R Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

We Shall Not Overcome: Divided Identity and the Failure of NICRA 1968

LANDON E. HANCOCK

Kent State University, USA

ABSTRACT   The role of national identity is such that any group that can authoritatively claim to 'own' the national identity can assert the legitimacy of their vision for the state; persuading other sectors of society to support their cause. The Northern Irish Civil Rights Association was unable to bridge the divide between themselves and Northern Irish security forces or their Protestant neighbors. The role that divided identity has played in Northern Ireland since its inception has increased structural impediments to bridging the gap between protesters and security forces, leading to a resurgent IRA and the outbreak of the Troubles.

Introduction: The Northern Irish Civil Rights Association and the Troubles

One of the more forgotten aspects of the Northern Irish Troubles was that they were not the direct result of IRA actions, but were, instead, the result of a non-violent civil rights campaign orchestrated in order to bring about equal rights for all of the province's citizens. Having been designed to protect its Protestant majority from Catholics in the rest of Ireland, it is unsurprising to find that for many years Catholics suffered from discrimination in employment, housing, educational opportunity and electoral clout (Darby, 1976; Rowthorn & Wayne, 1988; O'Leary & McGarry, 1996; Hancock, 1998; McKittrick & McVea, 2002). What was surprising was the decision by social activists to address these concerns within the structure of the Northern Irish state, focusing on the attainment of British civil rights for all of Northern Ireland's inhabitants rather than the IRA demand for the reunification of Northern Ireland with the southern republic.

The civil rights campaign began when social activists raised concerns regarding the unequal treatment of Catholics under the law. They formed a number of civil rights organizations, most notably the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA), to coordinate local civil rights groups across the province (Prince, 2007). NICRA became the first prominent face of the movement when demonstrators clashed with police on 5 October 1968, in what is widely regarded as the start of the Troubles. Following this, things moved rather quickly, with attempts both to escalate and to de-escalate the situation. Between 5 October and 30 January 1972 those wishing to escalate the conflict won out over those who tried to

pursue civil rights non-violently. Events such as the People's Democracy four-day march across the province and the Battle of the Bogside led to the resurgence of the IRA as Catholics called for defense against loyalist incursions, escalating tensions further as the IRA began to take actions against British troops as well as loyalist paramilitaries. The final act of this sad tragedy took place on Sunday 30 January 1972 when British troopers opened fire on a civil rights demonstration, killing 13 and wounding another 13 in what would become known as 'Bloody Sunday'. Although the civil rights movement continued to exist, Bloody Sunday is recognized as the end of the mass campaign and the failure of that movement to bring change peacefully.

Three Views of Non-violence and Success

Traditional theories of non-violence indicate that movement failure stems from failures of agency; whether that comes from a lack of organization, an inability to connect with and undermine the incumbent's pillars of support, or an inability to connect with the wider population. Another view is posited by Lucan Way, who argues that structural elements, namely the availability of a national identity that is held by a wide segment of the population—both elites and masses—and that can be framed in anti-incumbent terms, marks the difference between success and failure of non-violent movements.

This research charts a path between these two views to increase our understanding of both structure and agency in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of success for non-violent movements. It does so by concentrating on national identity as a key variable bridging the gap between structural impediment and social action, focusing on the extent to which it exists and is available for capture by either insurgents or incumbents. This analysis uses NICRA's failure as a test case to examine the role that national identity may play in the potential for success or failure of any non-violent civil rights movement.

Agency and Organization in Non-violent Movements

Non-violence is largely viewed as a series of strategies and tactics that allow organized groups of ordinary people to challenge oppressive systems. It has been practiced throughout written history, concentrating on spiritual traditions before the nineteenth century (Wehr, 1995, p. 84) and shifting from moral imperatives to include instrumental aims with the advent of the twentieth century (cf. Sharp & Paulson, 2005; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Nepstad, 2011; Sharp, 2012; Coy, 2013).

The pre-eminent scholar of non-violence is Gene Sharp, whose many works have highlighted the unique nature of non-violent struggle and how its many facets combine coercive strategies with peaceful intent. One of his key ideas is his pluralistic model of power. In this model Sharp shows that any state's authority is derived from the consent of the governed and that this consent can be withdrawn by the successful application of non-violent strategies and tactics (Sharp, 2010). These strategies and tactics are designed to shift the obedience and compliance patterns of the populace, thus denying the state their consent until the objectives of the movement are met (Zunes *et al.*, 2010).

Based on the premise that even in the most repressive societies, committed members of non-violent movements can find ways to deny the state their obedience, research, scholarship and advocacy have focused on the role of non-violence movements in overcoming adverse structural considerations. Three well-known experts on non-violence argue that

scholarship in the field, including most of its well-known literature, indicates that structural concerns have little impact on the success or failure of non-violent campaigns (Zunes *et al.*, 2010). In this paradigm, the failure of individual non-violent campaigns has more to do with the organization of the campaign, its resources, training and ability to encourage elite defections and garner mass support rather than initial structural conditions.

The agency paradigm of strategic non-violence focuses on individual case studies and the provision of knowledge and resources to groups interested in mobilizing against oppression. Authors such as Nepstad (2011), Stephan and Chenoweth (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and Zunes (1997, 1999, 2011) focus on increasing the ability of these groups to overcome structural obstacles through strategies and tactics designed to improve the organizing capabilities of civil resistance movements, increase the number of participants in non-violent actions and to reach out to more sectors of society; in particular to 'fractionate' the regime and separate its leaders from their pillars of support.

From Sharp onwards, scholars of non-violence have emphasized the necessity for strategic thinking and organization for non-violent movements, most especially the need for these movements to maintain organization and cohesion in the face of the expected violent repression by forces of the state or other oppressor. Sharp forcefully advocates the use of principled, strategic non-violence and indicates that 'the introduction of violence into a nonviolent campaign' either by the group engaged in the campaign or on their behalf 'is highly dangerous' and will probably only succeed in shifting attention to their violence and away from that of the oppressor (Sharp, 1973, p. 597). This focus on strategy reflects the dominant view that organizational capability and careful strategy are the most important elements driving the success or failure of a non-violent movement.

Structural Space for National Identity

The social movements literature focuses on structural factors as determinant in understanding the success or failure of revolutionary movements; whether violent or non-violent. Lucan Way comes from this tradition, arguing that the strongest impact on the success or failure of the color revolutions came not from their diffusion but from the ability of authoritarian regimes to dominate the public sphere and their distance from Western influences (Way, 2008, p. 60). Expanding on this idea, Way introduced national identity as a contextual factor, arguing that potentially successful movements require the existence of a national identity that is shared by a majority of both elites and the general population. Furthermore, the incumbent needs to be weak enough that popular attitudes shift against the regime, creating an opening for an 'anti-incumbent majority identity' which then benefits popular opposition even in the absence of a strong civil society. By contrast, he argues that a strong pro-incumbent majority identity benefits the regime by giving it access to both regime resources and popular mobilization (Way, 2010, p. 130).

