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Into the IRIS: a model for analyzing identity dynamics in conflict

Landon E. Hancock

Department of Political Science, Center for Applied Conflict Management, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA

ABSTRACT
I propose a lens model for understanding how core identities (ethnic, sectarian, racial or national) are affected by past interactions and narratives increasing the chances of the outbreak of violent conflict. The model can be used to show how core identities are polarized during conflict escalation and how they might de-polarize during periods of de-escalation and conflict resolution, leading to potential transformation of core identities in post-conflict situations. Northern Ireland will be used to illustrate the Integrated Relational Identity Structure model, showing how conflicting identities have changed, or not, as a result of history, the conflict and the peace process.

KEYWORDS
Identity; conflict transformation; Northern Ireland

Introduction: identities in conflict

Following the end of the Cold War, many were proclaiming a ‘new world order’ that would be defined by humanity’s ability to face its problems and resolve them in a rational manner (Bush, 1990). Unfortunately, these proclamations have not come to pass. Instead, we see a world still divided by inequality and inflamed by violence, much of which has been exacerbated by changing geopolitical, social, technological and environmental conditions. The end of the Cold War brought with it an increase in inequality as communist successor states sought to integrate into the capitalist system and a rapid rise in the number of ‘ethnic’ conflicts, best described as conflicts driven by differences in group identity (Brown, 1993; Gurr & Harff, 1994; Wolff, 2006).

There are multiple perspectives about why conflict occurs and what strategies should be undertaken in order to bring any particular conflict to a sustainable resolution. Conflicts can stem from realistic sources (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994), such as resource conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), desire or need for state power and dominion over other states (Prunier, 1995; Rieff, 1995), the security dilemma (Posen, 1993) or even conflict resolution-specific sources like Galtung’s (1969, 1990) structural violence theory or deprivation of basic human needs (Burton, 1990, 1997). Each of these perspectives refers to conflict as a start-up condition, focusing on theoretical requirements for conflict to begin (cf. Sandole, 1999). The idea that there are multiple pathways to the outbreak of conflict means that there is little consensus on what role identity might play in fomenting ethnic or sectarian
conflicts, contributing to some of the confusion about how to address ethnic or sectarian conflict as a phenomenon.

However, separating analysis of conflict causation into conflict as a startup condition and conflict as a process allows us to examine the role of identity and how it plays a role in fostering conflict escalation as well as impeding conflict de-escalation, resolution and potential transformation. It is clear that once a conflict has started, it begins to sustain itself, and that the identities of those involved in the conflict become enmeshed in the relationship between the parties. The more deeply entrenched the identities of the parties become in the conflictual relationship, the more difficult it becomes to resolve the conflict and move towards any type of peaceful relationship, as exemplified by Dingley’s description of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland as being at least partly defined by their ‘fear of or dislike of dominance by the other’ (2009, p. 369). This dynamic is part of the escalation process of the conflict itself and is a large part of what makes a conflict identity-driven (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012; Pruitt, Kim, & Rubin, 2004).

The goal of this work is to introduce a new model for examining identity dynamics in an attempt to more fully map the reasons for their entrenchment in conflict escalation and how this entrenchment often resists attempts at conflict de-escalation or resolution. The Integrated Relational Identity Structure (IRIS) model is designed to assist in understanding the relationships among various identities held by individuals as well as why some kinds of identities are often more important than others. Because this model is built upon several literatures that examine different aspects of identity, we first need to examine identity as defined across several fields. This will assist us to understand the interaction of identity with conflict escalation and violence and how to address identity when formulating conflict interventions and attempting to manage, settle, resolve or transform identity-driven conflicts.

**Identity: framing the fields**

When thinking about the confluence of identity and conflict, we come up against the realization that some identities are regularly considered to be more important than others. This begs the question of why some kinds of identities often have more pull with individuals and why membership in some kinds of groups – typically those that we are born into – become so much more important than those we later join and, to use Hirschman’s (1981) terms, are more able to voluntarily exit from in exigent times.

**Natural or constructed**

One of the most basic issues surrounding the study of ethnicity has been the face-off between those who believe that ethnic identities are primordial – a priori – and those who believe that they are socially constructed and reconstructed from generation to generation (Jenkins, 1994). Although some branches of primordialism have been widely discredited – sociobiology for instance – others, such as evolutionary psychology, continue to argue that there is biological evidence for ethnocentric behavior. For primordialists the key element is the nature of the ‘ethnonational’ bond as a special kind that is far
more powerful than other kinds of associations that one typically enters into voluntarily (Connor, 1994; Smith, 1986).

