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The Mysterious Orient(al) Schema: Images and Attribution*

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Abstract

Historically, Japan has been viewed as the “mysterious Orient”; and its people, inscrutable. Framed in terms of the mysterious Orient(al) schema, these cultural images of the Japanese are traced through triangulation, including a discourse study of American training films for its personnel during the Occupation of Germany and Japan. These postwar films, authored and produced by the intellectual elite, provide both a means for tracing the mysterious Orient(al) schema and for identifying an instance of the “fundamental attribution error.” A contemporary example of the schema is also provided by the children’s cartoon series *Mask..* These cartoons clearly show imaging of Japanese inscrutability and suggest a way of enculturation as well.

Such findings offer the intercultural trainer useful material for facilitating perceptual skills and for understanding related concepts. These findings also hope to encourage, conversely, the study of Japanese images of North Americans for mutual benefit.

Introduction

Schema is “a knowledge structure that summarizes generic knowledge and previous experience with respect to a given class of stimuli and events and, at the same time, gives meaning and guides anticipation with respect to


similar stimuli and events in the future" (Ross and Nisbett 1991: 12). "The notion of schema . . . has now acquired a central position in both cognitive and social psychology. In social cognition, [schema functions] to organize our knowledge about other people and other groups and their actions " (van Dijk 1987: 184).¹ One apparent schema is how the West has long seen Japan as mysterious.

In tracing this schema about Japan, a triangulation of related cultural images was attempted. Generally, triangulation as a research method observes a phenomenon from several vantage points. In cross-cultural research, one might compare three cultures rather than two on common dimensions. Mouer and Sugimoto (1986) seem to have triangulation in mind, as they consider the Japanese from and between the standpoints of Australia and the United States. The observations made in tracing the schema about Japan are graphically displayed in BOX 1.

These sources include: 1) historical surveys identifying past images and beliefs associated with the schema being studied; 2) American images of Germany and Japan in contrast as found in two orientation films for GIs during the Occupation of those countries during the postwar; and 3) a contemporary children's cartoon series in which is found a relevant Japanese character.

The display in BOX 1 attempts to depict the continuity of images of the Japanese from the early past to the present by successive time frames. Central to this analysis is the triangular relation of American images of Germany and Japan. At this middle level, the function of "mediator" of culture is served, for the level is between the generations of the North American people.

BOX 1 Triangulation of Images of Japan



One could very well make observations solely based on the orientation film to Japan. However, expanding that to include images of Germany might serve to anchor those made for the Japanese. Then, comparing these images with much earlier historical images, as well as with those of the present day, ought to provide confidence in the observations made.

The contemporary cartoon series is useful also because it may balance an abnormal condition such as a military occupation. And though the two military films may have come from turbulent times, they actually have much merit in their own right. Reasons for that will soon become clear below. Finally, the films studied, including the children's cartoons, are readily available; thus the findings herein can be verified.

Historical Evidence for the Schema

Japan has characteristically been viewed as the “mysterious Orient” (Moeran 1990; Morsbach 1980; Wilkinson 1983), and this view can be traced back to the very first European contacts with Japan in the sixteenth century (Wilkinson 1981; 1983). “Japan is in the furthest East, indeed in the earliest [Western] literature it was actually thought to be the Antipodes. [Westerners] never tired of writing that in Japan everything was antipodal, topsy-turvy and back to front” (Wilkinson 1983: 32). As the culture was topsy-turvy, so were its people: “‘Nobody can understand them.’ That is the complaint that has echoed through the centuries” (Statler 1984: 12). These two views--mysteriousness of the culture and inscrutableness of its people--have operated in tandem ever since. Because such images of the Japanese have a long history, and for other reasons that will become apparent, I attempt to frame such phenomena in terms of a group schema--the “mysterious Orient(al).”

The mysterious Orient(al) arises from a set of beliefs or group schema (van Dijk 1984) that forms a basis for Western culture-bearers to perceive and understand those of Asian origin, particularly those from China or Japan. What makes this view more like a schema than an isolated attitude is the propensity of Westerners to apply a common set of images to China, Japan, and “Asia” (Cobb 1990; Johnson 1988; Wilkinson 1983).

Johnson (1988) finds that China and Japan, over the past century, have had to alternate favored status in American popular imagination, and in so doing have had to trade off common images as well. This “seesaw correlation of American attitudes toward Japan and China--when one is up the other is down--[seems to be a reaction] to something Asian, something different from ourselves, and that the particular coloration we attach to a given country is dictated by current political considerations or events of recent past” (Johnson 1988: 12).