This view of identity restricts it to acting as a structural factor that will work for or against opposition movements regardless of their ability to organize or their strategies or tactics. Unfortunately, in reifying national identity as an either/or construct Way pays little attention to the socially constructed nature of identity or its ability to shift in meaning and interpretation in response to events and, at times, framing by elites, masses or others able to articulate clear messages. A broader view of identity shows

that its social construction can have a profound effect upon the conduct of conflict, and in particular the conduct of non-violent campaigns.[1] Smithey (2013, p. 31) notes that identity and tactical choice in non-violent campaigns are often recursive wherein tactical choice reflects 'collective or national identities, and collective action catalyzes the construction of collective identities ... through interaction with opponents, allies and bystanding publics'. So in a symbolic interactionist perspective, identity can be both a structural impediment and a resource that can be redefined and put into the service of the non-violent movement.

Balancing Structure and Agency in Non-violent Movements

One of the main goals of any non-violent movement is to separate the ruler or ruling regime from their sources of power; including the ruler's authority, human resources, their skills and knowledge, intangible factors such as common belief systems or ideologies, and material resources including financial resources, property and communications systems (Sharp, 1973, p. 10). According to Sharp, the power of these sources stems from the acceptance of the 'agents' of the regime and the general population and if this acceptance is withdrawn partially or completely, then the regime's 'effective power is weakened ... in proportion to the degree' to which the acceptance is withdrawn (Sharp, 1980, p. 23).

While authors such as Chenoweth, Stephan and Nepstad have found that when facing dictators, non-violent movements need to secure sufficient defections from the security forces in order to be successful (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 193; Nepstad, 2011, pp. 14--15), Sharp indicates that there are differences in approach when engaging in civil disobedience in ostensibly democratic states. As the goal in this case is the change of 'unjust' policies or laws not the overthrow of the government, the aims of the non-violent movement can be achieved only by 'building up conviction in [their] rightness among the population to the point where [the movement] has majority support' (Sharp, 1980, p. 128). Sharp goes further, indicating that 'a minority cannot impose its will upon a majority which believes in its own policy. There is no substitute for quality and genuine strength in a nonviolent movement, and there is no alternative to building up majority support for the views of the dissenters' (Sharp, 1980, pp. 128–129). By convincing a majority that the policies or laws of the state or regime are unjust and should be changed, the non-violent movement draws enough adherents to its cause and begins to separate the regime from one or more of its sources of power.

The case of Northern Ireland presents a unique blend, an ostensibly democratic part of a larger democratic state, but one which was arguably non-democratic in many ways and characterized by a wide sectarian split of the population. As outlined later, the goals of the civil rights campaign were to redress the economic and political discrimination suffered largely by the Catholic population, and also by working-class members of the Protestant community. The argument of this research is that in order to do so, the civil rights campaign not only needed the traditional elements of organization and agency required of all non-violent campaigns, but also needed to be able to convince the majority of the population—possibly including members of the security forces—that their grievances were legitimate and they represented the 'people' writ large. In order to achieve this, either a unifying national identity, as per Way, needs to be already present, or some form of bridge between communal identities needs to be constructed in order to create a majority capable of undermining those supporting unjust policies.

Civil Rights, the Early Days

Several groups formed in the mid-1960s to address discrimination in Northern Ireland, including the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ), the Derry Housing Action Committee/ Derry Citizen's Action Committee (DHAC/DCAC), the People's Democracy (PD) and, most notably, an umbrella group known and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association.

NICRA was founded on 9 April 1967 with a 13-member executive—only one of which was not Catholic (NICRA, 1978). Like the CSJ, NICRA began as a pressure group focused on writing letters. Its official history notes that shifting towards demonstrations came as a reaction to the government's ban on republican parades:

> NICRA was slowly coming to realise that a ban on street demonstrations was an effective Government weapon against political protest, and that although letter writing to Stormont was a fine form of occupational therapy, it was unlikely to bring any worthwhile results. (NICRA, 1978)

NICRA organized their first march on 24 August 1968 to protest about housing conditions in Dungannon, managing to keep the peace despite the presence of 1,500 counter-demonstrators led by Ian Paisley (Purdie, 1988, pp. 135–136). The upshot of this partial success was NICRA's determination to continue to use mass action, with Austin Currie stating that 'We will keep going with disobedience … to achieve our aims' (Purdie, 1988, p. 136). The DHAC was founded in 1967 to oppose the city's local government with the goal of establishing 'workers' power and public ownership of all land, banks and industries' (Purdie, 1988, pp. 180–181). The prime movers behind DHAC—Eamonn McCann, Matt O'Leary and Eamonn Melaugh—invited NICRA to coordinate the 5 October march, which they planned to use to bait the police into an over-reaction in order to draw support to their cause. Assuming that they would be able to control this reaction they thought that 'one certain way to ensure a head-on clash with the authorities was to organize a non-Unionist march through the city centre' (McCann, 1993, p. 91). When they met with NICRA, McCann noted that:

> It was immediately clear that the CRA knew nothing of Derry. We had resolved to press for a route which would take the march into the walled centre of the city and expected opposition to this from moderate members of the CRA. But there was none. No one in the CRA delegation understood that it was unheard of for a non-Unionist procession to enter that area. (McCann, 1993, p. 93)

The march itself had all of the hallmarks of 'a shot heard around the world', with civil rights protesters facing off against Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers armed with batons and water cannon. The Cameron Commission report indicates that the 'procession marched straight up to the police, and … at this stage batons were used by certain police officers … both Mr. Fitt and Mr. McAteer [MPs] were batoned by the police' (Cameron *et al.*, 1969). The report details what they think happened next:

> [C]ertain of the left wing extremists who were in the van of the procession … threw their placards and banners at the police, and that some stones were thrown at the police from the crowd … the police broke ranks and used their batons indiscriminately on

people in Duke Street ... Rapid dispersal of the crowd was also assisted by the use of water wagons which were moved along Duke Street and then along Craigavon Bridge. There is no real doubt that they sprayed the dispersing marchers indiscriminately, especially on the bridge, where there were a good many members of the general public who had taken no part in the march. (Cameron *et al.*, 1969)

The Unionist assessment of the Derry march was, unsurprisingly, somewhat different. William Craig, the Stormont Minister for Home Affairs who had banned the march, scoffed at the idea that the marchers were non-sectarian. He defended his actions, stating that 'There is little doubt in police circles that [the group] is, in fact, a Republican front' (Purdie, 1988, p. 147). The *Irish Times* also quoted Craig as indicating that:

all the activities of the civil rights movement had indicated that it was predominantly a Republican body ... Genuine supporters of civil rights in principle were extremely ill-advised to associate as they were doing with the IRA and Communism. (Purdie, 1988, pp. 147–148)

Loyalists argued that the whole purpose of the civil rights campaign was to destroy Northern Ireland as an entity. Ian Paisley indicated in an interview that he believed that 'the whole civil rights association is a front movement for the destruction of the Constitution of Northern Ireland' (Fanning, 2008).