By contrast, social constructivism argues that the creation of ethnic difference is always contingent upon the situational context and is brought into being in order to preserve the boundaries of the ethnic or religious groups involved (Barth, 1969). The preservation and maintenance of these boundaries serves the political and social aims of the groups, meaning that the content of group difference is less important than the construction and maintenance of these boundaries. The rationale for boundary creation and maintenance is the need to create and preserve positive self-evaluation on the part of individuals. According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), individuals will choose to accentuate minor differences with out-groups in order to enhance their self-esteem – which is often and most easily derived from group membership. For those groups where exit is not easy or is unavailable – such as ethnic, racial or, at times, religious groups – members may view outsiders as inferior or display other ethnocentric attitudes and behaviors.

**Primary socialization and identity polarization**

We are often at a loss to bridge the division between those who believe that primal identities are ‘blood-given’ and unchangeable and those who believe that all identities are socially constructed and malleable. For the former, the problem is that they rely upon either a ‘black box’ approach that assumes the priority of these identities without an evidence-based mechanism or they attempt to use biological or psychological approaches that are seen as overly deterministic. For the latter, the social construction of all identities leaves little room for differentiation between those identities that are easily changed and those whose power reaches deep into our psyches (cf. Acuff, 2010; Hancock, 2010). In order to address the first problem, we need to turn to Jenkins’ (1996) idea of primary socialized identity. In this concept, he marries social constructivism with a sense of a priority by recognizing that while all identities are socially constructed, those that are constructed through early socialization – those associated with:

- selfhood, human-ness, gender, and, under some circumstances, kinship and ethnicity – are **primary identities**, more robust and resilient to change in later life than other identities.

(Jenkins, 1996, p. 21)

The concept of a primary socialized identity, or primary identity for short, has the power to help us understand why in some contexts an individual’s strongest affiliation might be to an ethnicity or race, while in others it might be to a religion or sect and yet in others it might be to a state or some other identification such as gender.

One way to think about a primary identity is to examine the point at which conflict breaks out, noting that each instance has a great deal to do with the level at which one’s primary identity predominates. For many Western societies, the primary identity is more often centered on the individual and thus, most social groupings are chosen by preference. This can be contrasted with many non-Western societies where the primary identity is often more strongly aligned with communal, ethnic or religious groups (Jenkins, 1996, p. 66).

When a conflict escalates, what is essentially happening is that the identities of the parties become entrenched in the conflicting relationship and begin to polarize around...
these primary identities (Jenkins, 1996; Northrup, 1989). For social groups like those in former Yugoslavia, this identity is based on ethnicity. For Northern Ireland, these identities are based on sectarianism (Jenkins, 1997, p. 23). When a conflict becomes protracted, the definition of group membership shifts to the point where being a member of one group means adopting an attitude of hatred towards members of the other group. This means that when under threat, whether real, imagined or created by elites; members of these groups will often ‘retreat’ to their primary identities and polarize around them.

What we as researchers need to be able to do is to recognize the power and tenacity of these primary identities and to try to understand how they relate to other roles and identities held by individuals in conflict situations. In order to begin addressing this, we need to try and address the second problem outlined above, how to conceptualize the relationship among the different multiple identities held by individuals and how one can reduce the threat to and importance of primary identities while recognizing that while we cannot successfully paper them over or force them to go away. For this second problem, we turn to theories of identity stemming from symbolic interactionism and in particular the works of Sheldon Stryker.

**Symbolic interaction and identity salience**

In our perception of self, the importance of any single identification over another is predicated upon a theory of multiple identities, which holds that individuals have many identities to choose from depending on a multitude of factors. The general ideal of multiple identities is articulated most clearly by symbolic interactionists, but has corresponding concepts in sociology, psychology, political science and international relations. The symbolic interactionist position is that identities represent reflexively applied cognitions responding to the question of ‘whom am I?’ (Stryker & Macke, 1978, p. 206). In other words, each individual has a host of identities that correlate to the different roles played in social interaction (Burke & Stets, 2009).

