or students.”\textsuperscript{217} There was some speculation that the troops had used all of their tear gas on the Practice Field and had none left for the return march to the ROTC building. This was not the case. “Captain Srp and Lieutenant Stevenson of Troop G were aware that a limited supply of tear gas remained and Srp ordered one canister loaded for use at the crest of Blanket Hill.”\textsuperscript{218} Still, General Canterbury and Major Jones both would claim under oath that the Guard spent all of their tear gas canisters while on the Practice Field. As the guardsmen and officers marched off the Practice Field and back up Blanket Hill, they maintained a common V-shaped formation. Davies notes that at this time a sequence of photographs used in the subsequent court trials illustrates that members of Troop G lagged behind the others and seemed to be more concerned with the demonstrators in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot much farther away from them than other demonstrators who were closer and in the vicinity of Taylor Hall. Photos further show that guardsmen other than members of Troop G looked forward as they advanced up the hill.\textsuperscript{219}

On seeing what they perceived as a retreat of the Guard, some students felt that everything was over. Some followed behind the Guard at a distance of sixty feet or greater. An 8mm film by student Christopher Abell shows:

A member of Troop G, looking over his shoulder and down toward the parking lot, would have seen five students at a distance of 60 to 85 feet, 25 students between 85 and 175 feet, and 30 students between 175 and 325 feet. . . .

The evidence of the film is that at no time before Troop G opened fire were they being approached by more than 17 students, that none of the approaching students was closer than 85 feet, and that 10 of them were more than 175 feet away. . . .

The film provides conclusive evidence that the guardsmen had not been rushed.\textsuperscript{220}

As the Guard marched up the hill, students ahead parted to let them by. Some demonstrators threw rocks at guardsmen as they marched up the hill toward the Pagoda, but the FBI reported that rocks were not thrown at the time of the shooting.\textsuperscript{221}

As the Guard approached the Pagoda from the east around 12:24 p.m., apparently en route to the ROTC building straight ahead down the Commons side of Blanket Hill, some guardsmen on the trailing edge of the right flank, mostly from Troop G, wheeled 135 degrees to the right to face the direction of the Prentice Hall Parking Lot to the northeast.\textsuperscript{222} By all eyewitness accounts and photographic evidence, these guardsmen turned in unison, lifted their rifles in unison, pointed their weapons in unison, and began shooting for thirteen seconds, expending sixty-seven rounds.\textsuperscript{223} While the soldiers were firing, Lt. Col. Fassinger, Major Jones, and General Canterbury yelled, “Cease Fire!” Jones hit several men on the helmet to stop their firing.\textsuperscript{224} Students dived for cover during the thirteen seconds of gunfire.

Guardsmen killed four Kent State University students. William Knox Schroeder, a nineteen-year-old psychology major and member of the ROTC, was shot in the back at the seventh rib while lying prone 390 feet

\textsuperscript{217} Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 268.
\textsuperscript{218} Stone, \textit{Killings at Kent State}, 82.
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Truth About Kent State}, 42.
\textsuperscript{220} Kelner and Munves, \textit{Kent State Coverup}, 174–75.
\textsuperscript{221} Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 270–71; Stone, \textit{Killings at Kent State}, 87.
\textsuperscript{222} Michener, \textit{Kent State}, 340.
\textsuperscript{223} Kelner and Munves, \textit{Kent State Coverup}, 177.
\textsuperscript{224} Best, “Tragic Weekend,” 25.
from the firing position. Sandra Lee Scheuer, a twenty-year-old speech pathology and audiology major, was shot in the front side of her neck on her way to a speech therapy class. She also was 390 feet away from the line of fire. Allison Beth Krause, a nineteen-year-old Honors College art major, was diving for cover in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot when she was shot. She was 343 feet away from the line of guardsmen as a bullet passed through her left upper arm and into her left side. Jeffrey Glenn Miller, a twenty-year-old psychology major, was shot through the mouth while facing the Guard 265 feet away.

Guardsmen wounded nine Kent State students. Joseph Lewis (60 feet away) was shot by two different guardsmen in the right abdomen and the left lower leg; he was closest to the Guard on a walkway near Taylor Hall. John Cleary (110 feet away), who fell near the Solar Totem #1 sculpture in front of Taylor Hall, was shot in the left upper chest. Thomas Grace (200 feet away) was shot in the left ankle. Alan Canfora (225 feet away) was shot in the right wrist as he was diving for cover behind a tree. Dean Kahler (300 feet away) was shot in the left side of the small of his back while lying prone on the ground near the access road. He was permanently paralyzed from the bullet. Douglas Wrentmore (329 feet away) was wounded in the right knee. James Russell (375 feet away) was the only person outside the angle of gun firing leading to the Prentice Hall Parking Lot. He was near Memorial Gymnasium and at an angle approximately 90 degrees from the other students. His wounds in the head and right thigh were caused by a shotgun blast. Robert Stamps (495 feet away) was shot in the right buttock. The student wounded farthest from the Guard position, D. Scott Mackenzie, was 750 feet away and was shot in the left rear of the neck. All individuals shot on May 4 were Kent State University students. They were not outside agitators or Weathermen. Michener, Mayer, and syndicated columnist Victor Riesel were among those who suggested or stated that outside agitators were to blame for much of what happened on May 4, 1970. However, other sources reject the validity of the outside agitator allegation. No disruptive outsiders have been identified as participating in the demonstration on May 4.

Terry Strubbe, a student at Kent State, set his tape recorder on his dorm room windowsill on the first floor of Johnson Hall and left for the rally at noon on the Commons nearby. An analysis of that tape recording by engineering firm Bolt, Beranek and Newman of Cambridge, Massachusetts, revealed that the first three shots came from M-1 rifles that were located between the Pagoda and the corner of Taylor Hall. The firm also determined that there were 67 shots, not 61 as previously reported. A 2010 examination of a digital copy of the Strubbe recording initiated by Alan Canfora, one of the wounded students, indicated a verbal order to fire was given before the volley of shots. Follow-up by forensic audio analysts Stuart Allen and Tom Owen confirmed the order to fire. This new evidence supported the claims of some students and guardsmen who said they heard an order to fire.

In subsequent analysis of an earlier portion of the Strubbe recording, Stuart Allen concluded that four shots were fired from a .38 weapon 70 seconds before the 67-shot volley fired by the Ohio National Guard. Many

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225 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 273–74; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 52–55.
226 Kent State, 352, 409, 411; Commission on KSU, 4:2–23; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 142.
227 O’Neil, No Heroes, 7; Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 239; Stone, Killings at Kent State, 61; “Tragedy in our Midst.”
228 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 177.
229 Maag, “Kent State Tape is Said to Reveal Orders.”
231 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 275.
individuals question the findings of Allen’s second round of analysis. In a related aspect, some feel that “plainclothes agent Terry Norman, from whom a .38 revolver was taken shortly after the shootings,” was not involved in starting the shootings.233 For these individuals, questionable findings regarding sounds 70 seconds before the guardsmen shot are not new proof that Norman was involved. One investigator of Terry Norman, among many, William A. Gordon observes that “Arthur Krause, the father of slain student Allison Krause, used to warn reporters that Norman was a red herring and that he only served the purpose of distracting people from the more important question of why the soldiers killed his daughter and three others on May 4, 1970.”234 Others feel more certain regarding Allen’s second round of conclusions and believe that they substantiate the role played by Terry Norman in the shootings.235 From another direction, 2012 analysis of the audio by the FBI at the request of the U.S. Department of Justice found neither an order to fire nor gunshots from a .38 caliber revolver. The FBI suggested that the latter sounds were those of doors slamming.236 Many citizens would like further analysis of the audio recordings to take place.

There were seventy-six armed guardsmen and officers on the top of the hill at the time of the shooting. Guardsmen who fired from the Pagoda were members of Troop G of the Second Squadron, 107th Armored Cavalry, and Company A of the First Battalion, 145th Infantry, along with two members of Company C of the First Battalion, 145th Infantry.237 Accounts of the actions of these members of the Guard vary. According to the President’s Commission, “Twenty-eight Guardsmen have acknowledged firing from Blanket Hill. Of these, 25 fired 55 shots from rifles, two fired five shots from .45 caliber pistols, and one fired a single blast from a shotgun.”238 General Canterbury, Lt. Col. Fassinger, and Major Jones all claimed to hear a non-military shot which triggered the rest of the volley. The Justice Department summary of the FBI Report concluded, “The FBI has conducted an extensive search and has found nothing to indicate that any person other than a Guardsman fired a weapon.”239 The shooting began with no announcement or warning to the students and no immediate provocation. Some guardsmen later claimed they fired because their lives were in danger. Again, the Justice Department’s Summary of the FBI Report notes, “Six Guardsmen, including two sergeants and Captain Srp of Troop G stated pointedly that the lives of the members of the Guard were not in danger and that it was not a shooting situation” and that “the claim by the National Guard that their lives were endangered by the students was fabricated subsequent to the event.” Furthermore, the FBI concluded that the guardsmen were not surrounded by students, nor was there any rock throwing at the time of the shooting as alleged by some guardsmen.240 The President’s Commission concluded: “The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.”241

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233 Grace, Kent State: Death and Dissent in the Long Sixties, 357, note 5.
237 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 192; Davies, Truth About Kent State, 34; Michener, Kent State, 329–30; “May 4 Visitors Center, Walking Tour, Memorial.”
238 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 273.
239 Stone, Killings at Kent State, 89.
240 Stone, Killings at Kent State, 84, 87.
241 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 289.
After the thirteen seconds of gunfire, witnesses recalled an eerie silence. As students lay wounded and dying on the ground, members from Troop G and Company A turned and marched back to the site of the ROTC building—unimpeded by the hundreds of students on Blanket Hill on the north side of Taylor Hall or onlookers on the Student Activities Center roof between Stopher and Johnson Halls to the west of the Commons.

Company C, in position on the other side of Taylor Hall near the Prentice Hall dorm to the east, did not fire during those seconds. Following the shootings, Captain Snyder took seven of his men from this contingent to assess the conditions of the students wounded in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot. He reportedly looked at two young men and concluded they were dead.242 Jeffrey Miller had died instantly, but William Schroeder lived for some time after reaching the hospital. Several of Snyder’s men were near the body of Jeff Miller when some angry students yelled obscenities at them. One of the guardsmen threw a tear gas pellet at the student group in response.243 The members of Company C then returned to their skirmish line and eventually back to the Commons. Snyder told the federal grand jury that he found a pistol on Jeffrey Miller’s body, but later admitted he had concocted this story to develop a self-defense strategy for the guardsmen.244

The students who were witnesses to the shootings were now on their own to care for their classmates who lay dead, dying, and wounded in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot and on Blanket Hill near Taylor Hall. Some ran into the nearby dorms of Prentice and Dunbar Halls to call for ambulances and to find someone to assist them. Some went into Taylor Hall to seek out telephones and to seek help. Other students linked arms around the dead and wounded, while yet other students administered first aid to those who could still be helped. Some students were frozen in place and unable to respond to what they had just witnessed. Still others ran to the Commons screaming for ambulances that had not yet arrived. Faculty marshal Glenn W. Frank, a popular geology professor, rode with an ambulance from the Commons and assisted in getting the dead and wounded into the ambulances.

As some students were assisting with the dead and wounded, others began to gather on the hill above the Commons. After many of the fallen were taken to hospitals, shocked students milled around and also eventually moved toward the Commons. The National Guard stood at one end of the Commons, at the ROTC site, and the students stood near the Victory Bell, until the students moved to a grassy slope of land near Stopher and Johnson Halls where they engaged in a sit-in. Some students expressed anger; others were quiet with shock. Although they did not realize it, the potential was high at this time for further violent action by the Guard. Glenn Frank received permission from General Canterbury to give the faculty marshals some time to try to disperse the students, thereby avoiding any further military action on the part of the Guard. Frank, along with psychology professor Seymour Baron, political science professor Myron (Mike) Lunine, and history graduate student Steve Sharoff—each of whom also tried to negotiate with Canterbury, who remained adamant that the students must leave—worked mightily to convince the students to leave the site.245

A taped exchange captures Baron’s pleas to the students as they called out in their outrage and for action:

Baron: I want to protect your lives. I hope you can understand that. They’ve got live ammo. . . . They’ve got .30 caliber ammunition there. That stuff is bad news. . . . Look, for God’s sakes, we’ve made the point. . . . Vietnam, Cambodia. . . . We hate it, all of us do . . . every faculty member on this campus does. . . . You’re going to lose the whole stinking campus. They’re going to destroy this whole university. . . . You’ve paid the price. The point has been made. A couple

242 Best, “Tragic Weekend,” 25; Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 277.
243 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 277.
244 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 123–26.
245 Barbato, Davis, and Seeman, This We Know, 25.
As Baron entreated students not to move nearer to the guard, Glenn Frank thought that Major Jones was moving his men out to confront the students. Frank pleaded, “For God’s sake, don’t come any closer.” Jones replied, “My orders are to move ahead” to which Frank replied, “Over my dead body.” Jones did not move forward.

In the meantime, General Canterbury, at the skirmish line of guardsmen at the ROTC site, told his troops, “Have your weapons in the ready position.”

Realizing the Guard might start shooting again, Frank went back to the students. A radio station recording captures the continuing shouts and anguish of the students, followed by Frank’s desperate plea:

Frank: I don’t care whether you’ve never listened to anyone before in your lives. I am begging you right now. If you don’t disperse right now, they’re going to move in, and it can only be a slaughter. Would you please listen to me? Jesus Christ, I don’t want to be part of this.

The final plea from Glenn Frank was successful. By 1:30 p.m., the Commons and the adjoining areas were empty of students.

The university president, on returning from his lunch at the Brown Derby Restaurant, ordered the campus closed as of 1:20 p.m. Later in the afternoon, Judge Albert L. Caris of the Common Pleas Court of Portage County signed an order granting an injunction requested by Portage County prosecutor Ronald J. Kane to close the university until “conditions merit the reopening.” Students were forced to evacuate the campus immediately, but could not make arrangements for their departure, as Kent Bell Telephone shut down phone service to the dormitories, all traffic in and out of the city of Kent was stopped, and most did not have access to transportation. The dean for student residence life, David Ambler, “had the . . . idea of wheeling out the thirty-six university buses, loading them with students, and starting them off to Cleveland or Columbus, from which spots frantic students could catch what airplanes were available” or otherwise make their way home as best they could. By that evening, all students and personnel had vacated the campus, with the exception of seventy-two international students and residence hall staff. Military personnel patrolled the city and campus and there was a dusk to dawn curfew.

**National Impact of the Shootings at Kent State**

Evidence of the impact of the shootings at Kent State on May 4, 1970, continues to grow, as the event remains prominent in collective memory and public culture. In May 2015, two additional new documentaries featuring the May 4 history aired on PBS—*Kent State: The Day the ’60s Died* and *Dick Cavett’s Vietnam*—as part of its week of special programming remembering the fortieth anniversary of the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in

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247 Scranton et al., *President’s Commission*, 278.

248 News film footage in which Canterbury makes this comment is contained the following documentary: Mike Buday, Laura Davis, and Carole Barbato, *Kent State: A Turning Point*, Kent, OH: Kent State University May 4 Visitors Center, 2012.


251 “Struggle to Recovery,” 11.

Saigon. In 2014, CNN produced a Special Report titled Witnessed: The Killings at Kent State, which aired May 4, with Anderson Cooper as host. These works join nine previous documentaries, thirty-one books, and many thousands of news stories and articles. In 2013, responding to his experience of the Kent State University May 4 Visitors Center museum, which relates the May 4 shootings in the context of the long sixties, documentarian Ken Burns noted that he would need to rethink his forthcoming Vietnam War documentary to situate Kent State into his account of the war and its contexts. In 2010, Congressman John Lewis presented the keynote address during the dedication of a new May 4 Walking Tour of the site and recognition of its inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places. Walking Tour trail markers are accompanied by an original documentary narrated by Julian Bond, who donated his time to record the walking tour narration and his memory of the shootings in an oral history featured in the May 4 Visitors Center. In June 2009, widespread electronic and television news coverage linked the video of the death of a young woman, Neda Agha Soltan, shot during a protest rally in Tehran, to the photograph of Mary Vecchio kneeling over the body of Jeffrey Miller, illustrating that Kent State remains emblematic of the struggle for human and civil rights—all over the globe. In 2008, the Kent State shootings were voted, from among seventy-five choices, Ohio's top news story of the past seventy-five years in an Ohio Newspaper Association poll. In a 2007 Vanity Fair magazine political cartoon, President George W. Bush's response to the pleas for help of Hurricane Katrina victims in New Orleans is compared to President Nixon's response to the “Kent State massacre.” U.S. history textbooks highlight this moment in history, often including the iconic photo that captures the tragedy and transgression of that day. This brief sampling, among many such examples, illustrates that the Kent State shootings remain embedded in the American mind and experience. May 4 is recognized as a benchmark in U.S. political and social history, associated with the struggle to end the Vietnam War represented by the student protest movement from the sixties through seventies, a flawed Nixon presidency, and a clash of generational values. The events at Kent State represent a milestone in public memory and the efforts of a new generation to preserve its own past so the next generations might learn. Such an assessment begins with an understanding of President Nixon's initial response to the shootings and continues to the present.