Schema transfer (van Dijk 1984) suggests why such images remain so impervious to change: “even without *any* information about a group, people may already start building an attitude about them” (van Dijk 1984: 24; author’s emphasis). Hence, schema transfer between old and new outgroups appears mutually reinforcing and may well sustain even the most outdated of notions.

“But certainly not about the Japanese,” one might say. “I buy nothing but Japanese and think the best of them.” Japanese consumer goods have so won our admiration, that the mysterious Orient(al) seems passé. How mistaken it would be to think so. The mysterious Orient(al) lives on in the American collective consciousness if judged by characterizations of the Japanese found in the American media and other sources.

Significance of the Orientation Films

Although war material has its limitations, the orientation films are an exception for several reasons. First, the war was already over. In fact, the atomic bombing of Japan induced “many Americans to feel sorrow and pity for Japan,” resulting in “many of [the war-time images of the Japanese being] superseded by a new image of a mushroom-shaped cloud” (Garten 1992: 68-69).

Second, the film scripts were a collaborative effort of numerous people, many of whom came from the American intellectual elite. Their names read like a veritable who’s who of American letters and theatre: including Lillian Hellman, William Saroyan, John Huston, John Cheever, Robert Heller, James Hilton, Ben Hecht, Irwin Shaw, Irving Wallace, Janet Flanner, Gene Fowler, and so on (McBride 1992). The films were produced under the supervision of Frank Capra, the leading director of American film at the time, and were directed and co-written by none other than Dr. Seuss (Theodore Geisel), the famed children’s literatus (MacDonald 1988; McBride 1992). The two films, then, were not products of one person’s mind but of many from among the finest in America.

Furthermore, comparing the two films themselves offers us a key to America’s view of two former enemies, and may open the door to deep-seated beliefs whether in war or peace. Put another way, comparing the films ought to strike a balance, so that relative inflation of national characteristics of the other, if any, may suggest a historical bias. Put still another way, if American attitudes are relatively stronger toward one over the other, then that difference might be intrinsic to American images of those cultures.

Orientation Films to Germany and Japan: A Comparative Analysis

Your Job in Germany and *Our Job in Japan* (United States Army Pictorial Service 1945; 1946), two postwar films produced for the training of American occupation forces in Germany and Japan, were examined for content. I transcribed both films; transcriptions appear in the appendix of this paper.

Note that this comparison seems ideal: for one, the different scripts (Germany and Japan) were produced by the same authors and filmmakers (principally Capra and "Dr. Seuss" Geisel); two, they were intended for the same audience (Army GIs); three, they served the same general purpose (orientation training); and lastly, they are from the same time frame (close of the war) and have the same objective (occupation of a former enemy nation). Analysis of the films reveals three significant features: the fundamental attribution error; a double standard in favor of Germany; and inscrutable imaging of the Japanese.

The Fundamental Attribution Error

"The tendency to underestimate situational factors when observing others is so pervasive that it has been called the 'fundamental attribution error'" (Ross 1977; as quoted by Brislin 1981: 93). In other words, individuals apply situational knowledge to their own behavior that they deny in judging others (Brislin 1981). Put another way, individuals tend to use a double standard in favor of themselves. So if Sally finds her beau late for a date, Sally might explain his action by a trait (e.g., irresponsible; inconsiderate, etc.), but if the tables were turned, she would probably explain herself by a situation (e.g., traffic; work schedule, etc.).

Attribution of the German and Japanese Problem

Interestingly, the training films assign different causation to Germany and Japan for World War II: in Germany's case, to a situation--its history; in Japan's, a character trait--its mindlessness. Consider the following film excerpts:

The German Problem : You are up against German history. It isn't good. This book was written chapter by chapter. Not by one man.

Not by one fuhrer. It was written by the German people. . . . And Chapter Four [German warfare] could be. It can happen again. The next war--that is why you occupy Germany.

The Japanese Problem : Our problem's in the brain inside of the Japanese head. . . . the Japanese brain bought a big bill of goods. It bought just exactly what the warlords wanted. . . . That same brain today remains the problem. Our problem. . . . But we are determined that this fact will finally sink in: This is Japan's last war. . . . We're here to make it clear that, the Japanese brain that we've had enough . . . that their time has now come to make sense, modern civilized sense. That is our job in Japan."

As harsh as the German film may be, the Japanese film appears even harsher.

Despite the tragic Holocaust, a fact known to the Allies by virtue of having included footage of actual German concentration camps, *Your Job in Germany* avoids statements about the people's psyche or personality that the Japan film seems to make. There seems a qualitative difference between assigning the cause of war between a people's history and their brain. And on this point, the latter is a harsher condemnation than the former. Hardly anything could be more intrinsic to a person than the brain.