Stryker notes that the many identities held by an individual can be envisioned as existing on a continuum of more to less important, depending on certain circumstances. Those identities that are at the more important end of the continuum are said to be more salient than other available identities (Stryker & Serpe, 1982, pp. 206–207). Identity salience can also represent the probability of a certain identity being evoked across multiple contexts. The higher the probability of an identity being evoked in multiple situations, the higher its level of salience. This definition of identity salience stems from the purely sociological definition of salience as representing the ‘centrality of a particular attitude, identity, or role’ (Johnson, 1995, p. 580). For instance, a person’s identity as a weekend soccer player does not come into play when compared to their identity as a family member or member of a particular working profession. By contrast when a particular identity is threatened or used as the basis for discrimination, then one would expect that identity to be more central in everyday life, increasing its salience to the point where it would color all of the other identities that an individual might have (Hughes, Campbell, Hewstone, & Cairns, 2008, p. 528; Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

In order to determine the level of any particular identity’s salience, Stryker and Serpe (1982) indicate that one must examine the level of commitment in time and resources that an individual expends upon that particular identity. This aligns with Jenkins’
admonition above that an identity must be performed in order to be said to belong to an individual. The construction of the salience hierarchy is derived from the amount of commitment that an individual puts into each of his or her identities – with those identities having the most commitment, achieving the most salience and residing higher on the hierarchy. This is useful for understanding how to measure an identity’s importance vis-à-vis other identities, and it is one that can take into account the seemingly ‘natural’ importance of primary identities. However, it is limited in that it still treats primary identities as only one of many possible identities. That is to say, even though one can use Stryker’s salience hierarchy to measure ‘how’ a primary identity is more salient than other identities, primary identities are able to become less salient to the point of being able to fall off the hierarchy due to a lack of commitment. This contravenes the staying power of ethnic, national or sectarian identities that are often long-subsumed and only brought into play when threatened. In order to conceptualize primary identities as similar to, but not the same as, other socialized identities, we need to create and define a new model.

**Into the IRIS**

Thus far we have seen how identity can be described as stemming from a series of social constructs based on our associations. The introduction of Jenkins’ idea of primary identity gives us a handle to address the conflict between social construction and primordialism by showing how those identities constructed in a person’s formative years can develop the power and longevity of identities once thought to be primordial. Stryker’s salience hierarchy shows how some identities can prove to be more important than others, and how this can change over time. What remains is to combine these two ideas and incorporate processes of identity polarization into a single model that can help us to understand how and why identity can play such an important role in the outbreak and escalation of conflicts and why it contributes such a great deal to the intractability of conflicts, often preventing deep levels of conflict resolution or transformation.

The IRIS model represents a combination of Jenkins’ primary identity with Stryker and Serpe’s identity salience hierarchy, while incorporating notions of identity polarization and de-polarization in response to threat or its removal. In Figure 1 the model resembles a camera lens. The center of the lens represents the primary identity – properly described here as the core identity, while the individual’s other identities – described as role identities – are arranged in a hierarchy around the center with the most salient role identity at the 12:00 position and others falling into order in a clockwise circle around the central core.5

![Figure 1. Intergrated relational identity structure IRIS.](image-url)
In this model not only can the salience of role identities shift along the hierarchy – move closer or further away from the top position – the core identity can become more or less important, creating or crowding out room for role identities. This concept of identity narrowing and its reverse, identity widening also come from Stryker’s examination of identity roles and salience. In his initial experimental design, Stryker assumed that identity salience is based on the roles available for the individual to choose from. As Stryker and Serpe put it, ‘social structures … limit or constrain [individual] choices-who is brought into contact, what possible role relationships can emerge, what resources can be used in these relationships’ (Stryker & Serpe, 1982, p. 208). For identity widening the social structure reduces constraints on the choice of role identities, widening their availability. For identity narrowing, the reverse takes place with more constraints placed on the availability of role identities. The IRIS model is designed to capture this identity flexibility, with Figure 2 showing an example of both a de-polarized identity where the core identity takes up less commitment in comparison to the role identities and a highly polarized identity where the threat to the core identity is such that it has crowded out space for any other role identities in terms of availability of resources for commitment.

This sense in which a highly threatened core identity requires so much in terms of commitment that role identities are essentially unavailable has parallels in Northrup’s (1989) argument that threat to core identity constructs plays an important part in escalation and Hancock’s (2013, p. 64) findings that the reduction of threat to nationalist and republican core identities promulgated by the Good Friday agreement allowed individuals from that community to commit more resources to their role identities because they did not have to fight to protect their core identities as members of their communities in the eyes of the state.