May 4 and the People, the President, and Politics

In November 1969, Americans learned of one of the darkest events of the war overseas as the atrocities committed in 1968 at My Lai were made public. Six months later, Kent State embodied the dark side of the war at home—"a bloodstained symbol of the rising student rebellion against the Nixon Administration and the war in Southeast Asia." Vietnam veterans and even active soldiers in the field saw the military-like events of May 4 as too close to home and too close to their own experiences. In May 1970, during the student strike resulting from the shootings (discussed below), five hundred GIs deserted every day in Vietnam, and there were over sixty-five thousand deserters from the army alone in that year. May 4 helped to turn the tide of public opinion against the war. The killings at Kent State made clear that:

Death, previously distant, was now close at hand. New groups—Nobel science laureates, State Department officers, the American Civil Liberties Union—all openly called for withdrawal. Congress began threatening the Nixon administration with challenges to presidential authority. When the New York Times published the first installment of the Pentagon Papers on 13 June 1971, Americans became aware of the
true nature of the war. . . . Anti-war sentiment, previously tainted with an air of anti-Americanism, became instead a normal reaction against zealous excess. Dissent dominated America; the anti-war cause had become institutionalized.259

The shootings at Kent State dominated the covers of *Life, Newsweek, Time*, and other magazines. May 4, 1970, became known as the *day the war came home*, a phrase perhaps first used by playwright Arthur Miller in an article for *McCall’s*, a staple of middle-American households: “The war finally came home that day in May when American troops killed our children on their school grounds.”260 The shift in America’s view was reflected in Gallup Poll surveys that asked: “In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?” After the shootings at Kent State, Americans increasingly answered, “Yes,” with a five percent change in opinion against the war between April 2–7 and May 21–26, 1970.261 The staff of the *Akron Beacon Journal* won the 1971 Pulitzer Prize for its account of the shootings, and Kent State student John Filo and the tiny *Valley Daily News and Daily Dispatch of Tarentum and New Kensington* won the 1971 spot news photography Pulitzer Prize for the iconic image of Mary Vecchio kneeling over the body of Jeffrey Miller. That image would pervade the hearts and minds of many Americans.

On May 1, 1970, the morning after his primetime appearance announcing the invasion of Cambodia, which lit the fuse to antiwar protests across the nation’s colleges and universities, Nixon was recorded in the hallway of the Pentagon denouncing protestors: “‘You see these bums, you know, blowing up the campuses. Listen, the boys that are on the college campuses today are the luckiest people in the world, going to the greatest universities, and here they are burning up the books, storming around about this issue. You name it. Get rid of the war[,] there will be another one.’”262 After the shootings at Kent State, the president’s tone had not softened. When press secretary Ron Ziegler read Nixon’s prepared comments on May 5, there was no expression of sympathy. Such treatment exemplified Nixon’s side of the generational dividing line. He said to the country, “‘This should remind us all once again that when dissent turns to violence it invites tragedy.’”263 Arthur Krause, whose daughter Allison was a victim of the violence exerted by soldiers on May 4, cried, “‘My child was not a bum.’”264

Vietnam historian Stanley Karnow castigates Nixon’s reaction to the shootings at Kent State as “wanton insensitivity,” noting that Secretary of State Kissinger blamed Nixon for failing to find “the language of respect and compassion that might have created a bridge at least to the more reasonable elements of the anti-war movement.”265 Following a pointed press conference during the night of May 8, in which twenty-four of the twenty-six questions involved Cambodia and Kent State, Nixon stayed up late into the morning calling advisors. Aware that students were gathering for a large antiwar march, around 4:20 a.m. he asked his valet if he had ever seen the Lincoln Memorial at night. When the valet indicated that he had not, Nixon impulsively embarked on a visit and confusing interaction with protestors that he claimed was an attempt to better understand the youth. The press and observers, including his own staff, saw Nixon’s appearance at the memorial as evidence of the

260 “The War Between Young and Old,” 32.
262 de Onis, “Nixon Puts ‘Bums’ Label on Some.”
264 Ibid.
265 *Vietnam*, 626.
The Kent State shootings broadened the base of protest against the Vietnam War, which crossed over the generation gap and into the political arena. Howard Metzenbaum’s antiwar position helped him win the U.S. Senate seat in Ohio. “After the Kent State shootings, there was no way to keep Vietnam out of a contest for the U.S. Senate,” Tom Diemer notes in his analysis of Metzenbaum’s Senate career. Writing about John Glenn’s loss to Metzenbaum in the primary, Diemer adds that “the tide moved against him [Glenn] near the end of the campaign, as the incursion in Cambodia and the Kent State tragedy seemed to help the staunchly anti-war Metzenbaum.”

Gitlin further describes the effect in Washington in the wake of the Kent State shootings, along with nationwide reaction:

Lobbying in Washington for an immediate end to the war, students were joined by respectables: a thousand lawyers, thirty-three university heads, architects, doctors, nurses, a hundred corporate executives. Two hundred fifty State Department employees, including fifty Foreign Service officers, signed a statement against administration policy. The enormity of uprising broke Nixon’s will. As Henry Kissinger put it later, “The very fabric of government was falling apart. The Executive Branch was shell-shocked. After all, their children and their friends’ children took part in the demonstrations.”

Regarding the immediate aftermath of the shootings, Kissinger added that “the tidal wave of media and student criticism powerfully affected the Congress.” The day after the Kent State shootings, Nixon assured the furious

266 Thomas, Being Nixon, 269–76; Weiner, One Man Against, 92–93.
267 Nixon, No More Vietnams, 162.
269 Haldeman, Ends of Power, 107.
270 McNamara, In Retrospect, xvi.
271 Fighting the Unbeatable Foe, 76, 90; see also Glenn, A Memoir, 325.
272 Sixties, 410.
273 White House Years, 512.
Congress that U.S. troops would go no more than nineteen miles into Cambodia, and on May 8 he agreed to withdraw ground troops from Cambodia by June 30. Kissinger thought Nixon yielded to “public pressures.”274 Then on May 8, the Senate voted to withdraw funding for the Cambodian operation, marking the beginning of a series of measures over the following years to bring funding for the war to an end.275 To appease Congress and the public, Nixon at this time sought to answer the complaint of young people, “Old enough to fight, old enough to vote,” by working with Congress to push through passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to lower the voting age.276 While Congress cooperated on lowering the voting age, antiwar sentiment within the group translated into more action. Senator George McGovern, who had introduced an amendment to end the war the day before the Cambodian invasion, pushed for passage by reminding Senators how deeply America was anguished by both the invasion and the deaths at Kent State. He went on to admonish his colleagues as “partly responsible for sending 50,000 young Americans to an early grave,” claiming, “This chamber reeks of blood.”277

The National Student Strike

Across the nation (and the world), the events of May 4 prompted demonstrations and rallies. A week after May 4, one hundred thousand antiwar demonstrators converged on Washington to protest the Kent State shootings and the Nixon administration’s movement into Cambodia. Even though the demonstration was quickly put together, protestors still were able to bring out thousands to march on the Capital. It was an almost spontaneous response to the events of the previous week. Police ringed the White House with buses to block the demonstrators from getting too close to the executive mansion and sandbagged machine gun positions guarded the roofs of other government buildings. Campuses across the nation reacted to the shootings at Kent State. As Kirkpatrick Sale notes, “Protests took place at institutions of every type, secular and religious, large and small, state and private, coeducational and single-sexed, old and new.”278 Fifty-seven percent of college and university presidents reported that their institutions experienced a “significant impact” on their campus operations as a result of Cambodia, Kent State, and Jackson State.279 In his essay, “Kent State and Historical Memory,” Thomas M. Grace, himself wounded as a student at Kent State, gives measure to the reaction and sees in its magnitude why the shootings remain a landmark event in public memory:

That the killings later achieved such prominence in collective memory had much to do with the scope of the reaction by American students in the immediate wake of the fatal shootings. Numbers outline the magnitude: students staged demonstrations of some sort on better than half of all college campuses; more than five hundred universities closed for a period of time; and Kent State and fifty others were shut down for the remainder of the academic year. Historians know the statistics, while protestors—estimated at 4,350,000 people—can still call to mind their participation. Reaction first to the United States’ invasion of Cambodia and then to the Kent killings touched every corner of Ohio and the nation.280

It was the first national student strike in U.S. history and the largest student protest the country has experienced.281 While protests on campuses began the night of April 30, immediately upon Nixon’s Cambodia

274 Gitlin, Sixties, 410.
275 Hall, Vietnam War, 64.
276 Nixon, “Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendment.”
277 Congressional Record.
278 SDS, 636.
280 9. Other sources quantifying the scope of the strike include: Urban Research, On Strike, 1; Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:27; Michener, Kent State, 418; Sale 1973:636-38; Gitlin, Sixties, 410; and Fendrich, Forgotten Movement, 350.
281 Urban Research, On Strike, 1; Gitlin, Sixties, 410.
announcement, the Urban Research Corporation concluded from its national survey conducted in May 1970: “This country’s first national student strike was the result of the killing of four students by National Guardsmen and not President Nixon’s Cambodian Action. . . . In spite of Cambodia, without the Kent State deaths, there would have been no national student strike.” Researchers sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education agreed: “With the Kent State shootings, a powerful, emotional response added new fuel and great numbers to the growing turmoil. . . . Throughout the uprising there was exhilaration from doing something personally significant, taking control of events, achieving solidarity and community.”

Kent State and Jackson State

Among the colleges participating in the national student strike and the properties associated with the student protest movement of the 1960s and 1970s, Jackson State University (formerly Jackson State College), in Jackson, Mississippi, is most closely linked to Kent State. Ten days after the shootings at Kent State, in the early morning hours of May 15, 1970, two students were killed and nine were wounded on the Jackson State campus by the Jackson City Police and the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol. Gene Young, a Jackson State student who helped calm others when the shooting ceased, observed, “In the spring of 1970, no institution of higher education was left untouched by controversy and the courageous chorus calling out [f]or change.” He and others identify a complex of political and social issues affecting Jackson State students at that time, most of which were pertinent to the broader student movement: the war in Vietnam; escalation of the war through the U.S. invasion of Cambodia; the draft; ROTC; the killings at Kent State; and racism and repression.

Since 1965, Jackson students and demonstrative nonstudents who were called corner boys had responded to long-standing racial intimidation and harassment from white motorists by in turn harassing white motorists and white police along Lynch Street, the major, four-lane thoroughfare that bisected the campus. In addition to their other grievances, students were disgruntled that a bridge had never been built over Lynch Street for their safety. Disturbances at Jackson State in May 1970 took place on two nights. On the evening of May 13, “youths” threw rocks at cars on Lynch Street; broke the rear windshield of a campus security car; hurled epithets; threatened the two campus ROTC buildings with chanting and rocks, and, later in the night, threw two bottles with gasoline (the one with a burning wick was readily extinguished by an officer); and engaged in several other acts of vandalism. One “youth” fired four shots in the direction of a traffic light in front of Alexander Hall. Over the course of the evening, three security guards fired shots into the air. The state highway patrol rendezvoused with the city police. Around 3:00 a.m. on May 14, the Mississippi adjutant general notified the Jackson State president that the Mississippi National Guard had been put on alert and that it would likely use tear gas the following day if disturbances took place. No law enforcement or security personnel were fired upon and no police or highway patrol officer reported firing a weapon.

The summary of the events of May 14 by the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, created by President Nixon as a result of “demands for an investigation of the Jackson and Kent State killings,” includes mention that during the day city police shared rumors from “confidential sources” with the highway patrol that there

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282 On Strike, 1.
283 Peterson and Bilorusky, Campus Aftermath, xi, 1, 3.
284 “May 15, 1970,” 86.
286 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 413–14; Spofford, Lynch Street, 14.
287 Scranton, President’s Commission, 421, 419.
288 Ibid., 36–41.
289 Ibid., 421. 
would be trouble at Alexander Hall. That information was not shared with John Peoples, the college president, who was active in communicating with officials and students on May 13 and 14. Further, People's request that Lynch Street be closed was denied. Disturbances began around 9:30 p.m. when rumors spread that Charles Evers, brother of Medgar Evers and mayor of Fayette, Mississippi, and his wife had been shot and killed. Although many on campus discounted the rumor, tension rose and protestors again threw rocks on Lynch Street (it was soon closed, as had happened on the previous night). Protestors also set several small fires and overturned and set on fire a dump truck on a campus construction site. The National Guard moved closer to campus and highway patrol and city police, with Thompson's tank, a twenty-three-foot-long armored van that was a "hated symbol . . . of impregnable racism" built to control civil rights demonstrations in Jackson after Medgar Evers was assassinated in 1963, moved onto campus, with a fire truck behind them. Firefighters extinguished the truck fire, without interference from protestors. The twenty-six city police and forty highway patrolmen stood in a line between the dump truck and a crowd at Stewart Hall. The crowd at Stewart Hall, delivering jeers and yells, increased in size. "Rocks and pieces of brick were thrown, but there were no serious injuries to firemen or police officers." Guardsmen, mounted on armored personnel carriers, with "weapons but no ammunition" took a position on the west end of Lynch Street, and the police chief called the mayor to report "that the situation on campus was worsening." The mayor was informed after the fact that the police and highway patrol were already on campus when the chief called him. The chief dismissed the mayor's request that the National Guard be sent onto campus. Rocks and other objects were thrown from the crowd at this time, and "there were conflicting reports of small caliber gunfire from the area of Stewart Hall." A highway patrolman shot into a fourth-floor window of Stewart Hall; no one was hit. The mayor arrived near campus and began walking toward Stewart Hall with the National Guard. The firemen left, driving the perimeter to go to the other end of campus, where there was another small fire. The police chief later stated that he proceeded from Stewart to Alexander Hall in response to a request for police protection before the fire at the other end of campus was extinguished. He said he saw a crowd of about two hundred at Alexander Hall, which was three hundred yards away and moved there with his officers, the highway patrolmen, and the tank in the lead to clear the streets.

The President's Commission reports that the tank stopped approximately in front of the west wing of Alexander Hall, the women's dormitory. The police formed a line to the south and east of the tank, and the highway patrolmen to the north and west. Crowd size estimates ranged from forty to four hundred. As they had been at Stewart Hall, students here were ordered to disperse. Students jeered at the police and patrolmen. Two officers reportedly staggered when struck on the helmet by thrown objects. A bottle was thrown from the direction of Alexander Hall and broke on the ground at the feet of the police. The law enforcement officers (highway patrolmen and two city police) released a twenty-eight-second fusillade of "buckshot, rifle slugs, a submachine gun, carbines with military ammunition, and two 30.06 rifles loaded with armor-piercing bullets" directed at students on both the north and south side of Lynch Street. More than one hundred fifty rounds were fired, most "into the air." "Nearly 400 bullets or pieces of buckshot struck Alexander Hall. Immediately following the shootings, highway patrolmen picked up their casings and those of the city police. By 12:11 a.m. on May 15, a patrolman filed the following report at highway patrol headquarters:

"Advise demonstrators threw rocks at them from a building. In return they tried to get them back into the building and they threw more rocks. Units had to hurt a few."

291 Ibid., 424, 423.
292 "Our History."
293 Scranton et al., President's Commission, 425.
294 Ibid., 425–27.
296 Ibid., 432, 429, 434–35.
297 Ibid., 435.
Law enforcement officers killed two students and wounded twelve. Phillip L. Gibbs, twenty-one-years-old, was a junior pre-law major at Jackson State and the father of an eighteen-month-old son. He was slain when shot just under his left eye, twice more in the head, and under the left armpit by double-aught buckshot pellets.

James Earl Green, seventeen-years-old, was a high school student walking home from work at a local grocery store. He had stopped across the street and behind the line of police and highway patrolmen to watch what was happening. He was shot fatally by a single buckshot to his chest.298

In its analysis of the points of the chronology most under dispute, the President’s Commission determined the following:

- The crowd of demonstrators (numbering between seventy-five and two hundred) was behind a chain link fence and did not advance on officers prior to their opening fire.
- Shooting commenced five minutes or less after law enforcement arrived at Alexander Hall.
- Demonstrators hurled “vile” epithets at officers at Alexander Hall.
- In addition to the bottle that broke next to an officer, demonstrators threw “a small number of bottles, rocks and bricks” at officers in front of Alexander Hall.299

At least one patrolman and one reporter said that there was sniper fire directed at the police, and more specifically that at least some of this came from the stairwell window of Alexander Hall.300 The President’s Commission presents refuting evidence and cites the FBI’s determination that all bullets and pellets were “fired from outside the building [Alexander Hall].” While skeptical of many statements made by officers, the commission states, “The most favorable reading of the evidence tending to support a finding that there was such gunfire indicates that at most two shots were fired from one window.”301 It adds:

The Commission concludes that the 28-second fusillade from police officers was an unreasonable, unjustified over-reaction. Even if we were to assume that two shots were fired from a window in the west wing of Alexander Hall, the 28-second fusillade in response was clearly unwarranted. Peace officers should respond to sniper fire by taking cover and holding their fire. The Jackson City Police sniper team on the scene should have been used to deal with reported sniper fire. A broad barrage of gunfire in response to reported and unconfirmed sniper fire is never warranted.302

The grand jury’s position, “‘When people . . . engage in civil disorders and riots, they must expect to be injured or killed when law enforcement officers are required to reestablish order,’” was strongly condemned by the President’s Commission.303 To the grand jury, the commission responded,

That position, which the grand jury drew almost verbatim from grand jury charges by Federal District Judge Harold Cox and State Circuit Judge Russell Moore, may reflect the views of many Americans today. It is a view which this Commission urges Americans to reject.