In effect, some degree of sympathy is held toward the Germans by avoiding the ultimate step of condemnation--deducing the other's psyche to be abnormal. The act of sympathy itself is reflexive--Germany is a West European nation and therefore similar in race and culture with mainstream America. And that may also explain the different titles. *Our Job* suggests the American elite will be working along side the GIs in Japan as opposed to what *Your Job* implies. Even if Germany has a history of "conquest disease," Japan was apparently seen as a harder nut to crack. Hence the difference in titles suggests that the elites were more needed in Japan. Unfortunately, the portrayal of Japan in *Our Job in Japan* seems to hark back to prewar images of Japanese mysteriousness and inscrutability.

1. Attribution of a Japanese Trait

As noted, the film on Japan states that the problem is *in the brain inside of the Japanese head* . The film emphasizes an interior metaphor: One hardly

needs to be reminded of the brain's location. Yet, that message is repeated so much that the film seems to commit the same offense that it suggests the Japanese militarists committed against their own citizens--unnecessary drilling. The film frequently reduces the Japanese to a collective bodily organ, the brain. (Japanese *mind* is used only once; brain [or its derivative], 27 times.) By contrast, the film on Germany hardly does either. The German film neither drills the viewers (GIs), nor does it dehumanize the German people to the extent that the Japan film does. A count of the imagery (Japanese *brain* vs. German *hand*) reveals that the Japanese film relied upon it three times more than the German film did.

In brief, there are several reasons for claiming that the film on Japan assigns the cause of the war to a Japanese trait rather than to a situation. First, when considering the difference between trait and situation, the former is mainly internal and the latter, external. For example, the Japanese brain resides inside the body; whereas the German hand, outside (how these people were dehumanized in the respective films). And not surprisingly, the language of the Japan film uses a container metaphor, the brain, and related spatial metaphors: *in the brain inside of the Japanese head; put inside [the brain]; hammer in; sink in; hammer out; think out of*.

Second, the brain or mind is the seat of intelligence as well as other human characteristics. Without a brain one could not act in human fashion. In the film on Japan, the Japanese are characterized as following their leaders blindly: mindless (or brainless whatever the case may be). Furthermore, the viewer is told that Japan is a backward, superstitious country having a murky past and following a mumbo-jumbo religion. In sum, the choice of body part (brain), spatial metaphors, the characterization (mindless), and the description of Japanese culture all refer to a *perceived* trait.

2. Attribution of a German Situation

In contrast, the war with Germany seems to be attributed by the film to a cause external to individual German behavior: history. And indeed German history is later visualized as a book, an outside object. Although the film does speak of a "German conquest disease" and a "lust for conquest," these are more like states than traits. (Webster's refers to disease as a "harmful condition.")

Responsibility for one's actions may differ according to whether induced by a state or trait. States are more easily induced by outside forces and are relatively transitory. Thus German history was the "outside force" inducing a state or disease for conquest. Yet, states are transitory and changeable; traits are more characteristic of one's self, permanent and immutable. And this difference between state and trait corresponds to the perceived relative difficulty of occupying the two nations as implied by the films' respective titles, a point made earlier. Consequently, Japan, having been trait attributed, carries more responsibility for war than Germany, a matter discussed next.

3. Relief of German Responsibility for War

Regardless of however negative the image of Germans might be in the related film, compared to the Japanese, Germans seemed to have been relieved of some responsibility for the Second World War. If, as one has seen, the phrasing of who is responsible for this war raises the issue of history, it is little surprising that the cause of war shifts from the German people to their situation. It is almost as if the Germans could not help themselves.

And indeed, the two films appear to arouse different conclusions as to Japan's and Germany's potential for making war again. The film on Japan emphatically states that "this is Japan's last war." But the film on Germany does not. Instead, it ambiguously seems to allow for that country to take up arms again:

And Chapter Four [warfare] could be. It can happen again. The next war--that is why you occupy Germany. To make that next war impossible--no easy job. . . . We are determined that the vicious German cycle of war . . . shall . . . come to an end.

On the subject of propaganda and oppression, Germany again seems to receive favor. Although the film on Germany states that propaganda in Germany "produced the worst educational crime in the entire history of the world," it is the Japanese who are shown as becoming muddleheaded. When one considers the awesome tragedy inflicted on the Jews and others in the Nazi concentration camps--all aided and abetted by German citizenry--

one must wonder why the film on Germany did not wax clinic and pathologic on the German brain as was the case for the Japanese.