Rebuttals to the Cameron Commission's report came from across the unionist/loyalist spectrum. Craig himself later wrote that despite the declaration of non-violence by the civil rights movements that it was:

naïve not to make a distinction between a declared aim and the real aim of such an organisation. Only those determined to be taken in can have any doubts that the ulterior motive was to initiate trouble and violence by 'non-violent' means ... the appraisal of the Cameron Commission was faulty. (Craig, 1972, p. 5)

The South Derry Division of the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV)[2] issued a rebuttal of the Cameron Commission's report, disputing:

the Government's assertation that there was any 'formation of well-meaning organ- isations to ventilate those grievances'. In no circumstances will we concede that the Civil Rights movement was a 'well-meaning' organisation. (Farrell, 1969, p. 3)

Their critique was based on a purported IRA document published by the Belfast *News Letter* in 1966, detailing an IRA shift away from armed struggle and allowing members to participate in civil rights movements. Despite the fact that Purdie and other scholars indicate that this did not represent IRA direction of the civil rights campaign, the UPV saw it as a 'blueprint for the takeover of Northern Ireland' (Farrell, 1969, p. 3). For the UPV the mere presence of known IRA members as march stewards indicated that 'the organizers ... were intent on violence' and that the Cameron Commission was engaged in 'a classic whitewash' in an attempt to absolve NICRA of 'the heavy responsibility' for the day's violence (Farrell, 1969, pp. 7–9).

Despite efforts to focus on non-violence and non-sectarianism, once the civil rights campaign began to shift to large-scale street demonstrations, it began to raise the ire of both security forces and loyalist organizations, who assumed that the campaign was a front for the IRA. Even though these groups were inspired by the US civil rights movement, they varied in their capabilities and unity in tactical choices. This division between ways and means would have consequences as the movement gained steam and attracted larger numbers of participants.

Moderates versus Radicals

Following the events of 5 October the civil rights movement was pulled in several directions as radicals and moderates each attempted to drive the movement towards their own goals. Within Derry, moderates felt that the DHAC had let the march get out of hand and that they needed to return the movement to a more non-violent and non-sectarian stance. A meeting was called in Derry at which McCann (1993, p. 100) and his colleagues found 120 people who, after apologizing for not being more involved in the past, proposed to elect new members to join the original organizers as a new committee. McCann indicates that he refused to join his colleagues in this new organization, relating that:

> In a fit of either pique or principle I then stomped out and denounced the persons elected at the meeting as 'middle-aged, middle-class and middle of the road'. (McCann, 1993, p. 101)

This organization came to be known as the Derry Citizens Action Committee, and instead of pushing for another march they held a sit-down demonstration in Guildhall Square, on the Catholic side of the city. Purdie notes that McCann 'took the quite accurate view that the meeting had been called in order to incorporate the militants ... to a new, more moderate group ... and thus deny them any significant influence' (Purdie, 1990, p. 190). However, McCann (1993, p. 103) himself recognized that the DCAC 'struck an attitude which perfectly matched the mood of the Catholic masses in the aftermath of 5 October', noting that 'John Hume was its personification: reasonable, respectable, righteous, solid, non-violent and determined'.

It was Hume who focused on the need to be disciplined, organized and to avoid what they saw as needless provocation. He put a stop to a planned replay of the 5 October march and created a system of capable stewards. Purdie (1988, p. 191) indicates that this 'showed that the DCAC, unlike the DHAC, took seriously the likely outcome of its action and prepared carefully in order to give effect to its determination to avoid violence'. The DCAC organized several marches through Derry following the sit-down action, including two along the 5 October route. During all of these actions, counter-demonstrators led by Ian Paisley's deputy, Major Bunting, were present, but no violence broke out (Purdie, 1990, pp. 192–193).

On 30 November NICRA announced a planned march in Armagh's town center. Ian Paisley announced that the Ulster Constitutional Defence Committee (UCDC) would lead a counter-demonstration unless the march was banned by the RUC. According to the *Belfast Telegraph*, Paisleyites then began to shove handbills into letterboxes in the town and post other signs warning the townspeople to 'Board up your windows' and 'Remove all women and children' from the town on the day of the march. The paper

also reported that Paisley saw 'a front movement for the IRA' in the civil rights campaign, calling for 'every loyalist in Ulster' to 'take control of the city' to prevent the marchers from congregating there.[3]

Paisleyite loyalists prevented civil rights marchers from reaching their destination downtown by earlier occupying the same space. The *Belfast Telegraph* reported that up to 8,000 civil rights marchers were prevented from proceeding along their chosen route when 1,000 Paisleyites refused to move from their path. The Paisleyites, 'some of them armed', shouted insults and sang party songs while civil rights leaders stressed the need to remain non-violent.[4] Moloney indicates that 'major violence was averted' by the police decision to stop marchers from 'colliding with the Paiselyites' and because the 'marchers were well stewarded' they agreed to stop and disperse. A few days later, on 9 December, Stormont Prime Minister Terrence O'Neill gave his Crossroads speech, appealing for an end to marches and counter-marches and promising to enact the reforms he had announced in response to the earlier calls by the civil rights campaign.

Another impact of the 5 October march was the creation of the PD by students and radical activists from Queen's University Belfast. One leader, Bernadette Devlin, described the rationale for its founding as:

> moral outrage which launched the PD and sustained it in its first phase, a period of political innocence—outrage at the behaviour of the RUC in the streets of Derry on October 5 and the subsequent intransigence of O'Neill's Government ... The activists and the uncommitted were united, then, by the violence of the situation and by the administration's over-reaction to events. (Arthur, 1974, p. 29)

The PD was committed to the creation of a united socialist Ireland. Its membership and organization could be described as similar to many of the leaderless anti-globalization movements of the 1990s or the recent Occupy movement. It had:

> no accepted constitution and no recorded membership. At any meeting any person attending is entitled both to speak and to vote; decisions taken at one meeting may be reviewed at the next—indeed during the currency of any given meeting. No subscription, entrance fee or membership qualification is required of members (if they can be so called) of this movement. (Cameron *et al.*, 1969)

Between its founding and O'Neill's appeal, the PD staged a number of events. Its members became known for their radical viewpoints and their sense that others involved in the civil rights struggle were too middle class and middle-of-the-road to understand fully the necessity for a class revolution (Purdie, 1990, p. 94).