298 Spofford, Lynch Street, 97; “Our History.”
299 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 436–40.
300 Spofford, Lynch Street, 74, 127, 166.
301 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 437–40; 443–44.
302 Ibid., 450.
303 Ibid., 444–54, 458.
The Commission categorically rejects rhetorical statements that students must “expect” injury or death during civil disorders. Such statements make no distinction between legitimate dissent and violent protest. It is the duty of public officials to protect human life and to safeguard peaceful, orderly, and lawful protest. When disorderly protest exists, it is their duty to deal with it firmly, justly, and with the minimum force necessary; lethal force should be used only to protect the lives of officers or citizens and only when the danger to innocent persons is not increased by the use of such force.\(^{304}\)

This public avowal of First Amendment rights by the President’s Commission regarding Jackson State would be echoed over the years by the May 4 families. In a formal statement at the close of their ten-year legal struggle, the parents of the students slain at Kent State affirmed that one of their important objectives had been realized: “To assert that the human rights of American citizens, particularly those citizens in dissent of governmental policies, must be effected and protected.” They, including Martin Scheuer, a Holocaust survivor, added, “We have learned through a tragic event that loyalty to our nation and its principles sometimes requires resistance to our government and its policies—a lesson many young people, including the children of some of us, had learned earlier.”\(^{305}\) The mother of Jeffrey Miller said during the 1988 commemoration at Kent State, “The myth of a benign America where dissent was broadly tolerated was one casualty of the shootings at Kent State.”\(^{306}\) The second edition of *Kent and Jackson State: 1970–1990* (1995) states that each contributor to the anthology “stands firmly on the side of the students in this controversy, and condemns the actions of the police and military authorities, as well as the higher political authorities, who sanctioned the violent suppression of student dissent.”\(^{307}\)

The firing of weapons against students at Jackson State lasted twice as long as at Kent State, while the number of students protesting at the time, approximately two to three hundred, was much smaller. As Spofford recounts, the immediate aftermath included sit-ins to prevent the removal of evidence from Alexander Hall by repairmen; a march by five hundred city school children on the governor’s office; a one-hundred-mile civil rights march to Atlanta (“with a sign: 2 Killed in Jackson, 4 Killed in Kent, 6 Killed in Augusta”); a boycott of white-owned businesses; closing of public schools in New York City to honor the slain Jackson State students; campus demonstrations at other universities; and raising money at other campuses, including Kent State, for Jackson State scholarships and memorials.\(^{308}\) Spofford sees these reactions as part of the progression of the National Student Strike that erupted after the shootings at Kent State.

There are some indications that the Jackson State killings were responded to more attentively by the Nixon administration than those at Kent State, possibly because of potential connections to a disaffected black community. Jackson was visited by the U.S. attorney general, who soon after requested a special federal grand jury when the highway patrol refused to provide interviews or turn over weapons for testing to the FBI. President Nixon convened a roundtable of black college presidents to discuss student unrest and created his President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. Nixon sent a telegram to and phoned the mother of James Earle Green. A chartered plane carried a delegation from Washington to Green’s funeral that included members of Congress, the NAACP, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and the press, along with two Kent State students. Nixon, aware of criticism for his “cool” response to the Kent State shootings now “released a statement to the press that he and Mrs. Nixon were ‘deeply saddened by the death of two students at Jackson State College.’”\(^{309}\)

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304 Ibid., 458–59.
305 “Statement by the Parents,” 53, 55.
His cold statement about the Kent State killings did resound, however, when he called the president of Jackson State to ask, “What are we going to do . . . to get more respect for the police from our young people.”

The legal aftermath to the Jackson State killings was comparable to that following the killings at Kent State. The federal grand jury, instructed by a biased judge, failed to indict any of the law enforcement officers who fired their weapons at Jackson State. The judge for the subsequent county grand jury delivered biased remarks similar to those of the federal grand jury judge, and as a result the county grand jury indicted one young black man for arson and inciting riot. These charges would be dropped for lack of evidence. Wounded students and parents of the slain students filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the state, the city, five city police who admitted firing, the commanding highway patrol officer during the shootings, Lloyd Jones, and the forty-two patrolmen under his direction. After a trial lasting from February 28 to March 22, 1972, the jury declared that it found “for all of the defendants.” The legal aftermath of the Kent State shootings lasted ten years and the Jackson State legal issues lasted twelve years during which time the doctrine of sovereign immunity was upheld for the Jackson State suit, although it had been reinterpreted in Scheuer v. Rhodes, which allowed the Kent State suit to proceed. The Jackson State case was closed with no one being found responsible for the killings.

As at Kent State, students at Jackson State did not want to “take the scars away” by allowing the state or university to make alterations to the site. These efforts at memorialization contrast with administrative attempts to put these events in the past for the sake of image and enrollment. Lynch Street, which in 1970 bisected the campus, is now a pedestrian mall and there has been considerable post-1970 university construction in the historic area.

May 4 and Legal Precedent

In direct response to May 4, on September 16, 1970, the Ohio General assembly passed measures that equaled a restriction on rallies and protests. House Bill 1219 was designed to reduce the probability of campus disruption and violence by establishing hearing procedures for persons arrested on campus for any alleged violations and by making suspension mandatory for students, faculty, and staff arrested, and providing for their dismissal upon conviction. H. B. 1219 also provided for expedited trials for persons accused of such offenses.

At the national level, events of May 1970 were especially important as civil rights cases in the history of American jurisprudence. Litigation resulting from May 4 extended for a full decade after the shootings. During that decade, there were ten major investigations and trials. At the end of that time, however, “not a single person had been found legally responsible for any of the events of May 4, 1970.” Investigations were conducted by the Ohio State Highway Patrol, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. The case stimulated an unprecedented mix of both criminal and civil cases at both the federal and state levels. Criminal cases took the form of a state grand jury, a state criminal trial, a federal grand jury, and a federal criminal trial. The first two trials—of the Kent 25 (students, youths, and one faculty member) and of the eight guardsmen—received national and international attention. Charges against the Kent 25 were dropped. The second case came to court despite the announcement in 1971 by Nixon’s attorney general John Mitchell that there would be no federal grand jury investigation, citing insufficient evidence. Despite this

310 Langguth, Our Vietnam, 570.
311 Spofford, Lynch Street, 155–56.
312 Ibid., 174–76.
313 Ibid., 134–38, 139, 142.
314 Spofford, Lynch Street, 176–77.
315 Mayer, Commission on KSU, 1:32.
316 Hensley, Preface, ix.
attempt to block an investigation, new attorney general Elliot Richardson proceeded with an inquiry following the revelations of Watergate and an eyes only memo from Nixon to the Justice Department forbidding a grand jury. Richardson perceived the “intense concern” and “persistence of private citizens” as a quest not for “punishment,” but for the “truth.” Eight guardsmen were indicted. The case was dismissed by the judge before the jury could deliberate; the trial did not lead to conviction.317

The last chapter in the legal aftermath of May 4 took the form of a civil suit brought against James Rhodes, the sitting governor of Ohio, for damages caused by wrongful deaths, assault and battery, and the violations of civil rights. This case was precedent setting in American jurisprudence and resulted in a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court.318 In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court ruled that the executive branch of government did not enjoy absolute immunity for its actions and that while immunity could be used as a defense in a trial, it could not be used to block a trial from being held.319 Then followed one of the longest, most complicated trials in U.S. history, Krause v. Rhodes. Most federal civil trials typically last two to three days. The 1975 federal civil trial, in which the families brought suit against fifty-three defendants on thirteen counts, lasted fifteen weeks; contained testimony of 101 witnesses; and generated twelve thousand pages of transcript that necessitated seventy-six pages of instructions to the jury, which had to decide on five hundred individual verdicts.320 While none of the defendants was found liable, a successful appeal in 1977 led to a second trial in 1979, which ended in a settlement of $675,000 for injuries the students had received and a statement of regret by the indicted guardsmen and governor.321 For many, the ambiguous language of the statement left open the wounds of May 4.

During the thirtieth commemoration of the shootings, Kathleen Sullivan, dean of the Stanford University Law School, spoke to the broken promise represented by the shootings at Kent State, the expectation that freedom of speech will be protected:

If the government is prepared to deploy legitimate force to provide genuinely equal protection of the law, then expression of views that are hostile to subparts of the population pose no ultimate physical menace. . . .

On the other hand, we often suppose that we enjoy social order precisely because we have freedom of expression. . . .

Against the backdrop of this contemporary conventional wisdom, the shootings of student anti-war demonstrators by National Guardsmen at Kent State on May 4, 1970, appear anomalous: freedom of expression understood not as an aspect of public order but rather as a threat to public order, and enough of a threat to warrant the use of martial force.322

Sullivan places May 4, 1970, into an “undercurrent of free speech antihistory” that includes the Civil War and the civil rights movement in its timeline and asks, “How might these incidents . . . be reconciled with our canonical tradition that the First Amendment confers the highest protection upon dissident political expression?”323

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318 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 18.
320 Hensley, “May 4th Trials,” 77.
321 Ibid, 81.
323 Ibid., 4.
Impact on the National Guard

While no member of the Ohio National Guard was convicted or found liable for his actions at Kent State on May 4, 1970, the events of that day were important in guiding subsequent armament and tactics of the National Guard. In September 1970, the President’s Commission condemned the tactics used at Kent State:

> The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.

> The National Guardsmen on the Kent State campus were armed with loaded M-1 rifles, high-velocity weapons with a horizontal range of almost two miles. As they confronted the students, all that stood between a guardsman and firing was the flick of a thumb on the safety mechanism, and the pull of an index finger on the trigger.

> The general issuance of loaded weapons to law enforcement officers engaged in controlling disorders is never justified except in the case of armed resistance that trained sniper teams are unable to handle. This was not the case at Kent State, yet each guardsman carried a loaded M-1 rifle.

> Even if the guardsmen faced danger, it was not a danger that called for lethal force. The 61 shots by 28 guardsmen certainly cannot be justified. The Kent State tragedy must mark the last time that, as a matter of course, loaded rifles are issued to guardsmen confronting student demonstrators.324

In response, Adjutant General Sylvester Del Corso, the highest-ranking officer of the Ohio National Guard, began to address his approach to civil disturbance in October 1970:

> “We are planning to use some short range, non lethal weapons such as multiple batons that fire wooden pellets and similar weapons that will sting at close range,” said Del Corso after criticism of the guard last week by the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest.325

Del Corso asserted about the Guard’s reformed approach:

> “But we will not have a double standard,” he said. “We all still have some rifles. We’re going to be prepared in case someone starts shooting at us. “As far as we are concerned, there is no difference between a disturbance on campus and one in the city streets.” 326

By the end of the year, Del Corso’s policy came into compliance with U.S. Army standards: “In December 1970, after attending a review of Guard civil-disturbance policies in Washington, Del Corso abandoned the routine gun-loading policy and instituted a new set of riot control drills that emphasized the use of clubs.”327 With the new year in 1971, John Gilligan replaced James Rhodes as Ohio governor, Generals Del Corso and Canterbury were retired, and Del Corso’s live ammunition policy was immediately revised. Other states

324 Scranton et al., President’s Commission, 289–90.
325 “National Guard to Carry Non-Lethal Weapons.”
326 Ibid.
327 Kelner and Munves, Kent State Coverup, 144.
followed suit. That same year, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that written commitments had been received from forty-seven of the fifty states to abide by the Army field manual guidelines, which had not been observed at Kent State.328

The Arc of the Student Protest Movement

The pattern of ancient and historic drama has long been modeled as a pyramid, with rising action running up the left-hand side, a climax or turning point plotted at the apex, falling action running down the right-hand side, and the leveling out labeled the denouement—the resolution. The struggle for social change and protest against the Vietnam War were the rising action of the 1960s, reaching a climax on May 4, 1970. The period of falling action was significant. A turn in public opinion about the war resulted, along with one of the most notable mass demonstrations in U.S. history, the first and only national student strike. Demonstrations against the war continued, as well, with a “flurry” of activity in the spring of 1971. In February, a number of protests took place around the country in response to U.S. involvement in the invasion of Laos.329 Half a million people took part in a Washington, D.C., rally in April.330 During the May Day Protests in D.C., over eight hundred veterans threw their medals and ribbons on the Capitol steps and 13,400 people were arrested May 3–6.331 Such mass antiwar demonstrations did begin to wane, however, even as antiwar opinion continued to grow, as Todd Gitlin examines in his chapter titled “Fadeout.” Among the complex of contributing factors within this falling action, as Gitlin sees it, was the lack of a “national organization to keep the student movement boiling, to channel antiwar energy into common action.”332 The denouement of the student protest movement came with the end to the longest war in U.S. history to that point. By 1972, U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam were significant and peace negotiations had intensified. In January 1973, when Nixon announced the effective end of U.S. involvement, he did so in response to a mandate unequaled in modern times.333 The last U.S. soldier killed in Vietnam occurred in 1975. In addition, amid growing scandals about his administration’s wrongdoings and cover-ups, and facing certain impeachment in the House of Representatives and not enough support in the Senate to avoid removal, Nixon resigned from office in 1974.

Tom Hayden and Todd Gitlin reflect on the anti-war movement’s denouement, its resolution. Hayden asks, “What, then, did anyone gain from the Vietnam experience?” He answers:

If anything truly begins to justify the Vietnam experience, it is that U.S. foreign policy has been altered. . . .

However, a new foreign policy consensus remains to be formulated. “No more Vietnams” is a healthy reaction to the past, but not a clear policy blueprint for the future. Perhaps we are coming to a time when a new U.S. consensus can be projected in foreign affairs; if so, it will have to be a democratic consensus, not an elite one.

That is perhaps the key legacy of Vietnam: the new and hard-won potential of Americans to think twice before accepting our leaders’ words.334

After his painful examination of the end of the movement, Gitlin, like Hayden, sounds a hopeful note:

328 Davies, Truth About Kent State, 161, 169.
329 Isserman and Kazin, America Divided, 279.
330 Gitlin, Sixties, 411.
331 Morris, “May Day!”
332 Sixties, 409–19, 417.
334 Rebel, 227.
The changes wrought by the Sixties, however beleaguered, averted some of the worst abuses of power, and made life more decent for millions. The movement in its best moments and broadest definition made philosophical breakthroughs which are still working themselves out: the idea of a politics in which difference (race, gender, nation, sexuality) does not imply deference; the idea of a single globe and the limits that have to be set on human power. However embattled, however in need of practical policy, these ideas sketch out a living political vision.335

The last words Gitlin offers are those of first-century Rabbi Tarfon: “‘It was not granted to you to complete the task . . . and yet you may not give up.’”336

Ancient theater provided citizens opportunity to recognize and learn from the pattern of action played out on the stage. So too, the May 4 Kent State shootings site is the most tangible reminder—aside from the Vietnam Veterans Memorial—of America’s internal struggle over an unpopular foreign war and one of the nation’s best places to understand the student protest movement of the Vietnam era.

May 4 Site, Move the Gym, and the Movement

On November 19, 1975, a Daily Kent Stater article covering Kent State University’s decision to build an annex to its Memorial Gymnasium commented that the annex would be “about twice the size” of the existing gym. The footprint of the annex became better understood after the Kent–Ravenna Record–Courier in July 1976 published a diagram of the proposed building and its situation within the May 4, 1970, shootings site and when the summer Stater published a photograph of the model of the building. On October 5, 1976, the Stater published the first letter to the editor opposing construction and emphasizing its negative impact on the legal actions currently underway by the shooting victims’ families. The author of the letter, Nancy Grim, observed: “‘The disruption of this area could be serious for the continuing legal actions [stemming from May 4]. Many people change their minds about the causes and implications of the shootings when they experience the setting.’” During the following commemoration, May 4, 1977, the newly formed May 4th Coalition, which would lead protest against the gym annex, argued that the site’s preservation was essential in order to carry forward the lesson of the Kent State shootings for future generations and that it “would be one more element in a series of cover-ups of the ‘truth’ about May 4.” The coalition rallied around the call to “Move the gym!”337

Tent City and the University Administration

As Thomas Hensley describes, student reaction began to build on November 3 and 4, 1976, when the Daily Kent Stater student newspaper “indicated that the proposed facility could cover part of the area where the May 4th confrontation occurred” and announced that the university’s trustees would discuss the plan on November 11. At the trustees meeting, students presented six concerns that centered on the historic nature of the site and

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335 Sixties, 436.
336 Ibid., 438.
337 Bills “Introduction,” 40, 43. A Kent State student government representative, Grim helped to found the May 4 Task Force. She was not a practicing member of the group. She actively participated in the May 4th Strike Committee, organized spring 1976, and played a key role in setting up organization of the May 4th Coalition following the 1977 May 4 commemoration, Grim, “Tent City,” 221–22; Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 147.
338 Thomas R. Hensley, now professor emeritus of political science, Kent State University, personally observed the major events in the protest timeline, collected newspaper accounts and “countless leaflets” and university interdepartmental memos, examined numerous court documents and minutes of Kent State Board of Trustees meetings, recorded interviews with key figures in the drama, and attended key events, Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 140–41.
the need to pursue an alternative; however, the trustees approved the building location and in the same meeting accepted the resignation of university president Glenn Olds. As an unusual result, the trustees would interact directly with the major student protest to follow. Hensley views the 1977–78 protest as “the genesis of a new student movement, which not only came to dominate life on the Kent State campus but also spread across the nation, involving students from dozens of other campuses and eventually many nonstudent radicals as well. . . . While the protest had its basis in local issues, some members of the coalition felt that something much larger was occurring.”

Central to the gym annex controversy was the definition of the boundaries of the May 4, 1970, shootings site. The university administration defined the site to be only where the students had actually fallen from National Guard gunfire, and the proposed annex was not supposed to impact that location. The May 4th Coalition, though, defined the boundaries to include the entire area where the events of May 4, 1970, unfolded, including where the guardsmen had assembled, their marching route, and their firing location, as well as where the student protestors assembled, regrouped, and were shot.340 Some of that acreage was clearly going to be affected by the construction of the gym annex.