In brief, both countries are seen to be intrinsically warlike but for different reasons. For Japan, its warfare arises from a trait of the Japanese; for Germany, a situation of the nation. In effect, for the Japanese this means that "you can take Kenji out of the jungle, but you cannot take the jungle out of Kenji." According to the logic, the perceived trait required placing Japanese Americans into internment camps during War World II but not ethnic Germans. Germans were only dangerous in the situation of being in their German motherland; otherwise, they too would have been interned like Japanese Americans. German Americans were able to keep some respect even if they were attacked in certain communities in the United States at the time.

Compensating for the Germans in this way was a matter of course: Germany was an "old club member" of the West. And that membership bestowed certain prerogatives, including warfare. Consequently, the occupation of Japan required special attention by American elites (*Our Job* vs. *Your Job*) and more determination to deter war from an upstart.

4. Reflecting the Past in Current Trade Frictions

This differential treatment of the two films seems to parallel different responses to economic competition from Japan and Germany. During threat of a "trade war" in the 1980s, both countries bought up American assets and enjoyed a large trade surplus. Yet American wrath was vented almost exclusively on Japan. How can one account for this differential treatment?

Theodore White, the Pulitzer Prize author, may provide an answer. In reference to trade frictions, he tersely points out that "[t]he Germans, somehow, evoke little American bitterness because we understand their culture" (1985: 38). And White, forty years after the war's end, echoes what was suggested above about the trait attribution of Japan. Recalling his own presence at the Japanese peace-signing in 1945, he takes up trait attribution when he writes that Americans in general viewed Japanese like "all Orientals, as errant little brown brothers who must be rebuked, but then brought into Western civilization" (*ibid.*: 20).

War fever and the times contributed to such views, of course. The fact remains, however, that the Germans seemed to be treated relatively less harshly than the Japanese. No matter how one feels about the films' perspective, it is not difficult to show that the American filmmakers succumbed to subjectivity, if not irrationality, when it came to the Japanese. Qualities, in fact, they resoundingly faulted in *Our Job in Japan*. It becomes important, therefore, for Americans to recognize their own ambivalent attitudes toward Japan.

The task, then, is to be vigilant in monitoring such attitudes so as to control their related behavior if need be. This recognition of ambivalence toward Japan, then, can lead one to a broader critique of culture and, in so doing, will underscore the value of the present research. To complete this discussion, inscrutable imaging of the Japanese will be shown realized in a contemporary example next.

Unmasking the Mysterious Orient(al) Schema

The children's cartoon *Mask* (DIC Enterprises 1985) was chosen as a contemporary example of the mysterious Orient(al) schema because

Comics, children's literature, and textbooks play an important role within the wider context of processes of socialization (Katz 1976). They help to transmit the general cultural beliefs that have been accumulated during our colonial histories. And the media provide the more specific picture about the current ethnic situation, defining the topics of concern and the overall negative evaluation of minorities in our society (Husband 1982). (quoted by van Dijk 1984: 10)

Children are vulnerable to such material because they are impressionable and naive. Thus cartoons and the like merit special attention in this regard.

Mask is a cartoon series about a team of anti-terrorist fighters and their exploits. One member of the team is a Japanese named Bruce Sato. Six episodes, approximately thirty minutes in length each, were examined to note how this Japanese was portrayed.² It was found that in nearly half of the situations in which Bruce Sato appears, his associates complain that he does not make sense.

Although he seems to be living in North America, Bruce is identifiable as a Japanese national for the following reasons:

1. Bruce Sato has a foreign accent in English.
2. Sato is a common Japanese family name comparable to Smith or Jones in English.
3. Japan is a setting for one of the cartoons in which he states how it brings back memories of his ancestral home.

Bruce Sato speaks flawless English, yet he still miscommunicates. Indeed, this is typical behavior for him. In fact, this is made abundantly clear in his first line spoken in the series, an utterance that causes another character to say: "There he goes again . . . not making any sense." Moreover, similar reactions are heard throughout the sampled cartoons. Let us consider some:

- Hey Bruce, I almost understood that. Huh, must be something wrong with me.
- What in thunder is he talking about?
- Ah gee, Bruce, can't you ever give us a break?

His problem is neither linguistic nor phonological but rather intentional: Bruce Sato simply talks in riddles--proverbs--and does not bother to explain the import of his utterances. Obviously, his character is meant to be enigmatic and echoes a long tradition of Western views of Japan discussed earlier in this paper.

The concern here is that *Mask* is targeted for children. Because Bruce Sato's proverbs are uncommon, likely to strike the adult as odd or foreign, their comprehension requires analysis. However, children are likely to be unsophisticated about proverbs and fail to perform such analysis. Even for adults, time constraints may prevent it. Thus, Bruce Sato may seem especially circuitous in thought and thereby reinforcing the image of Japanese as enigma. Thus, too, this cartoon illustrates both the continuity

and substance of a North American/Western culture myth about Japanese communication style being incomprehensible, circular or both.