After O'Neill's Crossroads speech many civil rights groups agreed to suspend their street protests to allow communal tensions to subside and to give the government a chance to implement its promised reforms. However, the PD defied opinion and announced a four-day march to take place from Belfast to Derry starting on 1 January. From the very outset of the march Paisleyites, led by Major Bunting, dogged the student marchers—confronting and harassing them as they marched across the province. The culmination came when the marchers attempted to pass through a gauntlet of loyalists at Burntollet Bridge just outside Derry. There they were hemmed in between RUC members, ostensibly there to protect them, and several hundred loyalists, including

many later identified as off-duty members of the 'B' Specials. The attackers rained stones down upon the student marchers, and when the marchers tried to flee, they were pursued and beaten while RUC members either stood aside or huddled in their armored personnel carriers until the action was over (Egan & McCormack, 1969).

The Cameron Commission remarked that these events, which included large-scale rioting in Derry and the first emergence of the 'Free Derry' movement, had been disastrous for moderates in the civil rights movement, polarizing:

> the extreme elements in the communities in each place it entered. It lost sympathy for the Civil Rights movement and led to serious rioting in Maghera and Londonderry. It divided the Civil Rights movement and weakened the Derry Citizens Action Committee. (Cameron *et al.*, 1969)

Ó Dochartaigh (1997, p. 41) notes that the march and riots contributed to increasing sectarianism in Northern Irish society and the emergence of a more radical leadership in Derry that was more willing to use violence to protect their community and achieve their goals. For many, the PD march to Derry marked a watershed in the civil rights movement:

> The Loyalists, angered by what they regarded as a provocative march, could feel no sympathy towards the civil rights campaign, even though they too could benefit from the same civil rights. They saw civil rights as a threat to the Government, and consequently as a threat to Protestant privilege. The PD march helped to drive the Protestant working class into the arms of Paisley and Bunting.
>
> On the Catholic side the march, particularly the Burntollet ambush, was seen as a Protestant attack on the Catholic students. Civil rights was slowly becoming identified in the Catholic mind with opposition to the Unionist regime, and that meant opposition to the state. A conscious attempt to organise a broad non-sectarian civil rights movement was being gradually identified with a sectarian ideology and the PD's failure to distinguish between political progress and political turmoil hardly helped to reassure the Loyalist population. (NICRA, 1978)

It is clear that moderates on both sides felt that they were losing control of the situation. The reaction to the PD march hardened attitudes on both sides, with PD members elected to NICRA's organizing board and O'Neill himself focusing more on the marchers than on the acts of the RUC or the counter-demonstrators (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997, p. 40).

Across Northern Irish society sectarianism was beginning to overtake the reformist impulses of the civil rights movement. The question of whether this occurred as a result of tactical failures on the part of the civil rights movement or as a result of a structural gap will be examined below.

From Burntollet to Burn All of It

Following the events of Burntollet Bridge, the moderates of the movement lost control over the direction and dynamics of the civil rights campaign. For civil rights supporters the outrage caused by the attacks on the PD and the subsequent attacks in Derry by the RUC required a ramping up of civil rights marches in order to try and channel rage

away from violence and towards civil reform. Unfortunately, this attempt was, in the end, unsuccessful, with each subsequent march generating yet more violence and leading to more radicalization on each side.

Rioting took place in Derry following a 19 April march at which NICRA supporters clashed with Paisleyites and members of the RUC entered homes in the Bogside area, severely beating a man who later died from his wounds. Despite the 23 April passage of universal suffrage in Northern Ireland, Terrence O'Neill resigned on 28 April, the DCAC dissolved in early summer and, as the summer marching season began to ramp up, the new prime minister, James Chichester-Clark, mobilized the 'B' Specials in antici-pation of further trouble.

Chichester-Clark agreed to allow the annual Apprentice Boys march in Derry to go ahead on 12 August, despite signs that trouble would ensue. Their passage close to the Bogside was the match needed to light the tinderbox that Derry's Catholic area had become. By this time the civil rights campaigners had morphed into a largely republican organization whose goals had shifted from equal rights to issues of defense and complaints about the actions of the RUC (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997, p. 51; Prince & Warner, 2012). The resulting conflagration, 'the battle of the Bogside', lasted three days before the Stormont government appealed to Westminster to send troops to quell violence there and in other hot spots across the province.

As violence grew, NICRA and the civil rights movement began to fade into the back-ground. NICRA notes that 'in the spiral of violence' and in light of a ban on marches, it 'was powerless to act without the danger of creating more sectarian violence' (NICRA, 1978). Despite NICRA's attempts to shift the focus of the debate towards more civil rights issues, in particular through its choice to campaign for a Bill of Rights and for the repeal of the Special Powers Act, it was never able to shift the atmosphere from vio-lence back to non-violence. Nor was it able completely to distance itself from the argument that it was a sectarian organization dedicated to working for Catholics and against the interests of Protestants (Prince & Warner, 2012).

On 30 January 1972 the last nail was driven into the coffin of the civil rights movement when NICRA's march against internment, again in Derry, was met by a fusillade of shots fired by a unit of the British Army's 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment, killing 13 demon-strators and wounding 13 more. By March of that year, the British government prorogued the Stormont Parliament and instituted direct rule. The troubles were well underway and the civil rights campaign, for all intents and purposes, was over.

The Failure to Overcome: Rationales for the Troubles

Next I explore the two views about the failure of NICRA outlined above, first that it stemmed from the organizational failure of the campaign and its constituent components, and second that the lack of a shared national identity doomed the attempt to build bridges between the two communities and create a shared space for the airing and resolving of grievances based on discrimination.

Agency and NICRA's Organizational Failure

NICRA and other civil rights organizations were clearly unprepared to become mass movements. At NICRA's founding, its intention was to pursue a campaign to inform

the public and to shame the unionist government into granting equal civil rights to Catholics and working-class Protestants. However, NICRA had the same lack of success that the CSJ had in getting its voice heard and its goals taken seriously:

> For the first 18 months ... [NICRA's] main activity was writing letters to the Government ... complaining about harassment of political and social dissidents ranging from Republicans to itinerants. But it rarely went beyond the stage of dignified written protest. The Government's reply—when it came—was usually one of denying that a particular abuse had occurred and suggesting that even if the NICRA allegation was true, there was probably a very good reason for the abuse ... It was a time of frustration for NICRA. (NICRA, 1978)

It was this frustration, when coupled with the pre-emptive banning of Republican clubs, that led NICRA to change its policies and engage in street-level protests. The choice to protest was something that was forced upon the organization rather than being part of a reasoned strategy. This meant that, even with inspiration from the US civil rights movement, the use of non-violent agitation by moderates in NICRA, DCAC and other civil rights organizations was more of an ad hoc tactic. It was hoped by moderates that pressure on the Stormont government would produce the same results that the US civil rights movement had achieved.