The protest built as the May 4, 1977, commemoration approached. Members of both the May 4th Task Force, which organized the annual commemoration, and the Daily Kent Stater spoke out against the insensitivity of the administration toward May 4 matters and the scheduling of a trustees meeting on the afternoon of the commemoration. Students would occupy the building in which the trustees met that day, until 1:00 a.m., May 5. During their protest, students formed the May 4th Coalition, then drafted eight demands:

- **Justice!** (The university should acknowledge the injustice of the shootings.)
- **Move the Gym!**
- **Keep the Center for Peaceful Change!** (founded as a living memorial to May 4th)
- **No “business as usual” on May 4!**
- **Name the buildings!** (for the four who died)
- **Amnesty for May 4, 1977!** (anyone who participated in the commemoration)
- **Support the United Faculty Professional Association** (then in negotiations with KSU)
- **No reprisals for the sit-in!**

“Coalition members themselves took great pride in the unique qualities of their organization, and many saw their ‘constructive anarchism’ or ‘ultimate participatory democracy’ as a potential landmark development in the history of social movements.” Protestors were aware of the extensive media coverage at the local level, which was picked up in turn at the national level. Some coalition members felt that the earlier student Vietnam-era protest movement had waned, but was now “reincarnated at Kent State.” National figures, including Vietnam veteran Ron Kovic and black activist Stokely Carmichael, concurred.

The demonstrations at Kent State May 1–4, 1970, had not been led by a core group of activists, but were of a looser, counterculture nature and, for the most part, participated in by large numbers of students unaffiliated with particular groups. This was especially true on the day of the shootings. Conversely, the May 4th Coalition, as Hensley recounts, immediately developed an organizational structure, featuring in addition to its platform a steering committee, daily meetings, negotiations, and planned activities. With a substantial show of student support, the coalition met with the president and trustees on May 12, 1977. The university agreed to four of the

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339 “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 145, 142, 147.
342 Ibid., 142, 148.
coalition demands; it sent for committee review the request to name buildings and dedicate each May 4 to remembrance and education; and it deferred denouncing the shootings as unjust because of ongoing litigation renouncing the building of the annex. The university felt that it made a reasonable and responsible business and administrative decision regarding building the annex, one that would not impinge either on the legal aftermath of the shootings or the particular places where students fell. Having previously decided that its demands were nonnegotiable, coalition members left the meeting, marched past the dorms (where a few others joined in), went to the proposed construction site, and spontaneously founded Tent City. The sixty people who slept on the hill that first night vowed to remain “until the demand to ‘move the gym’ was met.”

“The protestors were a mix of older and newer activists, including participants in or observers of the May 4 rally of 1970: Ken Hammond, Bill Arthrell, Dean Kahler, Alan Canfora, Roseann (Chic) Canfora, Miriam Jackson, Tom Grace, and others.” During the two months that Tent City stood, the May 4th Coalition was joined by additional student protestors from Kent State and other universities. Other political groups joined the protest as well, including representatives from the communist Revolutionary Student Brigade (RSB). Tent City became both a “focal point of Coalition political activity as well as a social community.” To avoid being dismantled by the university, the community developed rules such as no alcohol and no drugs. Meals were communal and primarily vegetarian; tents were moved regularly to preserve the grass; and littering was avoided. “Participation in it became a ‘way of life,’ as had draft resistance groups during the 1960s.” “Members, like their 60s predecessors, lived ‘in opposition to the majority culture . . . moving toward an alternative consciousness and community.’”

The coalition pursued multiple tactics to support its cause, which was to block university attempts to “‘bury the history of May 4,’” by “‘literally bury[ing] the site of the shootings under a sprawling building.’” Of strategic importance, the coalition purposely sought to keep the attention of the media on the protest, seeking thereby to create anxiety that the situation might escalate, which would in turn cause the administration to relent. Coalition members tirelessly lobbied for support, by regularly explaining the organization’s position to students and faculty in person and through leaflets; by telling construction contractors and laborers directly that it was not opposed to the gym annex being built elsewhere; by researching the genesis of the facility; through benefit concerts and rallies with notable speakers; by building solidarity through linking Kent and Jackson State and supporting Black United Student demands; through a letter-writing campaign; by picketing state politicians; and by trying to find grounds for a court injunction against construction. Concomitantly, the university maintained its position that it had made a reasonable decision; kept a low profile; hoped that the protest would fizzle out; and issued a fact sheet to the media to explain its position. Neither the president nor the trustees officially met with the Coalition during the two months of Tent City to try to resolve differences. Several trustees did talk with protestors at Tent City or offered ideas about how to resolve the crisis. Dean of Student Affairs Richard Bredemeier and University Architect Ted Curtis also met with coalition members several times. Trustees David Dix and Joyce Quirk understood the point of view of the students. At the June 9 trustees meeting, Dix stated, “We have proven ourselves insensitive . . . but we cannot ignore the worst thing that ever happened to the Kent community and the University.” Quirk added, “The possibility of considering alternatives for this site might indeed be costly but in the long run the historical and aesthetic losses in my estimation might prove even higher.” Neither could effect change with the president or other trustees.

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343 Ibid., 148–49.
344 Bills, “Introduction,” 43.
345 Jackson, “Brothers and Sisters on the Land,” 103.
348 May 4th Coalition, position paper, quoted in Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym, 150.
349 Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 150.
350 Ibid., 150–51, 149, 152.
Shortly before the arrests of the Tent City protestors, Trustee James Fleming observed that “‘their protest has been very effective.’”\(^{351}\) The coalition’s mission was clear, to educate the university about what it should see as its mission:

“The antiwar movement of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s was the largest student movement this country has seen, a major part of American history. Kent State was a major turning point of the movement . . . a major turning point of the struggle against the war in Vietnam. It is an outrageous abridgement of the right to free and public expression. . . . Kent State is obligated to preserve this site, as Boston must preserve the site of the Boston Massacre.

The destruction of this area would be a confirmation of the bloody suppression of free expression on May 4, 1970. The preservation of this site is essential to carry the lessons of ‘Kent State’ to future generations.”\(^{352}\)

As was the case during the May 1970 protests, the Kent Campus became the focus of state and national attention as the clock ticked down. Hensley reports that State Representative John Begala brokered an arrangement with Ohio Lieutenant Governor Richard Celeste, Senate Majority Leader Oliver Ocasek, Senator Marcus Roberto, and Speaker of the House Vernal Riffe to provide funding to rotate the position of the gym, if the trustees would pass a resolution requesting the funding. Although the trustees felt that circumstances would not permit them to pass such a resolution, Begala felt that the obstacles the trustees perceived could have been overcome.\(^{353}\) Begala also supported the resolution introduced on July 6, 1977, by State Representative Harry J. Lehman, who was “upset at the absence of any memorial to the four students killed at Kent State University and fearful of renewed violence there.”\(^{354}\) Quirk and Trustee Michael Johnston, still feeling a resolution might be passed, asked Dennis Carey, a faculty member in the Center for Peaceful Change, to take the plan to rotate the annex to the coalition. Rejecting the plan, Tent City protestors instead “sent out an appeal throughout the nation for all supporters to come to Blanket Hill where protestors would lock arms and legs to resist removal or arrest in a nonviolent manner.” Joyce Quirk, still trying for a resolution, was able to reach President Jimmy Carter’s advisor Midge Costanza, resulting in Quirk’s proposal to the university administration and protestors that they seek nonbinding federal mediation. Neither side made the request.\(^{355}\)

Over the course of the protest, the coalition did attract the media attention coverage it sought as a political strategy. As with coverage of the shootings, reactions were strong on both sides. On May 28, 1977, the Cleveland Plain Dealer published an editorial titled “Blanket Hill’s Vista Should Not Be Desecrated.” Copy editor George Markell wrote: “To another generation it’s like putting a Howard Johnson’s on Normandy Beach. A desecration. . . . Should the battlefield at Gettysburg be excavated to build a bowling alley?” He went on to say, “When he is older, I’d like to walk on this spot with my son, pointing out these landmarks that remain from May 4, 1970. It is important to me that someday he understand what happened here, even if he can never comprehend why.” On June 2, 1977, an editorial in the Columbus, IN, Republic dismissed annual commemorations at Kent State for their featuring speakers who “customarily extoll the virtues of socialism and condemn capitalism.” “That alone would be enough to keep alive the spirit of ‘revolution,’ the Republic

\(^{351}\) Ibid., 149.
\(^{353}\) Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 152–53.
\(^{354}\) “Memorial is Asked at KSU Slaying Site.”
\(^{355}\) Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 152–53.
noted. In a Dayton Journal Herald report on June 3, 1977, coalition members invited to Wright State University by the local chapter of the Revolutionary Student Brigade asserted when interviewed by the press: "This is a battlefield, like Gettysburg or Boston Commons. . . . It shouldn’t be desecrated" and "What we’ve seen in the last half year is a rebirth of the student movement." Kent State alum Greg Rambo did concede, though, that while current issues were just as important as those during the Vietnam War, the majority of students seemed more concerned about getting jobs than “protesting for a cause.” The June 4, 1977, Cleveland Press solemnly supported the protest: “Kent became a symbol of a war that never should have been fought. And maybe Kent was the turning point in opinion about that war. The Kent protesters do not want a building that would defile the memory of the dead, nor do we. And we believe a compromise can be reached.” On July 8, 1977, Cleveland Plain Dealer analyst Meg Algren stressed the commitment of Tent City protestors to nonviolence and the absence at the site of “hardened revolutionaries” or any “organized effort to stir up trouble.” Plain Dealer politics writer Joseph D. Rice concluded “KSU Lesson Not Learned” on July 14 with: “What is needed now is a recognition by university administrators of the significance of what happened May 4, 1970, and a determination to build for the future by avoiding the mistakes of the past.” July 14, 1977, also had the Chicago Tribune concluding its editorial “Kent State Again” with: “The May 4 Coalition has a right to ask the Kent State trustees to keep the scene of the deplorable events of May 4, 1970, an open space in perpetuity, but everyone should recognize the trustees’ right either to accept or reject the suggestion.” The Chicago Daily News also supported the administration: “How does empty land honor the sacrifice of the dead? We are inclined to side with Kent State President Glenn Olds, who believes the best way to preserve their memory ‘is not in a physical entity, but in the living memorial built into the character of the school, such as [the university] did with the Center for Peaceful Change.’ Conversely, the day after the arrests, The Boston Globe ran its editorial, “Ohio’s Hallowed Ground,” which opened with: “There is a grassy knoll in Ohio on the campus of Kent State University that is hallowed ground to many Americans, even to those who have never seen it” and went on to say “it is soil to which we should all return . . . to recollect the consequences of official contempt of American guarantees of life and liberty.” The editorial concluded: “Kent State officials should think about the national significance of the knoll that cradled an American tragedy and mark it with an appropriate memorial, not a gymnasium.” The Boston Globe published a letter to the editor on July 21, 1977, expressing thanks “that the ilk of Kent State President Glenn Olds and the university trustees have not set historic landmark policy in the greater Boston area,” as “Lexington Green, where citizens and soldiers also once opposed each other, would be a dismal sight as a shopping mall, parking lot or gymnasium.” The New York Times reported on July 17, 1977: Demonstrators “maintain that the construction would ‘desecrate’ what should be a national monument.” Time magazine for July 18, 1977, opened an article with: “An old wound in American society has been painfully reopened.” That same day, The Chronicle of Higher Education made clear the position of each side and the nonviolence on both sides during the arrests. On October 2, 1977, the New York Times editorial page offered in “Remembering Kent State”: “The memory of Kent State represents a powerful link for students to the fabled era of campus activism. But unlike the incursions into Cambodia—an issue of urgent concern to the country—the 1977 activity shows signs of deteriorating into confrontation for its own sake. It is reminiscent of those campus demonstrations which were designed not to achieve specific objectives but to exploit a popular cause and so to ‘radicalize’ students.”

356 “Kent State Revisited.”
357 “Kent Students Want ‘Battlefield’ Commemorated.”
358 “Kent’s Newest Dilemma.”
359 “Tent City Fears Confrontation.”
360 “Remembering: 10 Summers Ago . . . And Seven Years Ago.”
361 Harris, “Gym on Lexington Green?”
362 Herron and Denenberg, “This Time, Calm at Kent State.”
364 Phillips, “Kent State Protest Ends in 194 Arrests.”
Protestors resided in Tent City “until July 12, 1977, when 193 people occupying Blanket Hill were arrested.”365 Portage County sheriff’s deputies, carrying clubs but no other weapons, ringed the site.366 An order to disperse was read; then unarmed members of the Kent State campus police cleared the hill, carrying off many of the protestors. Among the first arrested were the parents of coalition members Chic and Alan Canfora and the parents of Sandy Scheuer. Rev. John Adams367 was also among the first arrested.368 Protestors reoccupied the site, which had been roped off after the arrests, during a national rally on July 22. Arrest warrants were issued for twenty-seven of these protestors, and a six-foot-high chain link fence was erected to protect the construction site.369 The night of July 28, sixty-one who again had reoccupied the site were arrested, followed the next day by the arrest of eight others—among them four Cleveland area clergymen.370 On September 11, 1977, protestors used wire cutters to break down the fence and the site was again occupied by about 125 protestors, this time with no arrests.371 Construction began on September 19, 1977.

At the same time, May 4th Coalition members continued to pursue their goal through a multipronged approach. The legal system represented another route. On July 29, 1977, in a suit filed by William Kunstler on behalf of the May 4th Coalition, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Lambros issued a temporary restraining order against any construction. In granting the order, Judge Lambros cited a pending National Historic Landmark study of the May 4 site (see below). After some negotiation between the university and the coalition, including the proposal to rotate the annex slightly away from Blanket Hill, Judge Lambros suspended negotiations on August 8, 1977, then ruled in favor of the university administration on August 17, 1977. Coalition attorneys obtained a restraining order from U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, but this was removed on September 8, 1977. Construction of the gym annex began on September 12, 1977.372

The May 4th Coalition also tried to block construction of the gym annex by taking their cause to Washington, D.C., where White House advisor Midge Costanza became involved a second time. Costanza arranged for meetings on July 19 and 20, one for the students and the other for the Kent State trustees.373 The roster of attendees included the following: coalition members Alan Canfora, Chic Canfora, Dean Kahler, and others; John Adams; lawyer for the coalition David Engdahl; Kent State administrators Michael Schwartz, who was appointed interim president on July 15, and George Janik, chair of the board of trustees; William J. Murtagh of the National Historic Landmark Office; U.S. Representative John Seiberling; and U.S. Senators Howard Metzenbaum and John Glenn.374 Costanza noted after the two-and-a-half-hour meeting that “neither President Carter nor the White House could solve the problem the coalition brought to us yesterday, but we encourage them to keep working toward a solution.” Seiberling and Metzenbaum then requested that the National Park Service conduct an evaluation of the site of the May 4, 1970, shootings for National Historic Landmark status.375 The request was picked up nationwide by the news media, which had been following the Move the Gym protest. Future Pulitzer Prize–winning columnist Mary McGrory praised the involvement of the White House, Metzenbaum, and Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus for trying to overcome the deadlock by pursuing Landmark status for the site, commenting, “The whole landscape that was the scene of the greatest

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365 Hensley, “Struggle to Move the Gym,” 149.
366 Phillips, “Kent State Protest Ends in 194 Arrests.”
367 Adams was a minister in the United Methodist Church. In 1971, he published Peter Davies’ findings about the shootings, “to prod the Justice Department into convening a federal grand jury,” which became The Truth About Kent State: Challenge for the American Conscience, Kelner & Munves, Kent State Coverup, 20, note to page 20.
368 Bills, “Introduction,” 45.
369 “Chronology of HPER Facility Planning and May 4 Coalition,” Mike and Kendra’s Web site.
371 “Chronology of HPER Facility Planning and May 4 Coalition,” Mike and Kendra’s Web site.
373 McGrory, “A Tactful Solution to Kent State Flap?”
374 “Tent City/Gym Annex Protest Chronology.”
domestic tragedy of the Vietnam war could be preserved as it is for future generations.” McGrory concluded her article with: “All the situation ever needed was a little tact. It seems appropriate that the federal government, which caused the trouble in the first place, should at last, be providing it.” The column was picked up by newspapers across the country, from Vermont to Florida, Connecticut to Oregon. The expanse of media coverage of the Landmark effort resulted in hundreds of letters against such status from across the country. Many of these letters, on file at Ohio’s State Historic Preservation Office in Columbus, probably represent the single most concerted negative response to any National Historic Landmark evaluation in Ohio history. The general tenor of many was that such a designation would dishonor the tens of thousands of Americans who died in Vietnam. Also included in the files is an unsigned note from an Ohio Historic Preservation Office staff member dated July 18, 1977, indicating that Assistant Attorney General Roy Martin had called to state that Governor Rhodes actively opposed this nomination, but to keep his name out of it if possible. The governor's office "made it clear that the nomination should not leave Ohio." On the other hand, Judge Thomas Lambros, who had issued the temporary restraining order against any construction of the gym because of the pending National Historic Landmark study, compared Blanket Hill to Pearl Harbor and the Alamo. He added, “Those places become historic spots in and of themselves, regardless of administrative decrees.”

The Landmark study was initiated in 1977 after Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus determined that it could go forward without the event having reached the fifty-year mark. The study began with an on-site evaluation by historian James Sheire of the Historic Sites Survey Division. On January 1, 1978, parents of the slain students, the nine wounded students, and parents of seven of the wounded students wrote a letter of support for Landmark status to Secretary Andrus. Sheire’s report of January 1978, however, concluded that the shootings had no lasting political effect, that the social impact was too difficult to measure, and that the only enduring significance might be of a symbolic nature. Regarding the political effect, Sheire argued that the May 4 shootings had some effects on Nixon’s “tactics,” but not on his “basic object of American policy, peace with honor.” Further, despite Gallup Poll evidence of increased opposition to the war after the shootings, the shootings were not “significant” in bringing about lasting new opposition. Regarding social significance, “As of 1977 it [was], too soon after the events to assess the historical meaning or significance of the student movement of the 1960’s,” or Kent State’s “effect” on the movement. The Cambodian invasion and shootings, however, may have been “symbolic” of the “moment” when “Americans were most divided during the period of the war,” comparable to the Boston Massacre and other historic moments. Finally, “one indication that Kent State may become a lasting symbol,” Sheire said, was the vehement reaction of many Americans to the attempts of the May 4th Coalition to preserve the site through occupation and obstruction: “seven years after the event the silent majority and the antiwar movement once again confronted each other.”