In my many years of intimacy with the Japanese, I have never met one who spoke in riddles. Yes, speech behavior in Japanese and English can be quite different, but I wonder if characterizing Japanese speech as "circular" does more harm than good. First, Japanese behavior is highly situational: One can readily see this with use of *keigo*, highly stylized levels of the language tailored to fit perceived social differences between interactants. In other words, perceived circularity may relate to situational behavior more than inherent "Japaneseness." Second, "circular" as applied is poorly if ever defined. Third, the term is not neutral: Circular speech or thought often has a pejorative sense in English. Consequently, specialists in intercultural communication ought to rethink the utility of using a term that already possesses negative nuances. Such terms could unwittingly reinforce extreme caricature as that found in the cartoon series *Mask*.

Conclusion

In regard to the Japanese, one persistent trait attributed to them is inscrutability, an image held in the West since the earliest contacts with Japan in the sixteenth century. The persistence of this image was explained through the concept of cultural or group schema, a system of beliefs motivated by favor of the ingroup. Group schema may tend to increase the prevalence of the fundamental attribution error. This error in perception was illustrated by a comparative analysis of two training films made for the military occupation of Germany and Japan. These films differed essentially in assigning the cause of the Second World War to a German situation (history) but to a Japanese trait (mindlessness or irrationality). Having been trait-attributed in this way, Japanese Americans were placed in internment camps as a matter of course. Enculturation of the inscrutability image in contemporary North America was suggested in an analysis of a children's cartoon's portrayal of a Japanese character.

Communication specialists realize that interpersonal communication hardly ever begins with a clean slate. That the indexing of interlocutors into sociocultural categories occurs as a function of language has long been known by linguists. A host of prior images and beliefs about the other may impinge and possibly interfere even to the chagrin of the parties involved.

Identifying such images and beliefs enshrined by the mysterious Orient(al) schema may be a step toward improving intercultural communication between Japanese and North Americans. It is hoped that this paper stimulates Japanese researchers to identify related Japanese images of North Americans and others. After all, the landmark study of Bronfenbrenner (1961) suggests that "the other group often holds very similar stereotypes, indeed they often form mirror-images" (Argyle 1992: 173). Illuminating our mutual images might help remove the cultural shadows that linger from the past.

APPENDIX 1

Your job in Germany Transcription ⁴

The problem now is future peace. That is your job in Germany. By your conduct and attitude while on guard inside Germany, you can lay the groundwork of a peace that could last forever. Or just the opposite. You could lay the groundwork for a new war to come. And just as American soldiers had to do this job twenty-six years ago, so other American soldiers--your sons--might have to do it again another twenty-odd years from now.

Germany today appears to be beaten. Hitler out. Swastikas gone. Nazi propaganda off the air. Concentration camps empty. You'll see ruins. You'll see flowers. You'll see some mighty pretty scenery. Don't let it fool you. You are in enemy country. Be alert--suspicious of everyone. Take no chances. You are up against something more than tourist scenery. You are up against German history.

It isn't good. This book was written chapter by chapter. Not by one man. Not by one fuhrer. It was written by the German people.

Chapter one--the fuhrer: Bismarck. The title: Blood and Iron. The armies: German. Under the Prussian Bismarck the German empire was built. The German states combined, serving notice to all that their religion was iron, that their god was blood. Bismarck's German empire built itself by war--at the expense of Denmark, Austria, and France. And became in 1871 the mightiest military power in all Europe.

Enough conquest for awhile. Time out to digest it. Europe relaxes. The danger's over. Nice country--Germany. Tender people--the Germans. And very sweet music indeed.

Chapter two, a new fuhrer--Kaiser Wilhelm. New title: *Deutschland Über Alles*, Germany Over All. And the same tender German people smacked us with their World War I against Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Italy, Britain, and the United States of America. It took all of us to do it, but we finally knocked that fuhrer out. Defeated the German armies, second chapter ended.

We marched straight into Germany and said, "Why, these people are okay. It was just that kaiser we had to get rid of. You know, this is really *some* country. When it comes to culture--they lead the whole world." We bit. We poured in our sympathy. We pulled out our armies. And they flung Chapter Three in our faces.

Fuhrer number three. Slogan number three: Today Germany is ours--tomorrow, the whole world. And the tender, repentant, sorry German people carried the torch of their culture to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, England, Norway, Holland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Russia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the United States of America.