In contrast to the hopefulness expressed by moderate elements of the civil rights movement, it is clear that more radical members of the movement clearly intended to create a situation wherein marchers could provoke violence from the RUC. As Eamon McCann has put it:

> our conscious, if unspoken, strategy was to provoke the police into over-reaction and thus spark off mass reaction against the authorities. (McCann, 1993, p. 91)

In contrast to the seeming confusion about strategic goals and tactical methods on the part of the civil rights campaigners, the Paisleyite loyalists that made up the UCDC and UPV were highly organized and had a range of tactics at their disposal to aid in their goal of disrupting the civil rights campaigns. Loyalist organizations have long used the threat of counter-demonstrations and violent confrontation to force the government to ban or re-route civil rights or nationalist marches and demonstrations. Moloney noted that:

> Throughout the history of Northern Ireland, the response of most Unionists at all levels of government to Loyalist extremist pressure was invariably to placate them with concessions that drove Catholics further and further away from accommodation. During his own political career Paisley had amply demonstrated the vulnerability of Unionist governments to such pressure. From the Orange marches in Dungiven in 1959 through to the fall of O'Neill and the violent response he orchestrated to the civil rights movement, Paisley had virtually made Unionism his prisoner. (Moloney, 2008, p. 203)

The goal of the radicals was to generate a violent response; but they appeared to be unprepared for the outcome that they were working to generate. Other than assuming that such a violent response would generate a mass movement in support of the civil rights campaign,

there is little evidence that radical organizers were ready to make use of that movement or were prepared for the level of violence that would be directed at them by loyalists who viewed them as a threat to the state's very existence. Purdie's critique of the movement is startling both for our analysis of their tactical failures and for their lack of strategic understanding of Northern Irish society. He argues that the decision to engage in street demonstrations and marches was 'fateful' and implies that this error was made largely by members who had either not participated in earlier demonstrations or were too young to remember the last bout of serious sectarian conflict in Belfast in the 1930s. The one member of NICRA's board who had both of these qualifications was Betty Sinclair, who was 'the only member of the association's leadership to stand out vehemently against the strategy' of street demonstrations (Purdie, 1990, p. 244). More importantly, Purdie notes that although the US civil rights movement had been an inspiration for NICRA and other Northern Irish civil rights campaigners, there was:

> no evidence that any of the founders or leaders of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement ever visited the Southern United States, consulted with any of the Black civil rights organisations, or even undertook a thorough study of that movement. Their information came from the media and, inevitably, their application of the lessons of the American movement was patchy and reflected their own preoccupations and experiences. (Purdie, 1990, pp. 244–245)

This clear deficit of strategy and tactical acumen supports mainstream arguments that improved knowledge and ability are most important for successful campaigns. A traditional view of NICRA's failure would point to the lack of clear planning or objectives on the part of its leadership, a lack of coordination between moderates and radicals and the seeming unwillingness of the largely Catholic movement to make stronger overtures to Protestants or to refrain from undermining its non-sectarian nature by participating in street marches through contentious areas. This tactic, as Purdie notes, 'had a very definite historical and sectarian significance' and not only upset loyalists, but also led some Catholics to believe that it meant that they should 'become more aggressive and combative towards the police and the Protestant community' (Purdie, 1990, p. 244).

The Missing Link, Shared National Identity

While one can point to many organizational failures on the part of NICRA and its affiliates, it is also clear that there was a structural deficit in Northern Irish society, one that was not present in many societies where successful non-violent campaigns have taken place. In the US civil rights struggle the goal was to guarantee black Americans the same rights as white Americans, while the same could be said for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. While these goals are quite similar to the stated goals of NICRA and other moderate organizations, nowhere did one find mainstream civil rights groups in either the US or South Africa advocating the dissolution of those states in either the short term or the longer term. This is because, despite deep divisions based on race, most individuals in both countries viewed themselves as members of the same national polity. However, in Northern Ireland it is clear that the deep divisions between Catholics and Protestants were less about unequal treatment and a lack of civil rights for the underprivileged of both communities than they were about having different national aspirations and holding different

national identities. Therefore, in order to establish a substantial enough majority of the population calling for the end of discrimination, the civil rights movement would need to overcome the historical perception that any movement born in the Catholic community had as its end goal the dissolution of the Northern Irish state.

According to Way's thesis, a necessary component for a successful non-violent struggle is a national identity that is not controlled solely by the regime, but is available to be mobilized by non-violent agitators as a weapon against the incumbent regime (Way, 2010, p. 130). A central question of this paper has been to establish whether any national identity was available for civil rights protesters to mobilize to achieve their stated goals of equal rights for all in the province. In some senses that question is too simplistic when one acknowledges the difficulty of finding that middle ground and central identity in Northern Ireland. Instead we shall examine whether, or the extent to which, NICRA attempted to bridge the divide between Catholics and Protestants in order to create the majority that Sharp indicates is necessary to force political change. What signals did NICRA and its constituent elements send to the Protestant community about the nature of their protests, their goals and their desired end-state for Northern Irish society? How were their signals interpreted and to what extent, if any, was it possible for NICRA to bridge the deep divide of mistrust and fear between the two communities? It is in these questions that we may find a way forward between the views of non-violence as agency-oriented or structurally limited to see the potential for non-violent civil action in a variety of contexts.

Origins and Goals of the Civil Rights Movement

One of the biggest problems for NICRA was the widespread accusation from unionism that civil rights in Northern Ireland were little more than window dressing for yet another IRA campaign to create a united Ireland. Few academic sources believe that this was the case, with Purdie (1990, pp. 127, 149) arguing that while members of the IRA were allowed, or even encouraged, to participate in civil rights activities, they did so as individuals rather than as a part of coordinated plan to direct the civil rights struggle to the IRA's own ends.[5] The more fundamental question for this analysis focuses on the goals of the civil rights movement and whether they were aligned with persuading Protestants to share a common course or whether they focused on using civil rights as a longer term vehicle for reunification of Ireland and the dissolution of the Northern Irish state.

The goals of NICRA laid out in 1967 were based around five main objectives:

(1) To defend the basic freedoms of all citizens.
(2) To protect the rights of the individual.
(3) To highlight all possible abuses of power.
(4) To demand guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association.
(5) To inform the public of their lawful rights (Purdie, 1990, p. 133).