Upset, the students and families submitted an appeal to Andrus, dated April 10, 1978, which was composed by Peter Davies, with assistance from Elaine Holstein, mother of Jeffrey Miller, and Chic Canfora. Taking issue with Sheire’s interpretations, they argued a long list of points. Among these, they asserted that the shootings at Kent State

- led Nixon to withdraw troops from Cambodia earlier than he intended, saving other young lives,
- were the subject of “numerous” books,

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376 “A Tactful Solution to Kent State Flap?”
377 Franco Ruffini, personal communication to Mark Seeman, April 2009.
378 Associated Press, Cleveland, “KSU Compared to Pearl Harbor.”
380 Letter to Cecil D. Andrus, from Arthur and Doris Krause et al.
381 Bills, “Introduction,” 58.
were extensively investigated, including at the federal level,
were the subject of three grand juries and three trials,
resulted in a landmark “civil rights and law enforcement negligence case,”
marked the first time demonstrators were shot “in broad daylight” since the beginning of the antiwar movement,
were out of compliance with U.S. Army regulations for responding to civil disturbances,
were poorly documented by the Ohio National Guard in the immediate aftermath,
happened in a state where the governor called out the Guard more often than the other forty-nine states combined,
took place in a deeply divided country, led by officials who used harsh rhetoric to characterize student dissent,
evoked deep “passions” still intense eight years later and which will remain intense for many years,
triggered interpersonal and community divisions and substantial counterprotests,
spurred jingoism
deeply affected the nation, as reflected in coverage by media such as *Time* magazine,
and were “as important to our modern history as what happened at Boston on March 5, 1770, is to our Revolutionary history.”

The appeal concluded its list of reasons with the following plea:

The current Kent State Board of Trustees, and the University President, Dr. Brage Golding, have demonstrated an insensitivity to our grief and desires for justice that knows no bounds. Despite demonstrations and pleas of last summer, they have used the bulldozers to plough ahead regardless, and we can find no comfort whatsoever in their assurances that there will be no further desecration of the area where our children were killed and wounded.

In March 1978, two Department of the Interior consulting committees determined that the case had not yet been made for national significance of the site and that not enough time had passed for proper perspective. During a third round of review in April, the National Park System Advisory Board also found that national significance for the site had not been established. A letter of May 12, 1978, from Cecil Andrus to Howard Metzenbaum indicates:

The Board’s recommendation was that national significance for the Kent State May 4, 1970 Site has not been established and, therefore, the site does not qualify for designation as a national historic landmark. . . . The essence of establishing historical significance is perspective. Since this changes with the passing of time, specific events can be evaluated to determine their full impact on the broad sweep of American history only after the passage of sufficient length of time to achieve proper perspective. The consensus of those responsible for review was that there has not yet been time enough to reach a judgment on the national significance of this site.

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383 "Appeal to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior."
384 Ibid.
386 DiPaolo, “It’s All Over for Landmark Appeal.”
387 Andrus, Letter to Howard Metzenbaum.
The decision to build the gym annex represented more than a construction project. May 4th Coalition member Ken Hammond, an activist throughout his time at Kent State, commented, “‘It’s a contest over images. It’s a contest over who controls what we think, who controls our history. It’s a fight to gain back our roots, and our own understanding of ourselves and our past.’” When Joan Baez appeared at a May 4th Coalition rally on August 20, 1977, she noted, “‘There’s the idea that they’re putting a gym over the Vietnam War. I do believe that’s what is happening.’” Evidence from another direction came when President Michael Schwartz went to Columbus to talk about the controversy with the powerful speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, Vern Riffe, who told him: “If you don’t build the Gym Annex where it’s supposed to go, you’ll never get another building on campus. Is that clear?” Senator Metzenbaum and Representative Seiberling’s request to review the site of the May 4 shootings as a National Historic Landmark also can be seen in this same light.

**The Construction of Memory and History of the Kent State Shootings**

Determining significance—as understood by historians, preservationists, and others interested in recognizing the importance of past events—generally draws on a perspective that develops over time. The meaning of an event often depends on its context among other events, its impact on society in the decades since the original incident, and the extent of commemorative activity it generates in the present. Noting that “many sites of violence are shaped to commemorate significant moments in the national past,” Kenneth Foote observes that such “commemoration cannot occur unless there is a past worth commemorating.” The process involved in giving meaning to the site of an event often involves its subsequent memorial treatment—via ritual activities, landscape preservation, and the construction of monuments—as a special place worthy of continued commemorative attention. The places associated with ongoing struggles, such as American independence, civil rights, labor equality, or the end of an unjust war, “may, over time, be sanctified to mark the course of such a struggle, but usually only after a movement has attained a portion of its goals.” At this time in 2016, more than forty-six years beyond the shootings, those milestones have been reached and surpassed. As well as the measurable impact on national politics and policy examined above, commemoration of the event and the construction of memory of May 4 as a symbol began almost immediately after the shootings and continue to the present day. Documents and artifacts preserving the history of the event have been extensively archived. These resources have served as the foundation of permanent exhibits within the May 4 site that provide the public access to the history so that they may understand both the particular story and its context within larger patterns of U.S. history. Response to events at Kent State also has become deeply embedded in U.S. culture from the Vietnam era to the present. An understanding of at least some of these efforts is relevant to the construction of a social context for the May 4 shootings and its perceived significance to the national student protest movement.

**May 4 Memorialization**

The first program memorializing the May 4 shootings was held on the Kent State campus on May 4, 1971. A candlelight march and vigil was an important part of the program and has remained so for subsequent commemorative events. Every year on the evening of May 3, a candlelight procession starts on the Commons at the Victory Bell and traces the perimeter of the campus. The march acts to enclose and sanctify the historic property. It ends at the B’nai B’rith Hillel marker in the Prentice Hall Parking Lot, into which the Guard fired. The Hillel marker was the first object installed within the site to memorialize victims of the shootings. At the marker, participants may say Kaddish and the Lord’s Prayer or engage in silent reflection and leave their lit candles in remembrance. Then begins a candlelight vigil organized by the May 4 Task Force. Those standing

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389 Young, “Tent City and the Decades of our Discontent.”
391 Bills, “Preface,” 32–33.
vigil take their place in turns within one of the four named spaces set off by lighted bollards (dedicated in the fall of 1999) where Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer, and William Schroeder were fatally wounded and fell. The annual vigil lasts until 12:24 p.m. on May 4, the time that the Guard fired their rifles in 1970. The last four standing vigil proceed with their lanterns to the Commons for the commemoration speakers program. As described, the annual commemoration ceremony makes use of both contributing and noncontributing resources as focal points of remembrance. In addition to the Hillel marker and the marked places for each of the four martyrs, these include the Victory Bell, the Pagoda, and Solar Totem #1. The memorial dedicated during the twentieth commemoration in 1990 also serves as a place for quiet reflection.

The Rev. Jesse Jackson, then director of Operation Breadbasket, was the keynote speaker of the first May 4 commemoration program, which was organized by the university administration. In his address, he linked Orangeburg, Kent State, and Jackson State, and exhorted the crowd to take action toward truth and action: “Charles Evers carried out the resurrection of his brother, Medgar, killed in the early ’60s, and people must now carry out the resurrections of those killed here and at South Carolina State and Jackson State.” During the planning, institutional programming received pushback from the May Day Coalition, formed in February 1971, and its subgroup the Liberation Caucus. The coalition was a “mass organization,” with three to four hundred attending each meeting. The coalition and caucus pushed for alternate programming with freer opportunity than the university program promised to discuss the nature of the killings and need for attention to issues including sustaining the antiwar movement. One result of their actions may have been pop poet Rod McKuen’s pulling out of the program at the last minute. Other speakers included activists Dick Gregory and Julian Bond and James Ahern, former New Haven, CT, police chief and former member of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest. Ahern told the Kent State audience:

“Those who thought they could buy off segments of the American public by giving them students as a target of hatred, and by correlating demonstrations with violence and students with anarchism have failed.

We mark here the anniversary of four senseless, needless deaths. They, and their brothers at Jackson State and Orangeburg, were killed by the conscious, deliberate acts of other men.

The Commission on Campus Unrest, of which I was a member, recognized that too many Americans had begun to justify violence as a means of effecting change or safeguarding traditions, that too many of us had forgotten the values and sense of shared humanity that traditionally had united us. . . . We told the President that nothing is more important than an end to the war in Indochina. . . . That disaffected students see the war as a symbol of moral crisis in the nation which deprives even law of its legitimacy. And his response to this has been to sponsor an invasion of Laos and continue the slaughter. But most disheartening has been the lack of moral leadership . . . [and] decisions [that] tend to divide rather than unify the American people.”

Ahern’s words captured the honesty of confronting the truth of the killings at Kent State as well as their link to and the realities of the greater political and social spheres. Such an approach continues to characterize the annual commemoration.

392 “Jackson Leads Crowd in ‘Battlecry for Peace.’”
393 Liberation Caucus, May Day Coalition, “May Day Coalition: ‘To Educate, Commemorate, Not Confront.’”; “McKuen Out.”
394 Nichols, “Ahern, Brewster Speak at Memorial Services.”
In 1972 and 1973, the university program was organized by the Center for Peaceful Change (CPC). The Center for Peaceful Change, now the Center for Applied Conflict Management, was founded in 1971 by the Kent State Board of Trustees as a *living memorial* to the slain students. It provides a national leadership role and public service in promoting nonviolence and other democratic values. The May 4 Task Force (M4TF), a university-chartered and -funded student organization—founded in October 1975 by Kent State students and victims of the May 4 shootings Alan Canfora, Robby Stamps, and Dean Kahler—has planned and conducted the annual May 4 commemoration program for the evening of May 3 and the day of May 4 since 1976. Following the panel program on May 3, events move outdoors to the historic site. Each year’s commemoration, organized around an original motto, honors the memory of those killed and wounded both at Jackson State and Kent State.\(^{395}\) The Task Force created its first theme—*The Truth Demands Justice*—in 1976, a time when justice and truth were being pursued by the May 4 families through the court system. Each year since then, each annually created M4TF theme aims to promote understanding of the important issues in the May 4 history, appears on new posters, buttons, and T-shirts, and guides the content of each Task Force commemoration program. “In addition to an annual focus upon May 4, 1970-related issues,” the Task Force “welcomes and expect timely commentary linking 1970 with modern issues each year.” Further, the Task Force strives to “respect all First Amendment rights guaranteed by the US Constitution especially Freedom of Speech because that was the central violation of student rights at KSU on May 4, 1970.”\(^{396}\)

Every year since the shootings, Kent State has commemorated May 4, 1970. Over the decades, university-organized events have combined with the May 4 Task Force’s annual on-site commemoration to establish a long tradition of “social remembering” and “analytical history” making about May 4.\(^{397}\) Notable commemoration speakers have included: U.S. Senators George McGovern and Howard Metzenbaum; U.S. Congress members Bella Abzug (women’s rights activist), John Lewis (civil rights activist), and Tim Ryan; activists Julian Bond, Dick Gregory, Tom Hayden, Jesse Jackson, Ron Kovic, Russell Means, and Cindy Sheehan; photographer John Filo; journalists Juan Williams and Gwen Ifill; philosopher and linguist Noam Chomsky; filmmaker Oliver Stone; Governor Richard Celeste; attorney William Kunstler; musical artists Joan Baez, Gerry Casale, Country Joe McDonald, Crosby, Stills & Nash, and Peter, Paul, and Mary; and many more.

During the dedication of the May 4 Memorial on the twentieth commemoration, for the first time a public official, Governor Richard Celeste, apologized to “Dean Kahler, and all of those who suffered 20 years ago” and to the four dead:

“To Allison Krause, your family and friends, I am sorry.

“To Jeffrey Miller, your family and friends, I am sorry.

“To William Schroeder, your family and friends, I am sorry.

“To Sandra Scheuer, your family and friends, I am sorry.”\(^ {398}\)

Poignant as they were delivered to four thousand in a heavy rain, the phrases echoed the traditional Jewish Prayer of Remembrance:

> At the rising of the sun and its going down

\(^{395}\) Bills, “Preface,” 33–35.

\(^{396}\) “May 4 Task Force Homepage.”

\(^{397}\) Lewis, “Social Remembering,” 177.

\(^{398}\) Lawless, “Rain, Tears.”
we remember them.

At the blowing of wind and in the chill of the winter
we remember them.

At the opening of the buds and in the rebirth of spring
we remember them . . .

As long as we live, they too will live, for they are now a part of us
as we remember them.

During the memorial dedication, Celeste shared his reaction when he heard about the shootings: “‘We had
turned our weapons on our own children. . . . A distant war to save democracy had come home to threaten
democracy.’” Program speaker Senator George McGovern added, “The Vietnam War was the most ‘disastrous
blunder’ in U.S. foreign policy history.” He “called for a resolution of differences with Vietnam” and noted,
“‘the killing has stopped, but we have not come to terms with the tragedy of the war.’” The memorial
dedication included the planting of 57,185 daffodils on the monument hillside to remember the U.S. war deaths
in Vietnam.

Organizing its twentieth commemoration program around the theme *Truth, Justice & Freedom . . . Yesterday,
Today & Tomorrow*, the May 4 Task Force program for 1990 embodied both an honoring of the dead and
wounded and the spirit of continuing protest and activism that continues today. On May 3, the Task Force
staged *Kent State: A Requiem*, a fact-based play about the shootings through the eyes of the mother of Bill
Schroeder, killed on May 4. For the noon program, commemorating those lost on May 4 were Allison Krause’s
sister, Laurel Krause, and Gene Young, witness to the Jackson State shootings. Speakers also included SDS and
Vietnam Veterans Against the War activists and a current activist from Tiananmen Square. Task Force
members held a silent protest with two hundred participants at the memorial dedication, during which they
displayed signs saying “Whose May 4th is it anyway?” and “Don’t minimize student death.” The latter
expressed the group’s commentary on the dimensions of the built memorial compared to its scope in the
design. The memorial was designed by Bruno Ast in response to a national competition opened in 1985. The
memorial’s plaza, inscribed with *Inquire, Learn, Reflect*, ends in a “jagged, abstract border symbolic of
disruptions and the conflict of ideas,” which also “suggests the tearing of the fabric of society.” Another main
feature is comprised of four “pylons” oriented horizontally that decrease in size as they progress away from the
plaza. “The pylons stand as mute sentinels to the force of violence and the memory of the four students
killed.”

For the thirtieth commemoration, the university planned an extensive program under the theme *Experiencing
Democracy: Inquire, Learn, Reflect* and sponsored a national symposium on the topic “The Boundaries of
Freedom of Expression and Order in American Democracy.” The conference represented the first Symposium
on Democracy, dedicated to scholarship that seeks to prevent violence and promote democratic values and civil
discourse. It was instituted as a second living memorial to honor the memory of the four students who lost their
lives on May 4, Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer, and William Schroeder. Democracy
Symposium presenters have included prominent scholars and public figures, among them Kathleen Sullivan,
dean of the Stanford Law School; *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis; Admiral James M. Loy, deputy
secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; activist Tom Hayden; Yale historian Jay Winter;

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399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
401 “May 4 Site and Memorial.”
Pulitzer Prize winner David Halberstam; political analyst Juan Williams; Jehmu Greene, then president of the Rock the Vote Foundation; journalist Hodding Carter III; and documentary filmmakers Edward Gray, Ken Burns, John Scheinfeld, and Chris Triffo. The thirtieth commemoration featured more than thirty other scholarly and cultural events, including an original Dance Alloy production performed within the site. Other events were lectures by Mahatma Gandhi’s grandson, Arun Gandhi, co-founder and director of the M. K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence, and civil rights activist Staughton Lynd; and a panel discussion on May 4 and Jackson State, sponsored by the Student Anti-Racist Action organization.

The May 4 Task Force organized its observance of the thirtieth commemoration in accordance with the theme: Peace . . . Learn it. Live it. Teach it. and a design featuring a recumbent military rifle with a stemmed flower rising out of it. These images alluded to both a famous photo taken during a sixties protest at the Pentagon showing a young man putting a flower in a soldier’s rifle barrel and Allison’s equally famously doing the same on May 2, 1970, saying to the officer who had removed it, “What’s the matter with peace? Flowers are better than bullets.” During the noon program, Barry Levine, Allison’s boyfriend in 1970, read “Who Killed Allison? Why? What Had She Done?” his searing poem in the spirit of Bob Dylan, a favorite of Allison’s. In it the character of President Nixon answers the title questions with:

Not me says Tricky Dick
I listened to my advisors, take your pick
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean
Agniew, and Colson, they all knew the scene
Those college kids were bums—they needed a lesson
So I put out the word around this great land
To stop those damn hoodlums any way that you can.

The Task Force noon program also featured the airing of a taped speech by controversial figure Mumia Abu-Jamal, whose conviction for the death of a police officer has raised questions for some and who has published extensively on the treatment of prisoners. Other featured speakers included environmentalist Julia Hill Butterfly and Ramona Africa, the only surviving adult of a home firebombing by police in Philadelphia. Representing Jackson State were student shooting witness Gene Young and family members of slain students James Green and Philip Gibbs.