While Figure 2 shows the extremes of identity polarization, one can imagine a range of possibilities that are more likely to correspond to how an individual’s core identity interacts with the rest of his or her role identities in the IRIS model. Overall, I posit that there would need to be a balance between one’s core identity and one’s salience hierarchy of role identities. Given that one’s primarily socialized core identity helps to place one within a relatively stable collectivity – whether it is an ethnic group or nation, a nation-state, or a religious group – that core identity cannot be erased without great instability.

**Figure 2.** IRIS – de-polarized and polarized.
to an individual’s sense of self or connectedness to the larger whole. This extends Seul’s (1999) argument that religious identity is a form of collective social identity that connects an individual not just to a group but to the cosmos at large, providing a vehicle for an individual’s eternal continuance both as a member of a continuing group, and in an eternal heaven as a believer in one of the monotheistic religions. If we accept Seul’s notion that connection to great collectivities can grant one a form of immortality and combine it with those by Clark (1989, 1990), positing the need to human bonding in order to know ourselves and work by Nudler (1993) and Docherty (2001) on the power of metaphor and world-viewing; one can see how different interpretations of the meaning of different cultural activities can create threats and fears for the existence of groups in conflict. These theorists give us some sense of the power of and need for a primarily socialized core identity. The essence of my argument about the power of the core identity is that, unlike some tenets of SIT, the core identity cannot be ‘re-categorized’ as less important or ‘de-categorized’ altogether, but must be dealt with (see Crisp & Hewstone, 2000; Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001).

Now we will illustrate the uses of the IRIS model by examining the Northern Irish case and showing the impact of identity polarization and de-polarization of the core identities of its two main communities brought about by the Troubles and the peace process.

Analyzing with the IRIS

Given that this is a conceptual paper destined to introduce a new model, I have not yet collected data to thoroughly test that model on its own. However, over the course of the past decade and a half, I have conducted a great deal of research into the Northern Irish conflict, its antecedents and its peace process and post-conflict situation. In this section, I will draw from some of the data collected for my earlier projects and show where these findings can be better understood through the use of the IRIS model.

For instance, when examining Northern Ireland before the outbreak of the Troubles, it is clear that – at the very least – the Protestant loyalist community felt fearful of any Catholic resurgence. Historical interchanges between Protestants and Catholics dating back to the former’s plantation in Ulster in the seventeenth century had led to a pattern of fear and mistrust between the two communities (Arthur, 1974; Darby, 1997; Dingley, 2009; Hancock, 2014a; McGarry & O’Leary, 1995; Stewart, 1997; Whyte, 1986). This meant that despite their protestations that the civil rights movement was nonsectarian, Protestant perceptions of it expressed a great deal of fear with:

Right wing loyalists, including the Unionist Minister of Home Affairs at the time, William Craig, the dissident Desmond Boal, and Paisley’s Protestant Unionists, all interpret[ing] the Civil Rights campaign as an attack on the Constitution of Northern Ireland and as an Irish Republican conspiracy. (Smyth, 1987, p. 21)

This prima facie polarization indicates that, at least for some individuals and communities, the size and power of their core identities were quite large in comparison to the role identities in their salience hierarchy. Members of the civil rights movement, and moderates outside of the movement in both communities, were largely marginalized in the brief period between the first civil rights march in August 1968 to the Battle of the Bogside just a year later; with battle lines being drawn between the two communities and a
resurgence of IRA membership and activity as they were called to the task of defending the community. The identity polarization that had started and taken root in the loyalist community was transferred through the violence of marches and counter-marches to the nationalist and republican communities after such events as the ambush of the People’s Democracy march at Burntollet Bridge and the Battle of the Bogside (Arthur, 1974; Hancock, 2014b). Catholic polarization continued, and expanded with the introduction of Internment in 1971 and the killing of 12 peaceful demonstrators by British Paratroopers in 1972.