Over the shattered homes, over the broken bodies of millions of people who had let down their guard. We almost lost this one. It took everything we had. Measure the cost in money? There isn't that much money. Measure the cost in lives? We can only guess at that figure. It took burning and scalding ; drenching , freezing. It took legs, fingers, arms, and it took them by the millions. It cost hours, days and years that will never return. We threw in our help, our wealth, our past and our future. It took every last ounce of our courage and guts. Now what happens?

"Ah hell, this is where we came in." Yeah, this is where we came in. "And Chapter Four?" Could be. It can happen again. The next war--that is why you occupy Germany. To make that next war impossible--no easy job. In battle you kept your wits about ya. Don't relax that caution now. The Nazi party may be gone, but Nazi thinking, Nazi training, and Nazi trickery remain. The German lust for conquest is not dead. It's merely gone undercover.

Somewhere in this Germany are the SS guards, *Sturmabteilung* , the Gestapo gangsters. Out of uniform you won't know them. But they'll know you. Somewhere in this Germany are storm troopers by the thousands. Out of sight, part of the mob but still watching you and hating you. Somewhere in this Germany there are two million ex-Nazi officials--out of power but still in there. And thinking--thinking about next time. Remember that only yesterday every business, every profession was part of Hitler's system--the doctors, technicians, clockmakers, postmen, farmers, housekeepers, toy makers, barbers, cooks, dock workers--practically every German was part of the Nazi network.

Guard particularly against this group. These are the most dangerous--German youth. Children when the Nazi party came into power, they know no other system than the one that poisoned their minds. They're soaked in it. Trained to win by cheating. Trained to pick on the weak. They've read no free speech. Read no free press. They were brought up on straight propaganda. Products of the worst educational crime in the entire history of the world. Practically everything that you believe in, they have been

trained to hate and destroy. They believe they were born to be masters; that we are inferiors, designed to be their slaves. They may deny it now, but they believe it. And will try to prove it again.

Don't argue with them. Don't try to change their point of view. Other Allied representatives will concern themselves with that. You are not being sent into Germany as educators. You are soldiers on guard. You will observe their local laws. Respect their customs and religion. And you will respect their property rights. You will not ridicule them. You will not argue with them. You will not be friendly. You will be aloof, watchful, and suspicious.

Every German is a potential source of trouble. Therefore, there must be no fraternization with any of the German people. Fraternization means making friends. The German people are not our friends. You will not associate with German men, women, or children. You will not associate with them on familiar terms either in public or in private. You will not visit in their homes. Nor will you ever take them into your confidence. However friendly, however sorry, however sick of the Nazi party they may seem, they cannot come back into the civilized fold just by sticking out their hand and saying, 'I'm sorry.' Sorry! Not sorry they caused the war, they're only sorry they lost it.

That is the hand that *heil*-ed Adolph Hitler. That is the hand that dropped the bombs on defenseless Rotterdam, Brussels, Belgrade. That is the hand that destroyed the cities, villages, and homes of Russia. That is the hand that held the whip over the Polish, Yugoslav, French, and Norwegian slaves. That is the hand that took their food; that is the hand that starved them. That is the hand that murdered, massacred Greeks, Czechs, Jews. That is the hand that killed and crippled American soldiers, sailors, marines. Don't clasp that hand. It's not the kind of a hand you can clasp in friendship.

"But there're millions of Germans. Some of those guys must be okay." Perhaps. But which ones? Just one mistake may cost you your life. Trust none of them. Someday the German people might be cured of their disease-the super-race disease. The world conquest disease. But they must prove that they have been cured beyond the shadow of a doubt before they ever again are allowed to take their place among respectable nations.

Until that day, we stand guard. We are determined that their plan for world conquest shall stop here and now. We are determined that they shall

never again use peaceful industries for warlike purposes. We are determined that our children shall never face this German terror. We are determined that the vicious German cycle of war--phony peace; war--phony peace; war--phony peace shall once and for all time come to an end. That is your job in Germany. [end]

APPENDIX 2

Our Job in Japan Transcription⁴

"It's my earnest hope and indeed the hope of all mankind that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past. I now invite the representatives of the emperor of Japan and the Japanese government and the Japanese imperial general headquarters to sign the instrument of surrender at the places indicated."

The end of the war. The beginning of another peace, peace if we can solve the problem of 70 million Japanese people. Here's where we clinch our victory or we muff it. Here's our job in Japan.

What does a conquering army do with 70 million people? What does a conquering army do with a family of the Japanese soldier; fathers, brothers, mothers, cousins of the soldiers? What do we do with the soldiers themselves back now in civilian clothes as part of the Japanese family? What to do with these people? People trained to play follow the leader. People trained to follow blindly wherever their leaders led them. People who are led into waging a war so disgusting, so revolting, so obscene that it turned the stomach of the entire civilized world.