These goals are carefully non-sectarian and even fail to mention specifics regarding discrimination suffered largely by the Catholic population. The goals of the CSJ were framed similarly, representing the group's:

> intention to use all necessary means at our disposal for the dissemination of factual
> information about discriminatory practices exercised against our people in

employment provided by central and local government agencies and also in housing provided by public funds. (Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, 1965)

Furthermore, at several junctures members of NICRA made explicit reference to their self-professed non-sectarian identity. However, pronouncements of non-sectarian identity or intent ran afoul of both embedded perceptions and of actions that, whether intentionally or naively, betrayed either a Catholic bent or offended Protestant sensibilities. As explored above, the Derry march was designed to provoke the police into over-reaction. However, one consequence of the march was to offend Protestants by starting the march in a Protestant area and ending it at the Diamond, in the heart of the symbolic Protestant center of the city. The Cameron Commission noted as much when they indicated that the march:

> route traversed certain Protestant districts, and ended within the city's ancient Walls, which have major significance in Orange tradition ... The proposal to follow this route was designed to symbolise the claim of the Civil Rights Association to be non-sectarian, and neither Unionist nor Nationalist. However, the local Unionist headquarters objected to the march as offensive to a great majority of the citizens residing on the route, and also to any meeting near the War Memorial or any place closely associated with the siege of Londonderry. (Cameron *et al.*, 1969)

This sense of intrusion felt by the Protestant community was magnified in the PD's four-day march across the province from Belfast to Derry, which passed through many Protestant towns. Major Bunting was not just able to mobilize members of the 'B' Specials to attack the marchers at Burntollet Bridge, he was able to turn out local Protestants from towns all along the route; people who 'kept up a constant flow of invective' shouting sectarian slogans and forcing the police continually to re-route the march away from increasingly hostile counter-demonstrations (Egan & McCormack, 1969).

Furthermore, the act of marching in Northern Ireland was one that had deep sectarian significance and had been used, largely but not wholly, by the Protestant community to define communal separateness and to champion the superiority of one identity over the other. Therefore, the use of mass marches to champion a non-sectarian cause of civil rights did not fit into the normal discursive imagery. As Smithey and Sharp both note, when attempting to build a majority for political change, as well as when attempting to win over an opponent to one's viewpoint, care must be taken not to violate norms or standards that would render one's actions ineffective (Sharp, 1980, p. 128; Smithey, 2013, p. 42).

Fear and Loathing: The Protestant Response

There are two elements to consider when examining the Protestant response to NICRA and the civil rights movement. The first is the extent to which the identity divide between the two communities created Protestant mistrust about the goals and intentions of the civil rights movement. The second is the extent to which tactical choices made by the DHAC, NICRA and the PD reinforced or reduced the sense of mistrust built up over generations of interaction.

The divisions in Northern Irish society have deep roots in Irish history and are interwoven into cultural history and replayed for each generation in the rituals and symbols of

everyday life.[6] Evidence of these divisions can be found in many of the Protestant responses to NICRA's campaign. As expressed by a UPV member, Wallace Thompson:

> I had been brought up to believe that Northern Ireland was a Protestant, British state. I had loved the trappings of Orangeism and very many of my reactions were a basic gut feeling that we had this portion of land and we had to guard it; it was my home-land and any giving in at all to the forces of Nationalism was a disaster.

> I can recall going through a fleeting pro-O'Neill phase, a belief that his attempts at reconciliation were reasonable. But as events developed and the CRA took off my first reaction was like a red rag to a bull—here we have the old Nationalism rearing its ugly head and I rejoiced at the hammering the Nationalists received in Londonderry on October 5th, 1968. This was the stuff they deserved. (Quoted in Moloney, 2008, p. 168)

Paisley's newspaper, the *Protestant Telegraph*, tended to even more hysterical descriptions of the civil rights movement, comparing the Dungannon march to the St Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, when thousands of French Huguenots were killed by French Catholics, announcing that 'This year it [the massacre] was celebrated in Dungannon by a Civil Rights march that almost ended in the rebel marchers attacking the police and the Protestants who had turned out to voice their disapproval' (Moloney, 2008, p. 150).

Many Protestant organizations condemned NICRA as being nothing more than a front for the IRA, arguing that it was part of a blueprint for the takeover of Northern Ireland. Hennessey argues that this suspicion of the civil rights movement was well-founded because even though republicans did not control the movement or set its agenda, it 'had been born of Republicanism, was marshalled by Republicans and Republicans formed part of its leadership' (Hennessey, 2005, p. 136). Even the Cameron Commission confirmed the existence of these fears and indicated their belief that they had some basis in reality.

> The fears and apprehensions felt widely among Unionists have solid and substantial basis both in the past and even in the present ... We recognize ... the wide existence of this fear and the fact that it is sincerely and deeply felt and that it is undoubtedly a major factor in determining the attitude of many Unionists towards the Civil Rights movement, which they tend to regard as essentially a Catholic if not a Nationalist and Republican manifestation, unjustified by genuine grievance or complaint in fact. (Cameron *et al.*, 1969)

This underlying attitude can best be described as a manifestation of the fear of extinction, described by Horowitz as an anxiety-laden perception that if the dominant community were to fall under the power of the subordinate community, they would be subject to cultural or physical extinction (Horowitz, 2000).[7] Or as Paisley himself put it, 'This Civil Rights Association in Ulster is only a smoke screen for the real objective—the utter destruction of our country' (Paisley, 1970, p. 17).[8]

In referring to the Dungannon march, it is interesting to note the *Protestant Telegraph*'s depiction of the marchers as 'rebels' rather than as protesters; indicating a strong presence

of that aforementioned fear of extinction. Moloney describes this event as setting off a pattern of Paisleyite counter-demonstrations that would continue throughout the entire civil rights campaign. Moloney argues that this pattern indicates that civil rights marchers, 'despite their claims to be non-sectarian, would be seen by increasing numbers of Protestants as a coalition of Nationalists and Republicans who, by flouting the law and attempting to "invade" Protestant territory under the cover of "civil rights", were in reality working to achieve the old goal of Irish unity and Catholic domination' (Moloney, 2008, p. 150). This sentiment is echoed by Hennessey, who indicates that the non-republican leadership of the civil rights movement were naive to underestimate the impact of this republican presence upon Protestant perceptions, arguing that the underlying rationale of the movement committed the republican error of ignoring the national aspirations of unionists and loyalists, thus becoming a de facto Catholic movement (Hennessey, 2005, p. 136).

Finally, even members of the PD itself noted that, following the long march from Belfast to Derry, marches themselves had 'heightened the risk of sectarian conflict and polarised the community' (Arthur, 1974, p. 44). Arthur goes on to say that while most, if not all, of those analyzing the situation believed that the 'long march' had polarized attitudes and further radicalized both the PD and their Catholic supporters, 'no one stopped to ask what effect it had on Protestant opinion' and that the march 'was seen by many Protestants as a series of arrogant invasions of their territory' with 'the ambush at Burntollet bridge' as their answer to it (Arthur, 1974, p. 42).

It seems clear that the choice of street demonstrations contributed to Protestant perceptions of threat. Purdie calls NICRA's decision to turn to street demonstrations 'a fateful one' because marching 'had a very definite historical and sectarian significance, with vast potential for upsetting the tacit understanding between the two communities about territorial divisions' (Purdie, 1990, p. 244). It is clear that Northern Ireland remains a highly divided society whose boundaries are marked out territorially. Many areas in Northern Irish cities and towns are known as either Protestant or Catholic and many services and institutions are divided, serving only one community. The fact that NICRA and the PD had wanted to reach past the sectarian divide was not, by itself, enough to overcome these fears and divisions. The fact that they both used mass marching in order to confront the unionist government was, arguably, a poor choice, given that the tactic itself alienated Protestants who they wished to draw to their cause and probably prevented the movement from achieving the kind of majority necessary to bring about peaceful change.