A highlight of the fortieth May 4 commemoration was a ceremony recognizing the placement of the Kent State May 4 Shootings site on the National Register of Historic Places and the May 4 Walking Tour (the latter described below). Kent State participated via teleconference in Jackson State’s own fortieth commemoration program. As the Symposium on Democracy speaker, Congressman John Lewis made clear to the audience the place of the shootings at Kent State within the long, and still necessary, struggle for civil rights:

Another generation of young people. Another generation of students and teachers. Another generation of men and women black and white had the courage, had the capacity, had the ability to get in the way. They put aside the comfort of their own lives, and they got involved in the circumstances of others. Allison, William, Jeffrey, and Sandra. And nine other students who were also wounded put aside the comfort of their own lives to get involved in the circumstances of others. They did not have friends or family in Cambodia. But they heard the call. They heard the voice. They heard the trumpets sound. And they responded. They heard the call of Martin Luther King Jr. and

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402 Mike and Kendra’s May 4, 1970 Web Site.
403 “A Learning Legacy.”; “Mumia Abu-Jamal.”
others who had spoken out against the war in Vietnam. They had seen the value that nonviolent peaceful protest can bring change in America. So they decided to get in trouble. They decided to get in the way. It was good trouble. Necessary trouble. But it was dangerous, very dangerous to speak truth to power in those days.

Florence Schroeder, mother of William Schroeder and a strong voice on the pursuit of truth and justice throughout the four decades since the shootings spoke during the May 4 Task Force noon program. She offered a message of hope:

I believe that our efforts to prevent another Kent State-type tragedy have been rewarded with a new resolve for peace on earth and good will. Bill was a poet and one of his last poems included the line: “Learning from the past is of prime consideration.” I pray that we have all learned that lesson.

For the dedication, the future Kent State University May 4 Visitors Center printed a T-shirt with a quote from Allison Krause: “History must be made relevant to the present to make it useful.” The student design also featured nine white doves arranged on a musical staff to represent the opening of the refrain in Crosby, Stills & Nash’s “Ohio”, a song written by Neil Young in 1970, and four white doves flying away. Designed by the same student, the M4TF T-shirt displayed its slogan, Roots of Resistance: Continuing the Struggle, and a design featuring four hands—three offering gestures emblematic of the sixties and the fourth a pair of open hands releasing a white dove. White doves were released during the noon ceremony.

An important component of the forty-third commemoration was the dedication of the May 4 Visitors Center. Events included a panel discussion moderated by Gwen Ifill that featured scholars and the lead creative designer involved in the seven-year process to create the museum. Oliver Stone delivered a keynote address in which he shared his thoughts on May 4 and “History and Memory in Film” based on his films that depict sixties-era events. Visitors to the center received a commemorative pin printed with four white doves flying into the distance and the motto Be the change, Gandhi’s call to action, which appears on the final wall of the May 4 Visitors Center museum. The May 4 Task Force employed the theme Come Together, and its design featured a large peace sign superimposed with a pair of butterflies reaching down for the nectar in daffodils, at Kent State a flower of remembrance. In a program focusing on student activism then and now, featured speakers included William Ayers, Tom Hayden, and millennial advocate David Burstein. The Task Force also screened Daniel Miller’s documentary Fire in the Heartland, the most thorough film treatment of political activism at Kent State from Black United Students and SDS through the May 4 shootings.

For the forty-fifth May 4 commemoration, the May 4 Visitors Center sponsored several programs over the course of the spring semester. The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum’s Lauren Onkey, then vice president of education and public programs, examined Motown’s response to the Vietnam War in “What’s Going On: Marvin Gaye, Vietnam, and the Rise of Political Soul,” The Wick Poetry Center offered a public workshop titled “Overcoming Trauma through Creative Writing,” and advocate for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights Judy Shepard spoke on the legacy of her son Matthew Shepard. The May 4 Visitors Center and the May 4 Task Force co-hosted a screening of Dick Cavett’s Vietnam, which features the May 4 shootings as one of the critical events of the Vietnam era. Keynote speaker for the Task Force’s noon program on May 4 was activist Dick Gregory. Newly inaugurated Kent State president Beverly Warren delivered the first address during the noon program by a Kent State president since the annual commemorations began. The Task Force’s forty-fifth commemoration theme—The Persistence of Memory—appeared on the front side of its T-shirt, with the phrase set between graphic representations of two of the parking lot bollards. The back of the shirt featured two white daffodils, emblematic of both the Vietnam War and May 4, with the stems intertwined.
As illustrated here, Kent State has a rich and vigorous tradition both of commemoration and of providing a forum to consider the significant and complex issues that are embedded in events like May 4 and continue to arise in democratic societies. This long tradition is yet another indication of the significance of the events that happened in this place.

Accessing and Archiving the History of May 4

In 1978, in response to recommendations about recognizing the significance of May 4 following the Move the Gym protest, the university began to publish statements in the undergraduate and graduate catalog noting May 4, 1970, as a “pivotal moment” in the institution’s history, along with a brochure with the facts of the event prepared by faculty members Glenn Frank, Thomas Hensley, and Jerry Lewis. Institutionalizing the history of May 4, by preserving the facts of the event and making them readily accessible to the campus and the public, became of even greater concern as the decades went by. Thus in September 2009, the Board of Trustees passed a three-part resolution of support for nominating the site for placement on the National Register of Historic Places, for the creation of an educational walking tour of the site, and for a museum recounting the history of May 4 in the context of the times. The museum would be located within the site—in the place where events happened—so that they could be best understood. The goal of all three parts of the resolution was to further the opportunity for historical understanding of the May 4 events, as an additional complement to the ongoing social remembering of the event. In his essay “Social Remembering and Kent State,” Jerry Lewis cites the terms social remembering and history (or analytical history) as employed by James Wertsch. The social remembering of May 4 is reflected in the long tradition of honoring those who were killed and wounded, at both Kent and Jackson State, as described above. Certainly, many elements of the commemorative programs and dedications are analytical history as well. Creation of the May 4 Walking Tour and the May 4 Visitors Center intentionally sought to follow a history model. Wertsch says that history is “objective” and “distanced from any particular perspective”; it “recognizes ambiguities”; it views “disagreement, change, and controversy as part of ongoing historical interpretation”; and it uses the “museum as a forum.”

The May 4 Visitors Center museum is located in Taylor Hall in the heart of the 17.4-acre May 4 shootings site. Its permanent exhibit is comprised of three galleries. So that visitors can better understand the shootings, gallery one presents the context of the sixties in three subthemes: the struggle for social justice, the generation gap, and the Vietnam War. Gallery two discusses the shooting event itself with an original documentary, Kent State: A Turning Point, which shows through archival footage and still photographs moment by moment what happened on May 4. In gallery three, visitors understand that the reaction to the shootings was far reaching. Gallery three also illustrates the impact of the May 4 shootings, from Nixon’s decision to quickly withdraw troops from Cambodia to protests of today that show the importance of protecting First Amendment rights.

The May 4 Walking Tour extends the content of the indoor museum throughout the 17.4 acres of the site. The tour positions visitors to walk in the steps of history while accessing the best available facts of this pivotal event, made more understandable by the site itself. Content of the markers promotes understanding and appreciation of the patterns of U.S. history, including these elements:

- intense social and political divides of the Vietnam era,
- practices of responding to civil disturbances,
- how tragic violence is not necessarily inevitable,

• the First Amendment in action,
• the importance of sound decision making from the executive to civil levels,
• risks of saying no to power,
• need for respect of diverse opinions and civil discourse, and
• protecting First Amendment rights by continuing to practice those rights.

The May 4 Walking Tour and the May 4 Visitors Center were created through a seven-year process from concept through fabrication that featured extensive consultation with and input from many hundreds of members of the Kent State and the city of Kent communities and dozens of scholars both from within the university and from institutions around the country.

Invaluable to the creation of the May 4 Walking Tour and May 4 Visitors Center are two substantial archival collections that in perpetuity will continue to ground ongoing research into the history of May 4. In Kent State University Libraries’ Special Collections and Archives, there are three hundred cubic feet of boxed materials related to the May 4 shootings and their aftermath, the largest collection of primary sources pertaining to the event. First-person narratives and personal reactions to May 4 continue to be collected by the archives and by the Kent Historical Society from all manner of individuals and expressing all viewpoints.

The second major archival collection for May 4 research resides at Yale University. Yale University Library Manuscripts & Archives holds the ACLU of Ohio Kent State Project Records and an extensive Kent State Collection, which it describes in this way:

The collection consists of correspondence, manuscripts drafts, legal papers, clippings, issues of the Daily Kent Stater, interview transcripts, photographs and other material collected by Peter Davies, Paul Kean, Bill Gordon, James Munves and others concerning the disturbance at Kent State University and the shooting of Kent State students by members of the Ohio National Guard on May 4, 1970. The collection also includes a model of the Kent State campus.

Yale’s Kent State Collection also features the papers of the attorneys for the victims’ families who were plaintiffs in a federal civil trial in 1975. The collection contains the audio tape, a copy of a recording by former Kent State student Terry Strubbe that many accept as providing evidence of an order to fire by the Ohio National Guard on May 4.406

Social Response and Impact

Media Treatments of May 4

The May 4, 1970, shootings at Kent State University have been widely discussed and analyzed in a variety of media. There have been thirty books written on May 4 issues, in the categories of analysis, chronology, personal accounts, and fiction. The first book published on the event, The Report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest, remains one of the most important for understanding facts and chronology and seeing the event in its social and political context. The report, which appeared in September 1970, was important as well to the many who were deeply affected by the shootings for its affirmation that the Kent State shootings were “unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.” As importantly, the commission denounced the excessive use of

force against student demonstrators at Jackson State and upheld the principle of the right of citizens to dissent.\textsuperscript{407} Two other early books still important to research today are Peter Davies’ \textit{The Truth About Kent State} (1973) and Joseph Kelner and James Munves' \textit{The Kent State Coverup} (1980). Davies’ book made the case through photographic exhibits that there was enough evidence to convene a federal grand jury. Kelner and Munves' book chronicles how that evidence and other arguments were used in the landmark federal civil trial in 1975. \textit{Kent State & May 4th: A Social Science Perspective}, now in its third revised edition (2010), continues to provide valuable insight into the legal aftermath and commemoration of May 4, as well as analyzing the 1977–78 protest to preserve the site. Two books deriving from the Symposium on Democracy that each offer a range of critical perspectives are \textit{The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression & Order in American Democracy} (2001) edited by Thomas R. Hensley and \textit{Democratic Narrative, History & Memory} (2012) edited by Carole A. Barbato and Laura L. Davis. \textit{This We Know: A Chronology of the Shootings at Kent State} (2012) by Carole A. Barbato, Laura L. Davis, and Mark F. Seeman updates the chronology of the protests at Kent State, offers commentary on impact and meaning, and suggests further reading and viewing.

Another window into the events of May 4, 1970, and the culture that has developed around it are the documentaries about that day, its context, and its aftermath. There have been eleven documentaries made primarily for television, one made for radio, an unreleased feature film-length documentary—\textit{Fire in the Heartland} by Daniel Miller—original documentaries for the May 4 Walking Tour and for the May 4 Visitors Center, and numerous other documentaries made by students and others. \textit{Kent State: A Turning Point} (2012), the documentary screened in the May 4 Visitors Center received two national awards in 2013 from CINE (Council on International Non-Theatrical Events). Chris Triffo’s \textit{Kent State: The Day the War Came Home} (2000, re-released as \textit{Thirteen Seconds}) won an Emmy for best documentary. James Goldstone produced an Emmy Award-winning television docudrama in 1981. Documentary filmmakers continue to focus the place of May 4 in U.S. history. On April 27, 2015, PBS premiered \textit{Dick Cavett’s Vietnam}, which takes a substantial look at the shootings at Kent State, in the context of other key controversial moments in the Vietnam era, as illustrated in this review:

\begin{quote}
“Kent State,” which moves back and forth between Cambodia and the U.S. to create a kind of dialogue between the war abroad and the war at home, is less an attempt to present every fact than to let you taste the urgency of the moment, to evoke a sense of colliding social tides and a country in division and disarray. Kent State is seen as a culmination of this conflict, and the beginning of the end of the antiwar movement.

It's a measure of those times that a woman, asked about the Kent State shooting, responds in front of a television camera, “I'm sorry they didn't kill more.” More than half the respondents to one poll blamed the students for the attack; only 11% blamed the people with the guns.\textsuperscript{408}
\end{quote}

On April 28, 2015, \textit{Kent State: The Day the ’60s Died} by Room 608 premiered on PBS, which offers this description:

\begin{quote}
This will be history as told by the people who were there: students and guardsmen involved in the shootings at Kent State, young soldiers fighting in the Cambodian jungle, construction workers battling anti-war demonstrators on Wall Street, survivors
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[407] Scranton et al., \textit{President’s Commission}, 289, 458–59.
\item[408] Lloyd, “Last Days in Vietnam.”
\end{footnotes}
of the police shootings at Jackson State College, staff of the Nixon administration trying to manage a war in Indochina amidst an uprising at home.

During May 1970, frustration and anger split American society apart, and we still live in the aftermath of that rift.409

PBS promoted both documentaries as features in a week of special programming remembering the Vietnam War, in recognition of the fortieth anniversary of the end of the war with the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The promotion also looked forward to the expected release in 2017 of Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s *The Vietnam War*.410 As mentioned above, Ken Burns commented during his viewing of the May 4 Visitors Center that because of his experience of the exhibit, he would rethink his approach concerning the place of Kent State in the story of the war. His production team followed up by seeking information about specific research sources regarding the May 4 protests and shootings.

In addition to treatment by more than two dozen books and a dozen documentaries, there have been countless newspaper and magazine articles and features on May 4, 1970. Important works in 1970 included the *Akron Beacon Journal*’s special report on Kent State, which won the Pulitzer Prize for “Local, General or Spot News Reporting” in 1971. That same year, student John Filo won a Pulitzer for his photo indelibly etched on contemporary memory, which captures a kneeling young woman calling out over the body of Jeffrey Miller. Further measure of continuing interest in the legacy of Kent State is the online, print, and broadcast coverage by at least ninety media outlets of the opening of the May 4 Visitors Center. Many of these outlets, from all over the country, covered the story multiple times. One highlight was a feature by *The Wall Street Journal*, with a print version and a multimedia, interactive online treatment.411 In another story, interviewed about her experience visiting the museum, Gwen Ifill commented on how the May 4 shootings helped change Americans’ minds about the war: “It was surprising to people and that's why people spent so much time searching for evidence of, you know radicals and communists and infiltration because they couldn't believe that this was happening here. And because of that, that was more proof than ever that the tide was turning on public attitudes toward the war.”412 In response to another reporter, Oliver Stone, who like Gwen Ifill participated in the dedication of the May 4 Visitors Center, reflected: “Kent State is an example of our right to dissent. To make a statement about the morality of the war and the draft. It’s about our democracy. I’m old enough now to be totally disillusioned. I mean, the Vietnam syndrome is buried in the sands of Kuwait and Iraq. This is an honor. It’s making an effort to remember what happened.”413

**Artists’ Treatments of May 4**

Artists from around the world have responded to the shootings at Kent State. The best-known artistic interpretation of the Kent State shootings is the protest song and counterculture anthem “Ohio,” written and composed by Neil Young in May of 1970 in reaction to the Kent State shootings. It was performed by Crosby, Stills & Nash at the May 4 commemoration in 1997. The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum lists “Ohio” as one of the "Songs That Shaped Rock and Roll."414 It was accepted into the Grammy Hall of Fame in 2008. Dave Brubeck’s oratorio *Truth is Fallen*, which was released on LP in 1972, also had as its subject the May 4 shootings at Kent State. Kent State University professor emeritus of Pan-African Studies Halim El Dabh, an

409 “Day the ’60s Died.”
410 “PBS Remembers the Vietnam War.”
411 Porter, “Four Decades Later.”
412 Ramirez, “KSU: Director Oliver Stone Helps Commemorate.”
413 Michael Heaton, “Director Oliver Stone.”
414 Rock and Roll Hall of Fame.
internationally recognized composer, wrote *Opera Flies* in 1971, as his statement on the Kent State tragedy. The best-known poem associated with the Kent State shootings is Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s response to Allison’s Krause’s declaration “flowers are better than bullets” in his own “Bullets and Flowers,” originally published May 1970 in *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party in the former Soviet Union. During the twentieth commemoration of the shootings, more than three hundred poets from around the nation gathered at Kent State to share works that spoke to the events at Kent State and Jackson State. Of the published volume (*A Gathering of Poets*) that followed—the royalties for which go to Center for Peaceful Change and the Gibbs–Green Memorial Scholarship Fund at Jackson State—*Library Journal* wrote: “This book is a uniquely successful blending of social rage and literary art. . . . A significant, well-edited collection of historical and literary value, this book will help readers come to terms with the Vietnam War (years).”415 In 1995, Sandra Perlman’s play *Nightwalking: Voices from Kent State* debuted at the Terrapin Theater in Chicago. Professor J. Gregory Payne of Emerson College first premiered his play *Kent State: A Requiem* on the occasion of the donation of Kent State-related archival material to Yale University in 1976. The play has been toured nationally four times, performed at eighty different colleges and universities, and featured on the news and in special programming on NBC, ABC, and CBS. The novel *Hippies* (now an ebook) by Peter Jedick, a student at Kent State at the time, brings the era alive for many. Henry Halem, professor emeritus of art and President’s Medalist at Kent State University, created a number of works in response to May 4. This body includes a series of stoneware masks that represent each member of a Special State Grand Jury convened locally that issued secret indictments in October 1970 for the demonstrations of May 1–4 against twenty-five students, nonstudents, and one professor, while exonerating the Guard and blaming the university administration and its faculty. In 2008, The Ohio Historical Society assembled an exhibit titled *The Kent State Shootings* featuring artifacts, photographs, and documents from the Society’s collections as well as a gas mask, pistol, and rifle carried by Ohio National Guardsmen, and Alan Canfora’s denim jacket with a bullet hole in the wrist.416 EA Meuser is one of many hundreds of artists who has created work on canvas and paper giving expression to the May 4 history. She continues to work on her series “In America’s Wake” in monotype and painting, begun in 2008 and installed in the space in 2010 and 2011 for the future May 4 Visitors Center. The pieces reflect her “sentiments about life, motherhood and war.”417 They contain moving interpretations of features of the historic landscape, such as Lilac Lane, combined with a treatment of figures that suggest timeless narratives of human experience.