What do we do with the Japanese people when the military leaders they followed are gone? They can still make trouble. Or they can make sense. We have decided to make sure they make sense. And that job starts here. Our problem's in the brain inside of the Japanese head. There are 70 million of these in Japan. Physically no different than any other brains in the world. Actually all made of exactly the same stuff as ours. These brains, like our brains, can do good things or bad things, all depending on the kind of ideas that are put inside.

This kid starts life with the same brain as any other kid. None of them was ever born with a dangerous idea. No child ever said as his very first words, "Me, I can lick the whole cock-eyed world." Ideas are taught to a child as he grows older. Teach him the good things, and he learns the good

things. When he's taught playful ideas, his brain understands. Practical ideas, his brain knows how to use them. Artistic ideas, his brain can enjoy them. When he's taught geometry, geography, or geology he learns them. He can understand chemistry, architecture, engineering, law, any sensible idea, any modern idea.

The Japanese brain, like our brain, can learn when it is taught. And it was beginning to learn these things in an old backward superstitious country. While living in this setting, while living in a backward world, while still being taught the old time stuff the Japanese brain was starting to learn the new. And it might have made sense except for one thing. This group had plans, plans for themselves, and plans for the Japanese brain. With such a brain, with its mixture of ancient and modern, some very interesting things could be done.

A brain of thought in the modern way could be taught to use the latest modern weapons. A brain that also taught in the ancient way could be hopped up to fight with fanatical fury. If these men could hop it up then the sky would be the limit to the things that they could do. They gained power, glory in a great new worldwide empire that they could control as their own if they were smart enough to do tricks with the Japanese brain. They were smart enough. They did it in a very roundabout way through religion.

Shinto--just one of several Japanese religions--an old religion out of date, harmless. It had once been the official religion of Japan. But now a tired religion just lingering along with its dim, hazy almost forgotten gods. A perfect set up for the war lords to move in on. This was the place they would use to hop up the Japanese brain. This religion would become the mouthpiece for the military gang. They make Shinto the official religion again. They took Shinto over. They made it a place where the people had to listen. They filled up the Shinto religion with hokum and used it to sell the Japanese people war. Sell the people ancient nightmares. Sell the people ancient hatred. Play up the bloody fairy tales and pagan superstitions. Up from Japan's murky past bring back the mumbo-jumbo.

Steam up the emotions of the modern Japanese that was the warlords' business. Muddle the modern Japanese mind; hammer the ancient stuff in. Up from the barbarous bygone ages bring back the ancient Japanese gods of war. Tell them of the glory of the samurai knights of old. Tell them that the soldiers of yesterday are the Japanese gods of today. Tell them that a

Japanese warrior never dies. Play up the myth of the goddess of the sun. And over and over and over again keep on telling them and telling them and telling them just this: The sun goddess created the Japanese to rule all the other people of the earth. Tell them not to figure it out. Just tell them the sun goddess wants them to believe it. This is her family. Her family of warrior gods. All one sacred family created to rule the whole world. Created to rule the whole world. Make him bow, make him say it; make her bow, make her say it; Make them bow, make them say it. Everybody bow, everybody say it: Created to rule the whole world. When they have bowed enough, when they have said it enough, when they have heard it enough, they'll begin to believe it. Tell it to the school kids. Tell it to the bank clerks. Tell it to the farmers. Then start to drill the school kids. Drill the bank clerks. Drill the farmers. Tell them that they too are like the ancient samurai. Warriors of today, they will be the gods of tomorrow.

And the Japanese brain bought a big bill of goods. It bought just exactly what the warlords wanted. Modern ideas and ancient ideas both at the selfsame time. Fanatically convinced that the Japanese family was especially created for one single purpose: to crush, to conquer, and to rule like gods over all the other people of the earth. And they tried it.

We had miles of it. We had years of it. Dirty, stinking, heart-breaking years of it. All because of one idea that was sold to the Japanese brain. That same brain today remains the problem. Our problem. It will cost us time. It will cost us patience. But we are determined that this fact will finally sink in: This is Japan's last war.

And we're starting to prove that point by completely destroying their power to make war. There will be no more Japanese war factories. There will be no more Japanese warlords. No more Japanese warships. No more Japanese warplanes. But that is the easiest part of our job. Getting rid of their war machine is one thing. But it will take a lot longer to get rid of their idea.

This idea has been hammered into these people's heads. The United States Army can't hammer it out. They and only they can do that for themselves. They and only they can think their way out of this stuff. Our job is to see that they do it. Our job is to watch them while they do it--to watch them for tricks, to slap down any who try to pull tricks. But the honest ones, the sincere ones, the ones who really want to make sense are being given every opportunity they need.