Building Bridges or Burning Them: Outreach Efforts

Much has been made of the non-sectarian nature of the civil rights movement and the fact that it sought to improve conditions within Northern Ireland rather than directly trying to achieve reunification with the rest of the island. As explored above, these goals were a bit fuzzier than first stated; and many in the civil rights movement did want to see an eventual reunification of Ireland, but they did not intend to use the civil rights movement as a vehicle to achieve that goal. However, despite their good intentions it is also clear that for the most part the civil rights movement, both leadership and rank and file, were made largely up of Catholics.

Part of the problem was that much of the discrimination that pervaded Northern Irish society was aimed at Catholics in order to keep them from 'taking over' and 'destroying

Northern Ireland'. That meant that discriminatory practices in housing, jobs, education and voting were aimed primarily at reducing Catholic power. This discrimination is evident from academic studies and studies by the UK government, which detail the different types of discrimination that affected the Catholic community. Reviews of unionist and loyalist responses to the civil rights claims of discrimination rarely acknowledge the existence or veracity of these claims (cf. Farrell, 1969; Paisley, 1970; C. Smyth, 1970; W. Smyth, 1971). These responses were made despite the fact that some loyalist leaders knew of Catholic discrimination and disagreed with it on principle. However, the fear that such discrimination would lead to the disintegration of Northern Ireland is what kept leaders such as Ian Paisley and his then deputy Ian Foster from speaking out in support of the civil rights campaign (Clarke, 2014).

Mistrust and oppositional views of discrimination were certainly obstacles to efforts to engage in outreach to loyalist communities, but do not prove that such outreach was impossible. In one case, Eamon McCann states that prior to the 5 October Derry march some efforts had been made by DHAC to engage with local loyalists:

> During the previous months we had managed to make contact with some Protestants from the Fountain, a small working-class area which abutted the Bogside. They too had their housing problems, mostly concerned with hold-ups in a redevelopment scheme, and a few of them had approached us suggesting that we devote some of our agitations to their cases. This we had done, heartened that our non-sectarian intentions had been accepted. We knew that none of our Protestant contacts was going to march on 5 October—that would have been too much to expect—but we had real hope that the socialist movement we were going to build after, and partly as a result of, the march would engage Protestant support. (McCann, 1993, pp. 94–95)

Later, as a member of the PD, McCann admitted that the PD had failed to get its position across, that it had 'failed absolutely to change the consciousness of the people', which at that moment was 'sectarian and bigoted' (People's Democracy, 1969, p. 33).[9] A colleague, Cyril Toman, noted in the same interview that 'We have not as yet worked very hard at getting the support of Protestant workers' (People's Democracy, 1969, p. 34). This is just one example of an increasing recognition that the civil rights movement had failed to conduct sufficient outreach towards the Protestant community. In particular:

> the PD and the other extreme left leaders were just beginning to face up to the implications of the situation which they had helped to bring about. They had become more acutely aware of the reality of a divided working class and of the serious danger posed by the alienation and hostility of the Protestant workers. (Purdie, 1990, p. 239)

That members of NICRA and the PD made speeches touting the non-sectarian nature of the civil rights campaign is clear. That these speeches had little effect upon working-class Protestants and loyalists is also clear. The composition of the mass movement as mostly Catholic meant that Protestant perceptions that it was a sectarian movement were reinforced (Hennessey, 2005). The lack of systemic outreach to Protestant communities when coupled with traditionally hostile tactics such as marches meant that what little outreach was practiced fell upon deaf ears. This left the civil rights movement in the unenviable position of being unable to bridge the gap between themselves and the Protestant community.

> The PD and its allies on the left had put their fingers on an important contradiction in the movement's perspectives. The mobilisation of Catholics was not leading to the emergence of a non-sectarian mass movement seeking advances for all the underprivileged in Northern Ireland; nor was it forcing reform from above through intervention by Westminster. As the events of August 1969 showed, it was leading to a re-emergence of the old animosities and the old violence. It was this which tore the civil rights movement apart. (Purdie, 1990, p. 242)

The re-emergence of these old animosities meant that the civil rights movement would be unable to create the majority that Sharp indicates is necessary to achieve non-violent political or policy change. Richard English describes the problems faced by NICRA and other civil rights organizations as 'essentially twofold' consisting of Northern Ireland's 'deep, pervasive, and long-rooted' communal divisions and a civil rights program that focused on issues perceived as Catholic in nature and which 'reinforced rather than dissolved' the sense of communal division and fear (English, 2009, p. 79).

Tentative Conclusions and Wider Implications

So, overall, it appears that the identity gap that existed contributed a great deal to stymieing efforts by the civil rights movement to portray themselves as non-sectarian in goals and orientation. It is unclear the extent to which this gap was bridgeable by the civil rights movement, partly due to the structural issues of Northern Ireland and partly due to the sectarian nature of discrimination in Northern Ireland. It is clear, however, that instead of having a single communal identity that could be captured and used to promote a civil rights agenda and pressure the government, Northern Ireland possessed at least two main identities that were expressed in nationalistic terms. That is to say, in Northern Ireland there was, and remains, no imagined community of the Northern Irish.[10] Instead what we see are two versions of British identity, unionist and loyalist, which are often tied together only by their affiliation with the United Kingdom, but often do not share the same religious persuasion, culture or class. These were complemented by two versions of Irish identity, nationalist and republican, both of which were characterized by a desire to reunify Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.

It would be simplistic to say that the presence of this national identity gap fulfilled Way's thesis that one needed to be able to capture a shared identity in order successfully to undermine the regime and to create a large enough majority to press for peaceful repeal of discriminatory policies and practices. However, my analysis does not lead to such a simple conclusion. While it is clear that there was a gap between Protestant and Catholic, nationalist and loyalist, it is also true that, at least to some extent, members of both communities did suffer from similar forms of discrimination and could, theoretically, have been persuaded to work together to change the status quo. The reason that this did not happen is only partially structural in that there was no overarching national identity for the non-violent protesters to latch on to in order to capture the center, build a majority and move the government in their direction. In addition, there was also a clear deficit in terms of organizational capability and clear goals. Both NICRA as a whole and the PD in particular were deficient in creating a sustained campaign of outreach with which to try to persuade Protestants to join the civil rights cause. Moreover, because NICRA was a home-grown campaign, run by local people, it seems problematic that little forethought

was directed towards preventing clashes with Protestant loyalists; instead using tactics that would enable men such as Ian Paisley to capitalize on existing fears.