Sculpture provides some of the more interesting artistic and powerful responses to the Kent State shootings. *Bridge Over Troubled Waters*, a fourteen-foot-high, abstract COR-TEN steel construction by Donald Drumm, which bears the inscription “In memory of the Kent Four and the Jackson Two,” was installed at Bowling Green University in 1970. In 1978, the Mildred Andrews Fund commissioned for Kent State University a bronze sculpture by George Segal to commemorate the shootings. The university deemed the finished sculpture, titled *Abraham and Isaac: In Memory of May 4, 1970, Kent State University*, as inappropriate and declined the offer. The sculpture depicts the critical moment of the patriarch Abraham about to fulfill a divine obligation to slay his son, “an allusion to the moral dilemma inherent in the treatment of students by the state in Kent.”418 *Abraham and Isaac* is now a permanent part of Princeton University’s modern sculpture garden. The *May 4 Memorial* designed by Bruno Ast and the *Kent Four* sculpture by Alastair Granville-Jackson are both installed within the historic site. Two pre-existing sculptures on the Kent State campus took on additional meaning the day of the shooting. In January 1970, leading artist in the Earth Art movement Robert Smithson had participated in a student arts festival and created *Partially Buried Woodshed*. Meant to demonstrate “human arrangements of material objects as they face the challenges of natural systems and the mysteries of time,”419 the sculpture

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415 Quoted in Anderson and Gildzen, *Gathering of Poets*, back cover.
417 “In America’s Wake 2011.”
418 O’Hara, “Kent State/May 4,” 311.
419 Lambert, “Significance of Famous Earthwork.”
immediately gained an additional layer of meaning that summer when marked with the graffiti message MAY 4 KENT 70. According to John O’Hara, “the work had become an uncanny symbol of deteriorations in May 4 history and memory, and particularly so when the artwork was slated for destruction during campus expansion plans in 1974.”

The remains of *Partially Buried Woodshed*, now covered after being destroyed by university grounds crews, lie approximately one-half mile south of the boundaries of the historic site. Donald Drumm’s *Solar Totem #1*, a towering monolith near Taylor Hall and on the historic site, formed a partial screen of COR-TEN steel between the guardsmen and students in the parking lot 250 feet away into which the Guard fired on May 4, 1970. The quarter-inch steel plate of *Solar Totem #1* was perforated by an M-1 round. “Transformed by history, the sculpture has become a relic of the war at home as it orients visitors to the positions of students and guardsmen on May 4 and makes apparent, with its hole, the tremendous power of bullets.”

*Solar Totem #1* is regarded as a contributing object. The newest arrival as a donation to Kent State University is a 1970 sculpture by Bruno Lucchesi, a member of the New York art community that wanted to take action against Nixon’s expansion of the war into Cambodia. Deeply struck upon seeing John Filo’s iconic photo, Lucchesi created a fourteen-by-thirteen-inch terra cotta wall hanging sculpture in its image in remembrance.

Constructing the memory and history of May 4, 1970, has taken a variety of commemorative, artistic, historical, scholarly, and cultural directions that extend across time and space. The passage of time, the construction of the monuments, and annual ceremonies, combined with the relevant issues of the present, all help clarify the significance of the historic landscapes associated with the violent repression of dissent. The common threads that tie these events and their significance together are nearly all present in the story of the May 4, 1970, Kent State Shootings. The preserved buildings, sanctified landscape, a dedicated memorial, the May 4 Visitors Center, and regular commemorations help connect the event, its victims, the survivors, the university, the community, and the nation to the voices and actions of protestor-citizens past, present, and future.

The May 4, 1970, Kent State Shootings Site evokes response. In this place, people remember the responsibility to honor those who have gone before. People also realize the meanings of what happened here—the greater patterns of history. Understanding these meanings builds possibility for productive social change.

The words that follow were shared by Kingman Brewster Jr., then president of Yale University, at the first May 4 commemoration in 1971. They express what citizens may continue to learn from this place and what happened here:

Kent State University’s campus is “especially fit ground on which to restore the honesty, the freedom and the openness which is essential, if change is to be accomplished by rational persuasion, rather than by violent confrontation. We will best serve the memory of those who died here, if we can convince our fellow citizens of two truths about our country: Violence is the enemy of constructive change, and the only way to prevent violence is to keep the door to change open.”

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420 “Kent State/May 4,” 307.
422 Lucchesi, letter to Beverly Warren.
423 “Ahern, Brewster Speak at Memorial Services.”
**Historic Context and Comparisons**

*what’s past is prologue*

Shakespeare, *The Tempest*

The Kent State May 4, 1970, Shootings Site represents one of those singular events in American history where civic protest and tragedy combine as a pivotal moment for change. A thread of comparable tragic moments that have forced recognition twine throughout our history—reaching back to the founding of the country.

On March 5, 1770, a squad of British soldiers guarding a customs house fired on an angry Boston crowd, killing five and wounding several others: the Boston Massacre. Those arrested included eight soldiers, six of whom were acquitted and two found guilty of manslaughter.424 The slain were seen “as martyrs to the cause of American Liberty.”425 While the place of the shootings is significant, its exact location has never been determined. Subsequently, the term *massacre* was used many times, in the nineteenth century often in reference to the Indian Wars and particularly in cases where unarmed women and children were purposely killed.

The Wounded Knee Massacre in South Dakota of two hundred and fifty to three hundred Lakota (Sioux) by the Seventh U.S. Cavalry represents another clash of unequal forces with resulting tragedy. Here on December 29, 1890, United States military forces attacked a Lakota camp. Some of the Lakota were armed and returned fire. This was quickly suppressed, and the surviving Indians were ridden down and killed. Although Congress awarded seventeen Medals of Honor, photographs of soldiers posing over frozen corpses and “one long grave of butchered women and children and babies, who had never done any harm and were only trying to run away” showed a different reality. General Nelson Miles called for hearings and courts-martial, but there were no convictions.426 Wounded Knee, now a National Historic Landmark, signaled resignation to reservation life for Indians on the Plains. Through remembrance, though, it “became the rallying point for the Sioux uprising of 1973,” just as “the site of the Kent State killings in 1970 became a rallying point for the anti-Vietnam War movement.”427

The rise of organized labor in America provides another context for tragic violence and subsequent memorialization. The Haymarket Affair in 1886, the Ludlow Massacre in 1914, and the Matewan Battle in 1920 were all the result of increasing class awareness and the growing power of both corporations and an immigrant-based labor force.428

The roots of the Haymarket Affair can be traced at least as far back as the massive 1877 Railroad Strike, which ushered in an era of intense labor violence “as soldiers fired on their fellow citizens, railway cars burned, and the bodies of dead strikers lay strewn about the streets.”429 The carnage also radicalized the unions, whose membership was “outraged by the brutality of the police and the use of state and federal troops against workers,” and they armed themselves in self-defense.430 Haymarket itself was specifically a “revenge
“demonstration” in Haymarket Square, Chicago, for the killing by Pinkerton agents of six strikers advocating the eight-hour day at a May Day demonstration earlier that year. The Haymarket Square rally, sponsored by the Central Labor Union and attended by about four thousand people, was mostly peaceful until a bomb exploded. Seven policemen and four civilians were killed and many others wounded. Most of the casualties were attributed to the police firing wildly into the crowd following the explosion. Ten prominent radicals subsequently were arrested and tried for murder in a case where “the trial was about the political beliefs of the accused, rather than the act of murder.” All were found guilty and seven were sentenced to hang. In death they became martyrs for labor, representing “the persecution of the advocates of labor and the willingness of authorities to trample American traditions of free speech.” A Martyrs’ Monument was erected over the mass grave of the executed men in Forest Home/Waldheim Cemetery, signifying “one of the seminal events in the history of American labor.” The monument was designated a National Historic Landmark in 1997.

Different from the Eight-Hour Movement, which covered broad national themes in labor relations that were at the center of contention at Haymarket, the Great Coalfield Strike and Ludlow Massacre involved issues connected specifically to the dangerous, low-paying conditions in Colorado’s coal mines. The miners at Ludlow struck against Colorado Fuel and Iron, a company owned by the John D. Rockefeller and Jay Gould financial heirs. The miners were forced out of their company homes and into a tent city established by the United Mine Workers. The owners called on the Baldwin–Felts Agency to provide strikebreakers, many of whom then were recruited into the ranks of the Colorado National Guard. The harassment of the Ludlow tent camp culminated on April 20, 1914, when elements of the Colorado National Guard, along with a mix of strikebreakers and other law enforcement personnel, attacked the camp. When armed strikers began to deploy, the soldiers countered with dynamite and a gun battle commenced. In spite of attempts by the strike leader Louis Tikas to intervene, the shooting escalated as men, women, and children fled for cover. Late in the all-day battle, Tikas was killed and the soldiers burned the camp, trapping two women and eleven children in a pit under a tent, where they suffocated. The “Death Pit” provided a rallying symbol for the miners, and set off a conflict between miners and authorities that lasted nearly two weeks until President Woodrow Wilson sent troops to stop the fighting and end the strike. Hundreds of strikers were arrested and ten National Guardsmen were court-martialed, but in the end “no one was convicted or punished for any of the crimes of the Colorado Coalfield War.” While labor injustices rarely drew much sympathy at the time, “the deaths of innocent women and children provoked outrage that extended far beyond labor, socialist, and progressive circles.” Rockefeller faced harsh criticism and subsequently promoted a series of reforms that temporarily eased the worst conditions in the western mines and at the same time set the stage for Progressive activists like Upton Sinclair. The United Mine Workers purchased much of the Ludlow site, built a memorial, and, in doing so, created “an icon of industrial conflict” that marked “a turning point in the struggle for union recognition” and eventually symbolized “the wave of industrial violence that led to the ‘progressive’ era reforms in labor relations.” The Ludlow Tent Colony Site was designated a NHL in 2009.

Coal was also the focus of the next major deadly encounter between labor and ownership, this time in the hills of West Virginia. The exact circumstances surrounding what was called the Matewan Battle are unclear, but on May 19, 1920, four months after John L. Lewis, the head of the United Mine Workers, announced a campaign to unionize West Virginia coal mines, Matewan chief of police Sid Hatfield and Mayor Cabell Testerman were confronted by strikebreakers of the Baldwin–Felts Detective Agency hired by the coal company to evict

432 Painter, Standing at Armageddon, 49–50.
433 Bachin, “Haymarket Martyrs’ Monument,” 4–8, 18-19; Foote, Shadowed Ground, 139–40; Avrich, Haymarket Tragedy, 436.
434 McGovern and Guttridge, Coalfield War, 219.
unionized miners.438 In the battle, Alfred Felts, two newly fired miners, seven detectives, and the mayor were killed.439 This sparked “a 28 month strike that led to over two dozen deaths, West Virginia’s longest and most controversial murder trial, a United States Senate investigation, the retaliatory assassination of Sid Hatfield, and the largest armed civilian insurrection since the Civil War,” culminating in the Battle of Blair Mountain.440 Matewan, like Haymarket and Ludlow, was a significant event in the growth of unions and labor rights in the United States. The martyrs in this case were Hatfield and Testerman, who had struck the first blow in this protracted confrontation and who had paid for their efforts with their lives. In the end, the union won, and, as Bailey notes, “not until New Deal legislation formally endorsed the UMWA’s [United Mine Workers of America’s] legitimacy did southern West Virginia’s operators realize that although they had won the 1920–22 battle, they had lost the war.”441 The Matewan Historic District was designated a NHL in 1997.

The arc of protest and violent confrontation continues in American culture well after the labor protests of the early twentieth century and into the civil rights era of the mid-twentieth century. African Americans fought for their right to vote and to live their lives in a desegregated America, often with effective use of the tactic of nonviolent civil disobedience. The church bombings, police brutality, arrests, and pattern of white resistance in the South were particularly brutal. Many properties, including the Edmund Pettus Bridge, Selma, Alabama (NHL, 2013), the Lyceum–Circle District at the University of Mississippi in Oxford (NHL, 2008), and the 16th Street Baptist Church, Birmingham, Alabama (NHL, 2006) testify to this dynamic of active protest and resistance, often with tragic consequences. Although it is tempting to read an evolutionary trajectory into this recurrent test of citizenship and the right to dissent, even unto death, the quest for pattern, rather than an assurance of cause and effect, provides context, which may enhance understanding. From the Boston Massacre to Kent State to Black Lives Matter, resistance has taken many paths over the years. Affirming nonviolence as the path to social and economic justice, Martin Luther King Jr. understood that “a riot is the language of the unheard.” King implored America to listen, to hear the voices of the disadvantaged, the marginalized, the aggrieved and to make just change.442 The balance between free speech and the legitimate use of force is a critical and delicate one that bears constant awareness and renegotiation.

Comparatively, other properties pertaining to the broader civil rights movement possess sufficient significance and integrity to be recognized as National Historic Landmarks. However, properties pertaining specifically to the student protest movement either are not yet designated, or they are recognized for other reasons. Examples in the first category would include: the Edmund Pettus Bridge, Selma, AL (NHL, 2013), with a period of significance of March 7, 1965, to March 21, 1965; the Lyceum–The Circle Historic District, Oxford, MS (NHL, 2008), with a period of significance of 1962; and the Robert Russa Moton High School, Farmville, VA (NHL, 1998), with a 1950–1974 period of significance. An example in the second category includes Low Library at Columbia University, New York City (NHL, 1987), with a period of significance of 1800–1899. Low Library is designated for architecture, and there is no mention of the 1968 student takeover and associated protest movement. Similarly, the central campus of South Carolina State University in Orangeburg, South Carolina, was listed on the NRHP in 1996 as the South Carolina State College Historic District, with a period of significance of 1917–1969, but it does not include the portion of the property where the students were shot or highway patrolmen stood in 1968, and it now has seen additional construction resulting in a loss of integrity. The site of the Jackson State shootings also has seen considerable landscape modification and is not now an NHL or on the NRHP. In addition, Sproul Plaza at Berkeley and the Commerce Building at Wisconsin have not been nominated for inclusion on the NRHP or as National Historic Landmarks at this time. In sum, the Kent

438 Bailey, Matewan Before the Massacre, 6.
439 Savage, Thunder in the Mountains, 14, 25.
441 Bailey, Matewan Before the Massacre, 256.
442 King, “MLK: A Riot.”
State May 4, 1970, Shootings Site, as a key place in the “forgotten movement”\textsuperscript{443} associated with student protests against the Vietnam War, is one of the best remaining places to connect with this aspect of American history. As a Vietnam veteran visitor to the May 4 site recently shared, it is one of two places he has cried. The other was the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

\textbf{Postscripts}

I. “No one told me that meetings were prohibited. But if someone had, I would have gone anyway, because in my heart I would have believed it to be a violation of my constitutional rights.”
   —Roseann (Chic) Canfora, Kent State student protester (“The Shootings at Kent State,” 360)

II. “If those children hadn’t applied pressure, nothing would have happened. Those children had a cause and were seeking justice.”
   —Doris Krause, mother of Allison Krause (Clines, “Students From Then and Now Pass on Painful Lessons of Kent State”)

III. ‘‘Flowers are better than bullets,’ that was pure hope speaking.’’
   —Yevgeny Yevtushenko on Allison Krause (“Flowers and Bullets”)

IV. “She resented being called a bum because she disagreed with someone else’s opinion. She felt that war in Cambodia was wrong. Is this dissent a crime? Is this a reason for killing her? Have we come to such a state in this country that a young girl has to be shot because she disagrees deeply with the actions of her government.”
   —Arthur Krause to reporters outside his home the day after his daughter Allison was killed (The 20th Century with Mike Wallace: The Legacy of Kent State)

V. “We implore you to consider the incalculable dangers of an unprecedented alienation of America’s youth, and to take immediate action to demonstrate unequivocally your determination to end the war quickly.”
   —Letter sent to President Nixon from thirty-seven university and college presidents responding on May 4, 1970, to Nixon’s bombing of Cambodia on April 30 (McFadden, “37 College Chiefs Urge Nixon Move for Prompt Peace”)

VI. “My phone would ring, and it’d be Motown wanting me to start working and I’d say, ‘Have you seen the paper today? Have you read about these kids who were killed at Kent State?’ The murders at Kent State made me sick. I couldn’t sleep, couldn’t stop crying. The notion of singing three-minute songs about the moon and June didn’t interest me. Neither did instant-message songs.”
   —Musician Marvin Gaye (Ritz, Divided Soul: The Life of Marvin Gaye, 140)

VII. “Discontent must either be met or suppressed; . . . to meet it is liberation and to suppress it is the end of liberty. . . . Dear God, help us, this war must end.”
   —Edward M. Kennedy (Cyler, Edward M. Kennedy, 162)

VIII. “Four students were killed. The photograph of a young woman kneeling over the body of a dead student represented all that I and many others feared and hated about what was happening to the country . . . . I wore a black armband in memory of the students who had been killed . . . . I tried to explain the context in which protests occurred and the impact that the Kent State shootings had on Yale law students.”