At the same time, these people, these honest ones are looking to us to help them prove that our idea is better than the Japanese idea. These people are going to judge America and all Americans by us. That means we've got another job to do. That job is to be ourselves. By being ourselves we can prove that what we like to call the American way or democracy or just plain old golden rule common sense is a pretty good way to live. We can prove that most Americans don't believe in pushing people around even when we happen to be on top. We can prove that most Americans do believe in a fair break for everybody regardless of race or creed or color.

We can show that most Americans believe that religion is a matter of a man's own conscience and not something to be used for a political shakedown or to make trouble or to start wars. And by being ourselves we can show them that though we are normally an easy-going people, a people who like a good time as well as the next man, maybe even a little more than the next man - just the same, we know what the score is -- because we do.

We're kicking out the criminals who spike their religion with propaganda, the big shots who never again boss Japanese thinking through Shinto. We're telling these people they're free now, free of the jailers who threw their honest thinkers in prison. Free of the thought police who kept them from learning the truth. Now if they want to read the truth, the truth at last is here for them to read.

Now if they want to speak the truth there will be no one around to stop them. Now if they want to hear the truth there'll be plenty of truth to hear. When they have read enough truth, when they have heard enough truth, when they have enough firsthand experience with the truth, they will be able to lead their own lives. Let them think for themselves, talk for themselves, and educate themselves. Let them start to solve their own problems.

This is what their old leaders brought them. Let them develop and follow new leaders. Let them set up whatever form of government they choose provided it's a form of government that we know will work for peace. We're sticking around until they've shown us, convinced us, that they've got themselves under control. We're sticking around because we take no more chances.

We took our big chance with the Japanese. We took a chance that the waters of a ocean would protect us. We bet that 6,000 miles of ocean

could hold back a dangerous idea. We lost that bet. That bet has been paid by almost every family in America today. That bet has been paid by Springfield, Massachusetts; Montgomery, Alabama; West Field; Middletown; Dallas; Nashville, Tennessee.

Remember that ocean is no protection. Remember why we are here. We're here to make it clear to the Japanese that we're not the kind of people who forgets such things over night. We're here to make it clear that the Japanese brain that we've had enough of this bloody barbaric business to last us from here on in. We're here to make it clear to the Japanese that their time has now come to make sense, modern civilized sense. That is our job in Japan. [end]

* *This is an expanded version of a paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Cross-Cultural Communication, Institute for Cross-Cultural Research, San Antonio, Texas, March 1993.*

Notes

1. van Dijk is criticized for his discourse analysis by Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994) in their book *The Racism of Psychology* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf). Although this issue appears removed from my present application of van Dijk's work, their criticism warrants comment nonetheless. The most relevant of their criticism appears to be: 1. van Dijk neglects to define racism; and 2. he appears to study racist language that seems too obvious.

Space severely limits commentary. Suffice it to say that despite the importance of dealing with racism, Howitt and Owusu-Bempah can be faulted in the same way as they fault van Dijk: They neither define racism nor psychology--central terms of their thesis. Racism is an example conspicuously absent in the subject index of their book, for example. One becomes hard pressed to find where the same authors give their own guiding definition.

Psychology is a vast field. Consequently, one continually wonders exactly what subfields are concerned--clinical? counseling? social? developmental? industrial? cross-cultural?--to name a few.

Or is the whole of psychology involved?--an enormous undertaking for one book.

Moreover, one might ask, as they similarly do about van Dijk's work, what criteria are used to determine the racism *of*, rather than *in*, psychology? This question is never answered. This might explain why a non-psychologist (van Dijk) receives such scrutiny. But the focus by a linguist on "obvious" racist language ought not to be too surprising. Howitt and Owusu-Bempah's book does have its merits, but their interpretation of van Dijk's approach is not the whole story.

2. *Mask* was originally co-produced in Canada and France and was aired on American television. The six episodes studied appearing volumes 1, 2, and 4 of the video series, the total number of episodes for those volumes. These volumes were chosen solely because of convenience of availability.
3. Any suggested causal link between the film and internment is unintended, of course. (The film came much later.) Rather, the concern is with an apparent logic common to both--misattribution of Japanese traits.
4. The transcription consists of the film's narration. Phonological features were ignored except for the contractions and occasional speech reductions, such as /y/ for you. In such cases, informal convention was applied (e.g. ya for /y/). Finally, pauses in speech were problematic, for they did not always coincide with the sense of the formal sentence. Such pauses were treated in this transcription as "sentence" stops and left to stand. This treatment hoped to provide some of the rhetorical sense of the film.

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