One of the main problems for the civil rights movement was their lack of organizational capacity. This lack led to their failure to gain control over the mass movement that erupted following the 5 October march, but more importantly led to the willingness of their, largely Catholic, supporters to 'revert to the nationalism which already shaped much of their previous experience' (Wright, quoted in Purdie, 1990, p. 157) when faced with Protestant violence by the state and Paisleyites. This reversion on the part of Catholics is echoed by members of the PD as outlined above and shows how tactical failures on the part of the civil rights campaign not only led to or increased an inevitable violent loyalist response, but also that they started a dialectical process of polarization wherein Catholics who had been supportive of the non-violent strategy of NICRA would revert to violence against the Protestant community because it fit neatly within their own worldviews about the causes and continuation of discrimination against their community (Hancock, 1998).

While it may not have been possible to overcome the deep structural divisions and the lack of a centralized national identity available for capture, the failure of civil rights groups to organize thoroughly for non-violence and to make concerted attempts to reach out to the Protestant community make it difficult to determine which factor was most important in the failure of the civil rights campaign to build a large enough majority to achieve its goals through peaceful conversion. Despite this lack of certainty, it is clear that the lack of a central national identity provided a formidable barrier to the success of NICRA. It is my hope that this analysis may lead to further examination of the role that identity, and specifically national identity, plays in the success or failure of non-violent campaigns and the extent to which campaigners may be able to convert its lack from a barrier into an opportunity.

Notes

1. For more detail on different perspectives of identity, see Hancock (2010).
2. The UPV was a protestant force created by Paisley as an outgrowth of another Paisley organization, the Ulster Constitutional Defence Committee. The UPV was drawn entirely from loyalists, with a large number of 'B' Specials as members (cf. Moloney, 2008).
3. This comes from the news synopsis put together by Alan Scott, available on CAIN at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/newspapers/scott.htm
4. *Belfast Telegraph*, 30 November 1968, leader '8,000 marchers halted near Paisley crowd'. News synopsis by Scott, 25–30 November, available on CAIN.
5. One potential way to unpack the question of IRA motivation is to suggest that, rather than using NICRA as a wedge to force a united Ireland, with the withering of the Border Campaign the IRA needed some way to keep its organizational structure intact while either waiting for a more propitious opportunity to restart the armed struggle or, as seems more likely, to become involved in a number of civil activities in order to shift from an armed-nationalist struggle to a more socialist-oriented, class-based struggle (Purdie, 1988, p. 124). Moloney (2002, p. 7) indicates that it was the latter and that the ambition of the IRA's leadership of the early 1960s 'was to replace national struggle with class struggle; they had no time for Belfast's narrow sectarianism, no sympathy for armed struggle, no need for guns'. Authors such as Dixon (2001) and Patterson (1989) appear to agree, with all noting that this direction created divisions in the membership that precipitated the split of the IRA into its Official and Provisional wings (Moloney, 2002, p. 69). This view acknowledges that the IRA had not given up on its goal of a united Ireland, without giving the organization so much credence as to suggest that it 'planned' the civil rights campaign in order to ramp up disturbances, divide itself into two factions and, ultimately, fight a 30-year campaign resulting in a negotiated settlement.
6. For more detail on how historical memory has shaped Northern Ireland's two communities, see Buckley *et al.* (1995), Nic Craith (2002), Ross (2007) and Hancock (2011), to name just a few.

7. Also see Crighton & Mac Iver (1991), Hancock (1998, 2011) and Shirlow (2003).
8. As revealed in a BBC interview with Eamon Mallie broadcast on 14 January 2014, Paisley's apparent belief that the civil rights movement was a smokescreen for a plan to destroy Northern Ireland was so strong that he refused to support the movement despite his acknowledgement that the political and economic system in Northern Ireland was unjust and unfair.
9. McCann also noted that during the Battle of the Bogside he began to understand that unionists were not 'brainwashed' but truly felt that giving Catholics rights would result in extinction for Protestants (Prince & Warner, 2012, pp. 126–127).
10. Work by Karen Trew (1998) indicates that while some members of each community may choose to identify as Northern Irish, sample interviews indicate differentiated meanings of that identity that reinforce the sectarian divide.

References

Arthur, P. (1974) *The People's Democracy, 1968–1973* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press).

Buckley, A.D. & Kenney, M.C. (1995) *Negotiating Identity: Rhetoric, Metaphor, and Social Drama in Northern Ireland, Smithsonian Series in Ethnographic Inquiry* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press).

Cameron, J., Biggart, J.H. & Campbell, J.J. (1969) *Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland* (Belfast: HMSO). Electronic resource available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron.htm

Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (1965) *Northern Ireland: Why Justice Can not be Done. The Douglas Home Correspondence* (Castlefields, Dungannon: Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland).

Chenoweth, E. & Stephan, M.J. (2011) *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Clarke, L. (2014) Ian Paisley: he was right not to back civil rights movement, says hardliner, *Belfast Telegraph*, 14 January.

Coy, P.G. (2013) Whither nonviolent studies?, *Peace Review*, 25(2), pp. 257–265.

Craig, W. (1972) *The Future of Northern Ireland: A Statement by The Rt. Hon. Wm. Craig on Behalf of the United Loyalist Council* (Belfast: s.n.).

Crighton, E. & Mac Iver, M.A. (1991) The evolution of protracted ethnic conflict: group dominance and political underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, *Comparative Politics*, 23(3), pp. 127–142.

Darby, J. (1976) *Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Development of a Polarised Community* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan).

Dixon, P. (2001) *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke: Houndmills; New York: Palgrave).

Egan, B. & McCormack, V. (1969) *Burntollet* (London: L.R.S.). Electronic resource available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/pdmarch/egan.htm

English, R. (2009) The interplay of non-violent and violent action in Northern Ireland, 1967–72, in: A. Roberts & T. Garton Ash (Eds), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).

Fanning, M. (2008) The day the Troubles began, *BBC Spotlight*, BBC Northern Ireland.

Farrell, W. (1969) *A Commentary by South Derry Division Ulster Protestant Volunteers on the Cameron Report: The Only Detailed Commentary yet to be Published* (Belfast: Puritan Printing).

Hancock, L.E. (1998) *Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing* [web page], Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/landon.htm

Hancock, L.E. (2010) Ethnic identities and boundaries: anthropological, psychological and sociological approaches, in: R.A. Denmark (Ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Hancock, L.E. (2011) Narratives of identity in the Northern Irish Troubles, *International Studies Association Annual Convention*, Montreal.

Hennessey, T. (2005) *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan).

Horowitz, D.L. (2000) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2nd edn (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press).

McCann, E. (1993) *War and an Irish Town*, new updated edn (London and Boulder, CO: Pluto Press).

McKittrick, D. & McVea, D. (2002) *Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books).

Moloney, E. (2002) *A Secret History of the IRA*, 1st edn (New York: W.W. Norton).