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\textsuperscript{443} Fendrich, “Forgotten Movement.”
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United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service

MAY 4, 1970, KENT STATE SHOOTINGS SITE

—Hillary Rodham Clinton, former U.S. secretary of state (Living History, 45–46)

IX. “When the President of the United States thus creates a national mood, I suppose one cannot be too surprised if the National Guard of Ohio fails to exercise discrimination. . . . I know Kent; I have often lectured at Kent State. It is the essence of an Ohio small town; the students are all from small towns or off the farms; nothing could be more square, unradical and midwest-American.”
   —Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., American historian (Journals, 323)

X. “The killing of the students at Kent State electrified campuses . . . the country was in upheaval.”
   —Norma Becker, New York civil rights and antiwar organizer (“Harrassing Antiwar Demonstrators,” 314)

XI. “When students were killed at Kent State . . . I too began to speak out against the war.”
   —Ron Kovic, Vietnam veteran and author of Born on the Fourth of July, in his speech to the Democratic National Convention (Moser, The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent During the Vietnam Era, 123)

XII. “It wasn’t until Kent State and Cambodia that I started getting active again. When they turned the guns against their own people here at Kent State, when I saw American people believing the lies about Cambodia, that was it.”
   —Jack McCloskey, Vietnam veteran (Stacewicz, Winter Soldiers: An Oral History of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 99)

XIII. “The actual day that the Kent State thing happened we had a big brawl at the NCO [noncommissioned officers] club . . . . That’s what pushed me over the edge to some degree. . . . I went AWOL. I went to anti-war stuff all over the state and Washington, D.C. Eventually they court-martialed me . . . . I joined VVAW right after Kent State . . . . and redoubled my activism.”
   —Bill Davis (Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 108)

XIV. “The Kent State thing went down, and I started to have the disturbing feeling that what went on in Vietnam was going to happen here in the United States—that cordon and search operations were going to go on here. Our country was going to be a military dictatorship and the same kind of crap that I participated in was going to come home to roost. That scared the shit out of me.”
   —John Kniffin, Vietnam veteran (Stacewicz, Winter Soldiers, 112)

XV. “This is for the brothers and sisters at Kent.”
   —An anonymous Vietnam soldier as he solemnly tossed a handful of medals toward the U.S. Capitol steps on April 23, 1971 (Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 113)

XVI. “Then Jackson State and Kent State and the invasion of Cambodia happened in early 1970, and I just got to where I felt I had to do something. I didn’t know what it was I was supposed to do; I just felt there was something I was supposed to do. The military was killing our babies. You don’t send the military into your schools. That was wrong. That’s what we had done. We knew it. It was a gut reaction. There wasn’t any analysis. There was just this overwhelming sense that what had just happened was very, very wrong. Something had to be done. We didn’t know what.”
   —Pfc. Mike McCain (Stacewicz, Winter Soldiers, 150)
XVII. “Nixon, remember what happened to George III. We will make Kent State our Boston Massacre. The Continuing American Revolution is growing. The American Empire is falling.”

XVIII. “Kent State happened, and I think that threw me for a loop. I could not deal with having these fucking scum beat people up and shoot them down. I knew right away what happened. It was very clear to me that they had just fired into this fucking crowd. I’d been in the military, and I knew what it takes to shoot at people. I said, ‘Man, there is no way that they didn’t do that on purpose. There is no way that you should open up on some kids throwing rocks.’ I just couldn’t deal with that anymore. Everything came home. I can’t get away. These fuckers are pushing me from all sides.

I agonized over it for a few days and started asking around. I found out they were doing stuff over at the student center. I just walked in there one day and said, ‘Hi, I want to join up and do whatever. I don’t give a fuck what it is.’ I identified myself as a veteran. I started doing different stuff like passing out literature. I felt like this has got to be done and I can’t do anything else. It was an irresistible force.”
—Bill Branson (Stacewicz, Winter Soldiers, 164)

XIX. “After Kent State, there started being a lot of anti-war demonstrations at City College here in San Francisco. I started going to them, started looking at guys at demonstrations—some of them wearing fatigues, a little bit older than the students—started talking to some of them. About four of us started a group called Veterans for Peace.”
—Jack McCloskey (Stacewicz, Winter Soldiers, 215)

XX. “Four young men and women had their lives taken from them while lawfully protesting this outrageous government action. We are going . . . to make sure that the powers of the politicians do not take precedent over the right of lawful protest.”
—Graham Nash (n.d.) commenting on the release of the song “Ohio”

XXI. “Violence and hatred for the President, of an order probably never before seen in this country, exploded on campuses after this outrage. White House staffers looked stunned: heads were hanging; some said, ‘Hell, it isn’t worth it. Let’s just bug out of the damn war.’ . . . Kent State, in May 1970, marked a turning point for Nixon, a beginning of his downhill slide toward Watergate.”
—H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff (The Ends of Power, 105, 107)

XXII. “I thank God this amendment was submitted when it was, because as every Senator knows, in the turbulent days following the invasion of Cambodia and the tragedy at Kent State University, this amendment gave a constructive rallying point to millions of anguished citizens across this war-weary land.”
—George McGovern, U.S. senator (Congressional Record)

XXIII. “In some fashion as yet undetermined, the guardsmen opened fire on unarmed students and four of them fell dead. This shocking incident added to the growing furor over the continued killing in Indochina. The next day I decided that the time had come for a major televised attack on the Nixon war polices.”
XXIV. “Mezenbaum was vocally against the war, while my questions focused mainly on its conduct. I don’t know if the Kent State shootings made the final difference in the outcome, but I lost the primary by fewer than thirteen thousand votes.”
  —John Glenn, U.S. senator (John Glenn: A Memoir, 325)

XXV. “Rhodes also may have been hurt by the killing of four Kent State students the day before the primary. He had successfully opposed hard-line state legislation against student protesters, and Taft headquarters criticized Rhodes for that opposition only hours after National Guardsmen—ordered to Kent State by Rhodes—shot the students. On the issue of campus violence, Rhodes had no way he could possibly win. He was damned because he did and damned because he didn’t.”
  —“Primaries: Upset Time” (17)

XXVI. “For many of us there is little to remember but the promises and . . . the loss of the symbols of those promises—of John and Robert Kennedy, of Martin Luther King, Jr., of Medgar Evers, of Fred Hampton, and Malcolm X, of Allison Krause, Sandy Scheuer, Jeffrey Miller, and William Schroeder from Kent State, and Philip Gibbs and James Green from Jackson State: the loss too of friends, the fifty-three thousand Americans who have lost their lives in this degrading and immoral war.”
  —John Kerry, U.S. secretary of state (Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 12–13)

XXVII. “Our tragedy should never dissuade us from teaching young people not to be afraid to raise their voices, singly or in groups, when they believe their cause is just.”
  —Henry Halem, professor of art, Kent State University (Dionne, “After Twenty Years, Apologies for Kent State Dead”)

XXVIII. “How America accepts and understands Kent State will tell us the answer to the question, does America work?”
  —Charlie Rangel, U.S. congressman (“Kent State Reopened,” 12)

XXIX. “From Vietnam to Cambodia, from Los Angeles to Memphis, from Kent State to Watergate, the American spirit suffered under one shock after another, and the confidence of our people was deeply shaken.”
  —President Jimmy Carter (“Transcript of Speech Given at the Dedication of the JFK Library, Boston,” 1981)

Conclusion

May 4 was a course-altering event, a profound shock to the American conscience. It changed the paths of American history, policy, and conduct of the Vietnam War and fundamental approaches and attitudes to civil disobedience and protest. As such, it was in many respects unique. None of the previous campus demonstrations or subsequent events had a comparable impact. The Kent State site is of such transcendent import and impact and retains integrity enough to convey the significance of the events of May 1–4, 1970, and 1977–1978 that it deserves recognition as a National Historic Landmark.
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11. FORM PREPARED BY

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NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS PROGRAM
[This copy is the final revision sent to Patty Henry November 2016.]

The history of the events of May 1–4, 1970, at Kent State University embedded in this nomination in “The Day the War Came Home” section has its foundational base in discussions and activities from 2009 through 2013. These activities were aimed at preserving the Kent State shootings history and making it accessible within the site for the thousands who sought each year to learn the story within the landscape of the space. A broad range of participants provided input to these discussions and review activities, including:

- Kent State University undergraduate students
- Kent State graduate students
- Kent State faculty
- Scholars from throughout the U.S. and from Canada
- Kent State administrators, staff, and Board of Trustees members
- City of Kent professional experts
- Other city of Kent citizens
- Other professionals from near and far
- Those who were wounded at Kent State
- Families of those wounded and killed at Kent State
- Donors
- Kent State alumni
- Private and public junior and senior high school students
- Students from other colleges and university
- Journalists
- Documentary filmmakers
- Authors
- Creative artists
- Elected officials
- Public funding agencies
- Kent State University Press
- And more

The points below provide highlights of these many consultations. One of the four authors of the nomination of the May 4 Kent State shootings site to the National Register of Historic Places participated in all of these activities; the other three authors participated in a high percentage of the activities. Every iota of feedback described below was considered for the purpose of making further improvements to the documents described below. First on the family tree is the narrative of the events of May 1–4, 1970. That narrative, revised over the years, underpinned several major projects. Among these projects the May 4 Walking Tour of the site and the nomination of the site to the National Register of Historic Places were completed first, in 2009. The May 4 Walking Tour features seven interpretive trail markers; an original documentary film narrated by Julian Bond, which is available to visitors on iPods for viewing on the site; and an educational brochure. An early version of the May 1–4 chronology grounded all 3 components of the Walking Tour. The National Register nomination is 162-page document, with 73 pages of text and 89 pages of photos, maps, and exhibits. A revised version of the May 1–4 chronology anchored the NR nomination. The site was entered into to National Register on February 23, 2010, by Patrick Andrus. The third major project was the creation of the Kent State University May 4 Visitors Center, with a permanent museum exhibit. The central gallery features a center gallery with an original 11-minute documentary relating what happened on May 4. The film and the timeline of iconic photos on the gallery walls again were grounded in the narrative evolved through this four-year period, refined through many
During four extensive sessions convened in February 2009, a foundation document, key themes, and an exhibit content outline were drafted for the proposed May 4 Visitors Center. These discussions included May 4 Task Force student and community members; a journalism student; director of the Kent Historical Society; Alan Canfora and Tom Grace, both of whom were wounded on May 4, 1970; public historian Jay Winter; Kent State faculty from a range of disciplines; and Kent State administrators, including the Kent State University museum director. To provide support for discussion, the first draft of the narrative of the events of May 1–4, 1970, now found in revised form in this National Historic Landmark nomination was written by Carole Barbato and revised and edited by Laura Davis.

The May 1–4, 1970, narrative was further revised by Barbato, Davis, and Jerry Lewis, and Mark Seeman for the nomination of the May 4, 1970, Kent State Shootings Site to the National Register of Historic Places. Tom Grace was consulted regarding some revisions of the narrative and historic preservationist Jeff Brown provided feedback the whole nomination. The nomination was reviewed and revised at the state and federal levels after submission, received further revisions, and was entered into the National Register February 23, 2010. A plaque recognizing National Register status for the site was dedicated during the Fortieth May 4 Commemoration that year. Congressman John Lewis served as keynote speaker for the commemoration.

Approximately 150 members of the community and campus provided suggestions for the conceptual framework for a May 4 Visitors Center exhibit in four open forums and postings on a blog set up by the Kent-Ravenna Record-Courier newspaper. The fourth of these forums, which began in April 2009, was held during the annual May 4 Commemoration, which traditionally is attended by those most deeply affected by May 4, along with many other citizens.

Members of the Kent State University Retired Faculty Association returned questionnaires with their ideas for the conceptual framework and exhibit contents of a May 4 Visitors Center.

For several years, beginning in 2009, 5000+ visitors to the May 4 Visitors Center space (from 29 countries and Canada) during annual commemorations and to tables set up at Homecoming events had opportunity to comment on exhibit display drafts indicating potential content and basic design. These sessions inspired the earliest donors to the future May 4 Visitors Center.

A Kent State faculty advisory committee selected presenters for the tenth Symposium on Democracy, which was held during the Thirty-ninth May 4 Commemoration. The symposium explored questions of public history, memory, and community response relevant to creating a historical visitors center. The keynote speaker was public historian Jay Winter of Yale University. All parts of the symposium were open to the public and provided opportunity for discussion. Hundreds of students were among the audience members.

In the fall of 2009, 250 students, community members, and faculty provided feedback during walks of the May 4 site featuring readings of the May 4 Walking Tour script. The narrative in the draft script was based on the narrative generated earlier in the year and then revised for the National Register nomination with the benefit of related feedback coming in from consultations. The narrative appears in all three features of the Walking Tour: interpretive trail markers, educational map brochure, and documentary loaded on iPods to be taken out onto the site. The May 4 Walking Tour was dedicated in 2010. One new level of consultation at this time was from reviewers at the Ohio Humanities Council, which
awarded $15,000 in funding for the Walking Tour and two arts projects for the Fortieth May 4 Commemoration.

- From 2010–2011, a total of 150 Kent State University undergraduate and graduate students viewed presentations on the Walking Tour and May 4 Visitors Center exhibit projects and completed multiple, lengthy responses.

- From 2010–2011, a group of more than twenty internal and external faculty consultants gave of their time as university citizens to review multiple iterations of the Walking Tour script and design and May 4 Visitors Center exhibit script and basic design. Many of these consultants had participated in the foundational discussions of 2009, for which the May 1–4 narrative was first generated. Throughout the major projects, scholar-consultant reviews were conducted in accordance with standards set by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Three fabrication grant applications were made to the NEH, in 2009, 2010, and 2011. All three grant application processes included in-depth reviews by staff at the NEH and panels of external reviewers. Each time, the foundational work for the May 4 Visitors Center—the embodiment of the narrative—was improved upon in response to feedback from these reviewers. For 2011, the NEH awarded $300,000 for fabrication of the May 4 Visitors Center and completion of its multimedia elements. The May 4 Visitors Center application was the highest ranked among awardees and received an award at the highest level possible that year.

- From 2011–12, internal and external faculty consultants were formally engaged as consultant reviewers. They completed final reviews of the Visitor Center exhibit script and generated suggestions and reviewed scripts for multimedia elements. The multimedia element most evidently related to the May 1–4 narrative is the original 11-minute film and timeline in Gallery 2: What Happened on May 4. The narrative also underpins the museum as a whole. Consultants reviewed both the narrative script and techniques to be used in the film.

- In 2012 and 2013, students and community members also provided feedback on working copies of the documentary film. Their feedback helped fine tune special effects and other elements in the film. In 2013, professional review of the film by CINE, the Council on International Non-Theatrical Events provided another kind of review in the form of two excellence awards from that group.

- In 2012, the narrative met a new group of reviewers in the form of the advisory board and editorial consultant for the Kent State University Press, which published it as a chapbook titled This We Know: A Chronology of the Shootings at Kent State, May 1970.

- Over the years, regular meetings took place with the Kent State University president and cabinet members, designer Cybelle Jones Lewis, and Laura Davis regarding the major projects related to the history of the shootings on May 4. During a two-year span, the president, cabinet members, and Board of Trustees members received two drafts of the May 4 Visitors Center script draft, two drafts of the National Register nomination, Peter Davies’ The Truth about Kent State. Most of these individuals also participated one more guided tours of the site provided by wounded student Alan Canfora, witness Jerry Lewis, and witness Laura Davis. The president and vice president for university relations met with an invited panel of representatives from the public community. A conference call was held with university architects at the University of Virginia to discuss management of property with historical significance. In September 2009, the Board of Trustees passed a three-part resolution supporting the creation of the May 4 Walking Tour, May 4 Visitors Center, and nomination of the May 4 site to the National Register of Historic Places. During these many opportunities, the university has never sent back marked up copy
or asked for any changes to the narrative or any other aspects of these projects. Only one single suggestion was ever been made by the university administration: President Lefton once offered an opinion about the basic floor plan for the May 4 Visitors Center. Other than that, his only request was that it be “done well.” Period. In the last two years, the university administration has again received two drafts of a nomination, the nomination of the May 4 site for National Historic Landmark status. The Board of Trustees has again passed a resolution supporting the nomination and the Board chair has written a letter of support.

- In addition to winning two national awards for its documentary film, the May 4 Visitors Center was recognized with achievement awards from three additional agencies: the American Association of State and Local History; the Ohio Local History Alliance; and the International Society for Landscape, Place, and Material Culture.

- From 2009 to 2013, Carole Barbato and Laura Davis engaged in numerous conversations and interactions with students wounded on May 4 and the families of those who were killed. Barbato and Davis led the process of creating the May 4 Walking Tour and May 4 Visitors Center and were co-authors of the 2009 National Register nomination process, led by Mark Seeman. Carole Barbato was appointed special liaison to the wounded students and families, 2009–10, related to the dedication of the markers where the four students fell when they were fatally shot and the Thirtieth May 4 Commemoration, when all nine wounded students and four families of the slain students were invited back by the university and reunited for the first time. Many of the following interactions that Carole Barbato had, along with those of Laura Davis were directly related to the way the story of the shootings were being told in the museum and walking tour. Key interactions took place with family members Laurel Krause (sister of Allison Krause); Florence Schroeder (mother of Bill Schroeder); and Elaine Holstein, Russ Miller, Jeff Miller (mother, son, and grandson of Jeffrey Miller). Barbato and Davis also interacted during these years with Alan Canfora, Tom Grace, Jim Russell, John Cleary, Joe Lewis, Scott MacKenzie and Dean Kahler, each of whom was wounded on May 4. Barbato and Davis also met and conversed with Mary Vecchio about the impact of the shootings on her life.

- In 2012, members of the public had a unique opportunity to participate in creating the contents of the exhibit by answering a call for photos. 175 of these photos showing people of all kinds experiencing moments of all kinds in the fifties and sixties, giving a sense of the life of the individual against the backdrop of the tremendous stresses and changes of the long sixties. Every day, visitors may continue to add to how the history of May 4 is told in the May 4 Visitors Center. Two response stations at the end of Gallery 3 ask visitors to add their voices to the still-being-written history of the May 4 shootings. The comments they write are reviewed as specified by the National Endowment for the Humanities. The responses are archived in the May 4 Collection and available for research. A screen in the May 4 Visitors Center also features a dedicated display screen that scrolls with the comments visitors have left, to continue to write the May 4 story.