Throughout the Troubles, numerous authors attest to the use of symbolism and history by both communities to cloak themselves in victimhood and to articulate the fears that each felt of the other. Arthur points out the ‘public banding’ phenomenon of the Protestant community, wherein their creation of the modern Ulster Volunteer force harkens back to early twentieth century opposition to Home Rule movements and compares it to the 1969 resurgence of the IRA, which similarly harkened back to the 1916 Easter Rebellion, in an interplay of victimhood and resilience that often portrayed Northern Ireland ‘as a society without a sense of empathy’ for members of the other community (Arthur, 1999, p. 97). The use of these events, as well as others like the Ulster Worker’s Strike and the deaths of the IRA hunger strikers, as chosen traumas (cf. Volkan, 1997) can also be described by an IRIS model in which those who felt most threatened by their fears of the other would experience a widely dilated core identity – in effect, limiting or eliminating space for the role identities of the salience hierarchy. While one could expect a wide amount of differentiation among the populace, we could posit that those who felt it necessary to join the fight itself would experience the most polarization, those who experienced violence in their communities would experience a great deal of polarization and those whose daily experience of violence was slight might experience only a limited amount of polarization with very few, if any, able to completely counter their fears of the other (Hughes et al., 2008; White, 2010).

In contrast to my examination of identity polarization – which at this point relies largely on documentary evidence and secondary data – field research that I have conducted shows that identity de-polarization following the beginning of the peace process took place on two separate fronts. The first of these was in response to the paramilitary ceasefires by the IRA and the Combined Loyalist Military Command in August and October of 1994. These ceasefires – which were complimented by a withdrawal of British military forces to their barracks some 10 weeks later – helped to create a sense of hope for the future for many in Northern Ireland’s population. This sense of atmospheric change was followed up by the structural changes imbued in the Good Friday Agreement, whose section on Constitutional Issues recognizes ‘the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may choose’ and their right to retain citizenship in either or both nations as they choose’.11

In interviews that I conducted across the province in 2001, members of both communities described the impact that the peace process had had on their sense of self as well as their views of the other. Interviewees described a reduced sense of threat brought about by the ceasefires and by the other’s recognition of their right to be a member of their community. Most telling was one former loyalist paramilitary member who indicated a willingness to enter a united Ireland ‘but it would have to come about democratically’ (Hancock, 2013, p. 64).
Others addressed the sense of identity de-polarization directly, noting that when asked to describe how their sense of self had changed since the beginning of the peace process, most noted an increase of commitment in time and other resources for role identities that were less directly tied to their core sectarian selves. One interviewee even noted that she no longer had to fight to be a nationalist every day and, thus, could expend her energies on working with her family and even reaching out to members of the unionist and loyalist communities (Hancock, 2013, pp. 64–5).

These results were complemented by a review of both newspaper editorials and longitudinal analyses of opinions surveys, all of which showed a change of attitude about the other in Northern Irish society. At the time of my initial writing (Hancock, 2003), I noted that while these were potential indicators of a beginning of conflict transformation, they would require careful and continuous support in order to achieve a larger scale transformation of the conflict to sustain the de-polarization of core sectarian identities. To some extent work by Smithey (2011) has shown some of these changes taking place in the protestant/unionist/loyalist community, including evidence that some sectarian murals had been replaced by more culturally oriented murals and that organizations like the Orange Order had softened their stances towards parading somewhat and had were trying to position themselves as more ‘family friendly’ cultural organizations.

However, despite evidence that some communities and community organizations have made progress in working across the sectarian divide (cf. Hancock, 2012b), there are elements in Northern Irish society that continue to feel threatened by the other and have resisted pressure for identity de-polarization. Foremost among these have been the various victims groups, many of which have opposed attempts to address the violence of the past. From the outbursts directed at the Eames/Bradley Consultative Group on the Past (Hancock, 2012a) to the difficulty of implementing any official transitional justice mechanism, it is clear that despite some progress, identity remains highly polarized for significant sectors of Northern Irish society.

**Tentative conclusions: applying the IRIS**

It may be far too early to unequivocally state that the IRIS model should be used not only for analyses of conflicts like Northern Ireland, but for policy prescriptions as well. That being said, there are some lessons that should have been learned by politicians during the peace process but which seem to have been ignored in the post-peace implementation period. Foremost among these is the importance that economic and symbolic fears can have in re-polarizing identities around core sectarianisms. Work by the Community Relations Council has shown that many in loyalist communities have difficulty in engaging with their counterparts in nationalist or republican communities because they fear that, somehow, they will end up on the losing end of such arrangements (Church, Visser, & Johnson, 2002; Ryan, 2010). An additional problem has been the government and NGO focus on community relations as opposed to sustainable economic development for deprived areas of the province. This has led to a backlash from some communities who complain that their needs are ignored in favor of ‘jobs for middle-class unionists’ and other social workers (cf. Hall, Gae Lairn Centre, & Farset Community Think Tanks Project., 2000; Hancock, 2012b). Finally, one can see in the most recent incidents of violence – most especially including the loyalist flag riots of 2013 but also including rising violence by
republican dissidents – that narratives of fear and threat have not disappeared, though they are less now than during the height of the Troubles. The most potent threat – at least for the loyalist community – appears to be a loss of cultural rather than physical identity, but it is a fear that does have the effect of re-polarizing identity and shrinking room for nonsectarian role identities to take root (Hancock, 2014a; Lowe & Muldoon, 2010; McAuley, 2003; Ross, 2001).

In order to combat this rising tide of polarization it would be prudent for politicians and community groups in Northern Ireland to take note of successful work being done by community groups such as Suffolk-Lenadoon and by the reconciliation work being done by Healing Through Remembering as well as others (cf. Hancock, 2012a, 2012b). Both organizations have sought to improve the lives of members – in one case focusing on two communities and in the other on all members of Northern Irish society – through activities that not only directly benefitted these members, but encouraged them in terms of listening to their concerns, telling their stories and allowing members – especially in the case of Suffolk-Lenadoon – to have agency in terms of designing and implementing programs to benefit their own communities. It is too soon to say how important agency might be in terms of increasing or sustaining identity de-polarization – especially since such agency cannot, by itself, reduce the fear that often generates identity polarization. However, it might be enough to say at this point that once some de-polarization had taken place in Northern Ireland as a result of the peace process, efforts at increasing agency in threatened communities might have assisted in helping role identities to take root. If this had taken place, perhaps some of the more unhelpful events – such as the symbolic threat posed by lowering the Union Jack from government buildings – might not have had such a powerful impact. And perhaps this is where an awareness of the difference between core identities and role identities might come in useful – in designing interventions and social programs that assist with the formation and strengthening of the latter without necessarily creating existential or symbolic threats to the former. For if we understand that core identities cannot be extinguished, but that they can be transformed over longer periods of time – much as they were created over long periods of time – then policymakers and community activists can recognize their power and work to de-polarize them in comparison to role identities that can serve the everyday needs of conflict affected populations.

Notes

1. For more on how these fears developed over the hundreds of years since Plantation see Darby (1976, 1997), Hancock (2014a) and Stewart (1997).
2. For a more detailed review on the literature of ethnicity and identity, see Hancock (2010) for ethnicity and Acuff (2010) for nationalism.
3. For more on these biological approaches, see Buss (2008) on evolutionary psychology, Gill-White (2001) on essentialism and Rushton (2005) on genetic similarity theory. Also see Richardson (2007) for a critique of evolutionary psychology similar to critiques made regarding sociobiology.
4. The original work on SIT was done by Tajfel (1978, 1981) and Turner (1987) and has been followed up by large numbers of researchers pushing the theory in multiple directions. For more detail, see Brewer (2001), Brown (2000), Huddy (2001) and Spears (2011) to name just a few.
5. One could easily expect the number of role identities to vary for individuals from a few to very many for those individuals involved in a great deal of activities. However, given the limitations of life, the amount of commitment in time, and potentially other resources, could be said to be finite – making the number of potential role identities also finite.

6. Also see Armstrong (1982, p. 54).

7. This explains why Tito’s efforts to subsume Yugoslavia’s various ethnic identities into a ‘Yugoslav’ identity failed and why current RPF attempts to create a Rwandan identity out of Hutus and Tutsis are unlikely to prove any more successful (Mutisi, 2012, p. 54; Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 1994).


9. This is not as farfetched as it might seem, largely because the development of the IRIS model has come from my prior examinations of identity in Northern Ireland as well as other conflicts.


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Notes on contributors

Landon E. Hancock, is Associate Professor of Applied Conflict Management and Political Science at Kent State University. His research foci include the role and dynamics of identity formation and change in conflict and conflict resolution, issues of identity in transitional justice and the roles that identity and agency play in conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. He is co-editor (with Chris Mitchell) of Zones of peace (2007) and Local peacebuilding and national peace (2012). He has published articles in Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Ethnopolitics, International Studies Perspectives, International Studies Review, Irish Political Studies, Journal of Peace Education, Peace & Change, and Social Psychology.

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